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Abstract*
The problem of the thesis is the relationship of 
caste, or caste systems, to forms of political organisation, 
before the bureaucratic centralisation of the British had 
made caste politically irrelevant in formal terms* Anthro­
pological studies of caste indicate that there was a multi­
plicity of chiefs usually belonging to one caste, spread 
over a region, and having relatively intense political 
interaction with each other*
Two traditional systems are examined in detail*
These are Kerala up to 1792 and Punjab up to 1848* Both 
systems have a social stratification into castes* Kerala 
has the typical Hindu caste system, polarised in terms of 
purity and pollution between Brahmins and Untouchables* It 
was relatively independent of external political opposition 
till 1792* Punjab, subject to greater political flux, also 
has a stratification into castes, but the bases of stratifica­
tion are not so clearly formulated in terras of purity and 
pollution, and there is a significant development of a sect - 
the Sikhs - who denied stratification into castes. Such 
denial served a purpose in organising the system against 
external political opposition - from the Muslims - but did 
not successfully abolish such stratification.
In both systems, there existed a political system
3characterised by the dispersal of power among chiefs of 
one or two castes who interacted closely with each other 
in relationships of conflict or alliance. Various factors 
contributed to the containment of conflict among the segeral 
competing chiefs. Competition for power was confined to 
the chiefs. It never occurred between social strata.
The system of dispersal of power gave way to a 
politically centralised system in South Kerala from 1729 
and in Punjab from 1790. In both cases, one of the competing 
chiefs annihilated and absorbed rival chiefs. A small 
initial advantage in resources was strengthened by them by 
the use of mercenary armies and a salaried administrative 
cadre, instead of the hereditary warriors and hereditary 
officials characteristically used by the chiefs in the older 
system.
The local centralisation in the two regions failed 
to displace the earlier system, as did the pre-Islamic Hindu 
empires with their wider centralisation. In every case, the 
caste stratification persisted. Caste stratification, where 
it provides the only system of ranking, is incompatible with 
centralisation. Pactionalisation or dispersal of power is 
its necessary political concomitant.
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gForeword*
The study of literate societies by anthropologists 
opens up new possibilities of research# Written records 
add a dimension to the analysis of contemporary societies. 
Where they date to the past, they provide material for the 
reconstruction of systems the knowledge of which cannot be 
acquired in any other way# Maurice Freedman underlined 
the fruitfulness of written materials in the study of 
inaccessible societies in the Malinowski lecture of 1963*
11A Chinese Phase in Social Anthropology#11 The contemp­
orary accessibility of Indian societies, be they villages 
or regions, has tended to encourage field research# Only 
one or two anthropologists have tried to analyse past 
Indian societies# There is however no anthropological 
monograph on a historical Indian society# Historical re­
search on India shows that the data is rich, especially on 
political events and persons# The study of political 
systems can be furthered enormously by the use of historical 
data# The present analysis of Kerala and Punjab during 
the period that they were independent political systems 
is an attempt at anthropological analysis of historical
Gmaterials.
Kerala and Punjab were selected for analysis on 
the assumption that they represented two extreme types 
of Indian society. It is generally known that caste 
stratification in Kerala was sharply polarised between 
Brahmins and Untouchables in terms of ritual purity and 
pollution. In Punjab on the other hand, untouchability 
is much less severe, Brahmins are not as sharply set off 
by ritual purity, and there is an overt, consistent 
sectarian development which set aside ritual criteria of 
stratification. Kerala and Punjab are thus assumed to be 
polar opposites which define all other Indian societies 
between them. Obviously, this can only be proved by 
further comparative studies of other regional societies 
of India.
The historical background of the two regions 
selected here supports the choice of these as radically 
opposed types. Kerala, between the ninth and eighteenth 
centuries, was not ruled by any outside power. Foreign 
influence and power was confined to commercial activity.
In the case of Punjab, there has been a constant influx 
of outside powers, even before the Muslim invasions, and
fPunjab was almost never independent before the eighteenth 
century. Kerala therefore was far less subject to 
political disruption than the Punjab. Whether in this 
respect as well they are extreme types of Indian societies 
again requires confirmation by further comparative analyses.
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Chapter I
IflTRODUOTION
In any anthropological research, certain assumptions 
are made of a general nature. These cannot always be proved 
empirically. But it is necessary to give reasons for 
holding these assumptions, if there is to be a strong 
foundation for the subsequent building of hypotheses. A 
basic assumption that may either precede or follow the 
selection of a problem is that the area of study - a certain 
territory, or a group of people - is a valid isolate, that 
it hangs together internally so as to form a system, and that 
it can be separated from other groups, or territories, with 
which it is physically contiguous and with which it may have 
a high degree of interaction.
The problem of the present thesis is the relationship 
between political organisation and caste stratification in 
the traditional period. I expand later on the terms caste, 
political organisation, and traditional. Before that, it 
is necessary to state the initial and basic assumption, made 
throughout, that linguistic regions in India are so many 
separate caste systems. This assumption, simple though it 
seems, is not universally accepted, especially by social 
anthropologists with field experience of caste. To the field 
worker, the study of interactions is paramount. He equates
the field of interactions with a social system, and denies 
any other basis for defining the outer boundaries of a social 
system. A caste system to him would be the group of villages 
among whom there is, or was, where modern communications have 
developed, effective interaction. Before the development of 
modern communications, interaction among the different parts, 
or tracts, of a linguistic region was extremely limited. It 
will be shown later that such interaction, though limited in 
the sense that it was relatively infrequent, and that it did 
not involve economic or political interdependence, occurred 
in crucial spheres, within an accepted framework of customary 
rules and values. These interactions linked the various 
parts of a linguistic region into a system. If we take the 
quality or the level of interaction rather than its quantity 
(that is, frequency), as our criterion, we shall find later 
that the assumption that a linguistic region is aidiscrete 
caste system, or society, is justified. The attempt to draw 
a boundary by starting from a small-scale unit, such as a 
village, and following up the range of interactions radiating 
outwards from it, is empirically acceptable, but may not 
further analysis. The frequency, rather than the nature of 
the interaction, would tend to be emphasised.
Common language does not necessarily entail cultural 
homogeneity. Here again, a field worker notices cultural 
heterogeneity, and may mark off culturally differentiated
areas within a linguistic region. Such cultural areas are 
accepted as the social system of which the villages being 
investigated are a part. Cultural heterogeneity indicates 
limited communication in the region, which in its turn 
accounts for localised interaction. But it does not mean 
that the local area is an isolated unit that can be fully 
studied without reference to any wider system. The larger 
region, sharing a language, is not merely a cultural region 
of which this unit is a part. The units interact with each 
other* The linguistic region is not a collection of 
culturally similar areas. It is a social system consisting 
of independent and territorially distinct units , held 
together by certain regular, recurrent interactions.
Obviously, whether one takes the local interactional, 
(or cultural) area as the unit of study, or one takes the 
wider area, depends on one’s interest. My contention is that 
the local unit is only theoretically an isolate, and that it 
cannot be fully understood unless its interactions, especially 
political interactions, with other local units in the same 
linguistic region are taken into account, a linguistic region 
however, can be studied without reference to other linguistic 
regions. Linguistic regions have clearly different caste
1. Gough, in Schneider and Gough, 1961, pp. 298-442.
systems. The number and size of castes, their occupations, 
their approximate rank in the hierarchy, differ without 
reference to each other. They do not differ within a common 
framework of reference. The local units within a linguistic 
region differ with reference to each other, especially where 
they are in direct contact. Political interaction between 
linguistic regions was not regular and recurrent. When it 
occurred, it took an unprecedented form, such as imperial 
domination of one by another. The history of ancient India 
is full of instances of this kind. The ancient Hindu 
emperors however did not obliterate the ruling groups of the 
regions they conquered. Rather, they tried to rule through, 
or over, the local ruling groups themselves. The later 
Islamic empires were more centralised than the ancient Hindu 
empires. They were, however, almost as unsuccessful in 
displacing local rulers, especially in outlying provinces. 
Local rulers suffered diminution of power and privileges, 
and were economically burdened by an obligation to provide 
tributes and armies for the emperor. But they were rarely 
deprived of their recognised offices and their territorial 
jurisdictions. The British domination followed an entirely 
different pattern. Local rulers were deprived of their 
traditional territories, though normally allowed to retain 
offices and, if they were docile, some estates. Those rulers 
who were not so deprived had to disband their armies and
submit to supervision. British rule, therefore, marks the 
watershed of political change in all the caste societies of 
India. Caste systems that passed through this mill (and all- 
of them, in India, did) never again regained their normal, 
or traditional, form. To a considerable extent, forms of 
political interaction characteristic of the traditional 
society persist till today, especially at the local level, 
in villages, or groups of villages. The basis of political 
sovereignty, however, has changed. Sovereignty resides 
formally in the Indian Union, and is backed by a corresponding 
form of government. The federated units are, at least 
theoretically, subject to a central government which has its 
own administration, and, more significantly, which controls 
the array and the ultimate sanction of force. Caste systems, 
the regional societies of India, are no longer the only, or 
even the most important arenas of political interaction, as 
they used to be. As linguistic regions, or states, they are 
formally recognised political units within a^much wider 
entity, the Indian State, As caste systems, they have no 
formal recognition at all.
The period prior to the British empire has been 
described above as traditional, and the political organisation 
of caste systems then prevalent is also called traditional.
The Islamic and the Hindu empires, however, also belong to 
this period. These were not coterminous with any caste
system nor with a linguistic region. They are therefore 
not included under the term 11 traditional political organisation”. 
On the other hand, they affected caste systems and their 
political organisation according to the power they exercised 
over them. Such systems can be said to be less typical of 
the traditional type, as defined above, than those relatively 
untouched by outside domination.
A traditional system, therefore, is one in which a 
linguistic region, having a recognised hierarchy of castes, 
is ruled by members of one or other of these castes. Such 
systems existed, with modifications, up to the eighteenth 
century. With the establishment of the British empire, and 
the complete dismantling of the political organisation which 
previously existed, the traditional political systems ceased 
to exist, though linguistic regions and caste systems persisted.
This brings us to the problem of the thesis, which is, 
the relation of caste, or caste systems, to forms of political 
organisation, before the bureaucratic centralisation of the 
British had made caste politically irrelevant in formal terms. 
What was the typical political organisation of the typical
traditional caste society? We have glimpses of an answer in
1 2 E.G. Bailey and Eric M i l l e r W e  have a more substantial
1. Bailey 196*0, 1963a.
2. Miller, 195^»
1 ?
if still insufficient indication in Bernard Cohn. In every 
case, we find a multiplicity of chiefs usually belonging to 
one caste, spread over a region, and having relatively intense 
political interaction with each other. Is this dispersal of 
power among several minor chiefs typical of a caste system, 
or was it an accidental occurrence in the particular systems 
studies? Is dispersal of power a direct result of limited 
communications? In which case, is a caste system and its
particular pattern of political interaction possible only
2
in a small scale society, as Bailey- contends?
In subsequent chapters, two traditional systems will 
be examined in detail, with special reference to political 
interaction within the systems; an attempt will be made to 
show that there is a necessary, or functional relation between 
the social system and the type of political organisation. 
However, neither one can be proved to be prior to the other. 
Also, other societies, without caste or caste-type stratifica­
tion, are known historically to have had a similar political 
organisation, that is, a severalty of chiefdoms, linked by 
close cultural and kinship ties. We need therfore to examine 
some of the terms that will be used in this analysis.
Our first major term, or concept, is caste. For
1. B.S. Cohn, 1959.
2. Bailey, 1963b, PP. 107-124.
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present purposes, it is unnecessary to weigh the controversy
whether caste is a universal sociological category, or whether
it is a cultural category that includes only Indian, or pan-
Indian societies. Even if we accept it as a sociologically
universal category, for the present we are concerned only
with what would then he its Indian sub-category.
In the past two decades of intensive field-work on
caste in India, innumerable facts have been put together,
and useful concepts been developed. But there has been far
less theorising than there was in the pre-empirical phase.
The only serious attempts in this direction have been made 
1
by Bailey whose main emphasis is still empirical. Because 
it is so, his explanation of caste is a careful one, sep-
2
arating out the several referents of the term as now used, 
and using caste in traditional Indian society as a baseline 
for his definition.
The first referent, caste as varna, is by now 
generally recognised as being only a formal model. It is 
not the system on the ground now, nor was it at any period 
except perhaps a very remote and unverifieble past. The 
three other referents discussed by Bailey are l) caste as cat­
egories, normally in a linguistic region, but not social
1. Bailey, 1963a, 1963b
2. Bailey, 1963b.
strata since, though they are exhaustive and exclusive, "they 
are not unambiguously groups"; 2) caste as associations, exc­
lusive but not exhaustive, since not all members of a caste 
join it. These are significant as new structural forms of caste 
3) caste as jati, which is 11 the main sociological referent".
I now quote fully Bailey’s discussion of caste as jati.
"In order to expound clearly the principles on which 
it (that is, caste as jati) is based, I must be permitted 
the gross oversimplification of 'traditional Indian society*. 
This society was divided into countless small political units, 
which I shall call 'blocks1, because they could be arranged 
and rearranged to make larger units. While the larger units 
were segmentary (in the sense that any feudal state is
2
segmentary, in particular in the sense used by Southall; ,
the blocks were organic, relatively stable, and relatively
indestructible. £lcck6 had these characteristics because
ritual, political and economic systems reinforced one
another and to some extent coincided, and because kinship
*
links did not cross the boundaries of the unit.
"Both these facts are aspects of the caste system, 
and each block itself constituted a caste system. The 
population of each block (call it a 'chiefdom') was divided
1. Ibid, p. 107.
S. 2. Bailey's (1963b) footnote: "Caste and Territory in 
Malabar", by E. Miller in American Anthropologist,
Vol. 56, 1954.
2 Bailey's (1^63b) footnote: "Alur Society", by Southall,
1953.
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vertically into villages or larger territorial sub-divisions,
 ^ 1and horizontally into castes”.
~ f I - ' . ” * . ' • ' * ‘ * ‘ *1 * V >  * = *•’ * ■'* * -J r  ’ * • '
This is a definition of the political structure as
much as of the caste system of traditional Indian societies.
Bailey repeats this definition in a discussion of social
change in Orissa, and I quote again, ’’The older type of caste
belongs, if one may put it that way, to a small-scale, non-
bureaucratic, political organization - the system operated
within a kingdom or chiefdom, where rule was personal and
relations more or less face-to-face. Kinship and caste
relations came to an end at political boundaries, and these
boundaries were culturally marked by differences in custom
between two castes which bore the same name. There is an
excellent analysis of this system in eighteenth century
Malabar by Miller (1954), one which is almost the ideal type
% )|0
of what I mean by the ‘‘older system.
Bailey’s last sentence is, unintentionally, a 
testimonial for the choice of Kerala as one of my areas of 
study. But, more seriously, his definition of caste 
underlines the multiplicity of political units, and their 
roughly symmetrical, segmentary political interactions. 
However, he overemphasizes the separateness of these political
1. Bailey, 1963b, p. 108.
2. Bailey, 1963a, p. 132.
1&
units. When he says there were marked cultural boundaries 
between such units, we must agree on the basis of several 
first hand accounts of these (e.g. Kathleen Gough on Kerala).^ 
But the need to be culturally demarcated from neighbours arose 
out of the need to identify the political unit, not because 
of absence of communication between units. Besides, such 
cultural differentiation was v internal to the linguistic 
region; it was a variation upon a theme. It is also 
significant to note that there was, and is, a similar cultural 
differentiation between different castes within any area, 
and that such cultural differentiation is not accidental.
Units were differentiated by direct reference to their 
immediate neighbours.
Bailey claims other, more tangible boundaries between 
units, notably, kinship. In fact, however, kinship links 
were not totally confined to the block, as we shall see in 
the Kerala analysis. The higher the caste, the more likely 
it was to have kinship ties with families of the same caste 
elsewhere[the linguistic region. (Bailey1s caste as category, 
see pp,ikrll) Such ties were occasionally affinal ties, though 
more often marriage tended to be hypergamous, strengthening 
the political block. More typically, these ties were
1. ed. Schneider and Gough, 1961. See page ^
created by dynastic adoptions which could be made only from 
the adopter’s caste. These may not have occurred very 
frequently, nor did they always entail political or other 
interaction. But they emphasised every now' and then the 
existence of a horizontal political layer. This layer had 
no corporate political functions. But all political positions, 
(that is, chiefs hips of varying importance), were held by 
families belonging to this layer. (in Kerala, the layer 
consisted roughly of three castes). Therefore I think it 
is reasonable to talk of a caste system co-terminous with 
a linguistic region. The block was essentially a political 
unit, and not, as Bailey says, itself a caste system.
Because the block was a political unit, its slice of the 
regional caste system tended to be marked off from neighbouring 
slices. In the absence of an administrative system to 
separate out the block from others, such marking off was 
effected by cultural differentiation and by hypergamy, and 
probably by local traditions, ritual observances, and so 
on.
We have then caste societies, or systems, most 
clearly demarcated by language (and kinship ties, whether 
cognatic or affinal, never crossed the linguistic boundary, 
except for the stray case of marriages forced by political 
domination from outside. In the latter case no continuing 
kinship relation as a result of the marriage was recognised).
On the other hand, we have a political organisation which 
specifically inhibits the development of a caste society 
into one political unit. There is a ruling caste - which 
is not in any sense an association - and all political 
sovereignty resides in members of this caste, again not 
collectively, but in so far as each has hereditary rights 
to a certain territorial jurisdiction, and to certain 
political titles with accompanying rights and duties. The 
political units in any region are roughly symmetrical, and 
subject to the same set of rules about the position of 
chiefs, their rights and duties, and proper and improper 
interaction with other chiefs in the region* rights and 
privileges of lesser personages, such as hereditary officials, 
and of lesser groups, such as the caste or castes which provide 
warriors; the system of land tenure which supports the 
differential powers of chiefs, their dependents, and of the 
warriors. A neighbouring region has often a completely 
different set of rules about these things, and a separate, 
unrelated culture.
This, therefore, is the model of the traditional 
caste society - a region-wide society politically split into 
blocks. To throw it into relief, we can follow another of 
Bailey’s referents, caste as association. In discussing 
this he has shown, successfully, how caste is changing in a 
large scale political system. I quote, 11In place of countless
22.
small, relatively isolated, traditional political divisions,
there are now emerging a few large political arenas, which
in this contest we can take as the States of the Indian Union-*
Within these States various .jatis t which formerly were -
separated by being in different political systems, are now
uniting. What were formerly caste categories are becoming 
1groups". Such a caste group is associational, it is a 
"competing interest-group, to be categorized with political
p
parties sooner than with status groups'1. Again, Bailey 
treats his block, or chiefdom, as a separate political system, 
parallel to what he earlier called a separate caste system.
I hope to show, with material from Kerala and Punjab, that 
the blocks were not so many political, or caste, systems, 
that they were rather linked and often interlocking units, 
or segments, which together constituted a system. Otherwise, 
he brings out very clearly the difference between traditional 
and modern caste. The former was characterised by vertical 
segments,the latter by horizontal ones. Wherever horizontal 
political segments develop, and vertical segments break up, 
we would have one kind of structural change. (Another kind 
would be where vertical segments are incorporated into a
1, -Bailey, 1963b, p. 121.
2. Bailey, ibid, p. 123-
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single, centralised system, of which again we have instances 
in Kerala and Punjab, and also in Maharashtra which is not 
covered in the present research).
The vertical political units of traditional systems 
stressed the hierarchy of castes. Competition did not occur 
between castes within the block, and the vertical relationships, 
with the ruling, or chiefly family at the top were maintained. 
The leading family was not assisted in its domination by an 
organised bureaucracy, itor was its army an easily controlled 
instrument of power since soldiers were usually self-equipped, 
paid in kind (usually land), and they were warriors by 
hereditary profession and not at the chief’s behest. The 
chief, or leading family, had a traditional and hereditary 
right to rule, but obviously such a right could not last 
without hard support. One prop of the chief was the larger 
estates he owned, giving him an economic advantage over all 
others in the territory. His patronage was extended to the 
largest number of clients, with whose support he kept his 
leading position. The other prop was his caste affiliations. 
These were primarily kinship ties, including marriage where 
the vertical unit was not highly developed. They were not 
associational. They did not entail political interaction as 
a group. The ruling caste did however exercise a more or 
less exclusive control over political power, and competition 
for power was confined to their ranks. Interaction among
chiefs was not directly concerned with the maintenance of 
caste stratification and control over lower castes. It did, 
however, have this effect by preserving local hierarchies.
By engaging in competition beyond the boundary of the block, 
chiefs confirmed their own position at the top, barring 
Brahmins, in the local hierarchy. At the same time, they 
asserted that they were the political centre in the block. 
Competitive interaction with other chiefs could only be 
undertaken when chiefs were the only or the predominant 
centres of power in their chiefdoms. These blocks, vertically 
arranged into castes, on the one hand split up a caste society 
into territorial political units. On the other, they maintained 
the caste layers, at the regional level by segmentary interaction 
among members of the ruling caste, at the bloc£, or chiefdom, 
level by the authority relations of these ruling caste families 
to their subordinate castes. It is precisely this function 
of maintaining caste hierarchy that is performed by the 
dominant caste factions noted in so many parts of rural 
India at the present time. On this hypothesis, the absence 
of factions v/ithin a dominant caste is a symptom of the 
low degree of dominance of the caste. The caste hierarchy 
in such a situation would be blurred, with several castes 
closely contesting for power and probably for ritual status 
as well.
It is necessary to differentiate between ruling caste 
and dominant caste. To speak of a caste being dominant is
25.
to imply that it is in successful competition with other
castes. The term is in fact useful in the modern context, as
we have seen in Bailey’s analysis. If we take Srinivas*
definition, caste may be said to be ’dominant* when it
preponderates numerically over the other castes, and when it
also wields preponderant economic and political power. A
large and powerful caste group can be more easily dominant
if its position in the local caste hierarchy is not too low.1*1
That is its ritual position. The dominant caste in this
sense was not without significance in traditional societies.
Of Mysore, Srinivas tells us, ’’The council of the dominant
caste in the hobli-capital is called a kattemane (house of
law), and it settles disputes not only occurring within the
capital, but also entertains appeals from councils of every
village in the hobli. It normally tries to uphold the
2
authority of local elders”. This, despite the present tense 
used, was the traditional function of the kattemane. It 
was mainly an administrative function, but not, usually, a 
political one. It did not exercise sovereignty over 
territories, nor wield an army. It was a collective entity. 
The caste, and not its constituent members, dispensed justice. 
It continued to do so no matter who was the sovereign, at
1. Srinivas, 1959, quoted from his ’’The Social System of a 
Mysore Village” , in Village India, edited by McKim 
Marriott, Chicago, 1955*
2. Srinivas, 1959, P* 16.
2 6-
least till British times, and often persisted thereafter.
The chiefs in the blocks of traditional caste systems 
did not constitute a dominant caste, as described above.
Rather, they formed a ruling, sovereign stratum, deriving 
their power from a control of economic resources and independent 
armies, to some extent from a high ritual position such as 
Kshatriya, or allied caste. They did not depend upon numbers, 
nor upon any collective organisation* They did not hold
their power vis-&-vis other castes. I therefore call them
, 1 
a ruling caste as distinct from a dominant caste. The
characteristics of a ruling caste briefly listed are: hereditary
right to rule; (hence) legitimate exercise of power probably
supported by Brahmins; fairly high ritual position; hereditary
estates, the extent of which determined the minimal strength
of individual families; spread usually coinciding with
linguistic region; linked to each other by kinship, through
adoptions, marriage; without collective organisation of any
kind whatever; in mutual competition for power, each being
independent of every other; and, finally, deriving strength
not from their own numbers, but from the numbers they can
call up in armed conflict. In fact, a numerous ruling caste
would mean infinitesimal fragmentation of resources and of
power, which would weaken it vis-a-vis other castes which might
then throw up rival contenders for power. The study of power
1. B.S. Cohn, 1959« The "little kingdoms” described by
Cohn were ruled by chiefs who formed such a ruling caste.
relations in a traditional caste society, therefore, is a 
study of the activities of members of the ruling caste.
The study of power relations in small-scale societies
initiated by "African Political Systems" , has been carried
forward to a fairly high level. The most theoretical
statement of the problem has been made by M.G. Smith both
2
in his essay "On Segmentary Lineage Systems" and in his 
more recent book, "Government in Z a z z a u " V e r y  briefly, 
Smith separates out two distinct axes of government, the 
segmentary - that is, the political, ..and the hierarchic - 
that is, the administrative, where relations of authority 
hold the system together. All forms of government could be 
plotted on a graph with these two axes. Thus the Ruer system 
would fall wholly on the segmentary axis or just'a little, 
above it. Highly centralised states, like wartime Germany 
fall on the hierarchic axis. Most forms of government would 
fall somewhere in between.
It will be shown in the present research that it is 
possible to have a system of political segments that are 
hierarchically arranged. This would appear to be a 
contradiction in terms. If they are hierarchically arranged, 
they cease to be segments. They cannot be in political
1. Evans-Pritchard and Fortes, 1940.
2. Smith, 1956.
3. Smith, 1960.
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competition. Or, if they are competing segments, they 
cannot be hierarchically arranged. It is possible however 
to have unequal segments. Each is theoretically independent, 
and hence a segment,. But the balance of power cannot be 
maintained, and the more powerful segments are able to impose 
themselves on the less powerful. Such imposition, while 
hierarchic, is not authoritative. It is not crystallised 
into an administrative relationship, and is inherently 
unstable though specific conditions may give it considerable 
stability.
Another complication facing any attempt at classification 
arises from the fact that each of these segments has an internal 
authority structure, and may in addition have internal political 
segments, such as factions in the ruling family. The levels 
of segmentation are not related to levels of authority, as 
they are in, for example, a centralised bureaucratic structure. 
There, competition for power occurs within the framework of 
administrative offices. In the case of Kerala we will find 
that there is no competition for administrative offices.
Such offices as there are, are hereditary, a s  in ruling 
families, so in office-holding families, competition within 
the families themselves was minimised. Such competition 
often merged into the wider competition between recognised 
political segments. Obviously, here, the administrative 
axis is not well developed. Nor, however, is the segmentary
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axis as neatly developed as in the case of the ftuer,1 or of
2
the more complex Swat Pathans. We might recall Bailey on 
the political characteristics of the chiefdoms (see p. l^ T), 
where he says ’’the larger units were segmentary (in the sense 
that any feudal state is segmentary, in particular in the 
sense used by Southall)• •.”
When we use the term ’feudal1 , we refer to ”a mode 
of social organisation that may recur in diverse forms in 
differing periods and environments* Medieval European
feudalism nevertheless remains the model of all feudal systems
3
as well as the best known”. We need therefore to know 
something about this model if we are to know where we may 
not apply the term ’feudal1 outside the societies of medieval 
Europe. Southall gives us an abstract model of feudalism, 
derived from his studies among the alur. ’’Perhaps it would 
be clearer to distinguish between pyramidal social structures 
and hierarchical power structures. In the pyramidal structure 
of segmentary societies there is surely a vertical distribution 
of power, though this may be largely in an upward rather than 
a downward direction. For example, this may result from
1. Evans-Pritchard, ’’The Liuer” , Oxford, 1940.
2. Fredtpik Barth, ’’Political Leadership among the Swat 
Pathans” , London, 1959*
3. M. Bloch;, 1932, p. 203.
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conflict between segments of tbe lowest order, leading to 
joint action between segments of an ever higher order until 
an equilibrium is reached. The important point about the 
powers exercised in this way is that they are virtually of 
the same type at the several different levels of the pyramidal 
segmentary structure". This structure Southall contrasts 
with the hierarchical, or centralised political structure.
The definition of the pyramidal structure could, however 
include the nuer type where segments are simply clans.
Southall does not differentiate conceptually between the 
pyramidal structure where segments are relatively undiffer­
entiated and the one where segments may be markedly differ­
entiated and where they do not operate as simple building 
blocks in a series of levels of opposition. The ^lur, 
however, did have differential segments...." the chieflets,...
in both a geographical and an ideological sense, radiated
2
out from the major chiefs". The latter structure is 
obviously more complex than, for example, the Nuer type.
Its segments are not only uneven, introducing an extra 
factor into segmentary, political interaction. They are 
also to some extent internally centralised.-'* This is so
1. Southall, 1953, P« 250.
2. Ibid. p. 180.
3. Southall, ibid. p. 237.
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among the Alar, It is so, as we shall see, in Kerala,
Such a political system, whose segments have a complex 
internal hierarchy, may not be a half-way house between 
the simple segmentary structure and the fully centralised 
state. It needs to be conceptually separated for a proper 
analysis and not subsumed in a typology whose extremes are 
the acephalous, segmentary system, and the centralised 
state. Southall’s failure to recognise Alur as a type 
distinct from the purely segmentary type, is regrettable,
for his material is more useful to social anthropology 
than is, for example, the historical data about a similar 
society, supplied, among others, by Marc Bloch. The 
conceptual tools of history are not uniform, nor universally 
accepted. Analysis of historical data escapes with difficulty 
the jargon both of its earlier "mythical charter" days and of 
its later efforts to become objective history. We need 
to look at the historians* word on feudalism not so much to 
gain a conceptual tool, a model, as to know the original 
feudal society, and to use that itself as a standard of 
comparison,
2
Marc Bloch, discussing feudalism of the European 
variety, finds five significant features. The first is that
1. Bbach and Bury, discussed later in this chapter.
2. Bloch, 1932.
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kinship ties, real or fictitious, are replaced by other ties* 
Kinship is now confined to the family; it no longer extends 
to the society and its government. Secondly, prestige is 
derived not from the control of land, or other property, 
but from the control of men* This development was however 
inhibited because the economy was still tied to the land, 
and it was not possible to support a large class of dependents. 
The third feature arises out of the first two. In the absence 
of kinship ties which operate in a small society, or of money 
which provides a bond unifying more complex societies, there 
is a contractual relationship, a personal bond, linking lords 
to subjects. This contractual nature of feudal ties in 
Europe seems to me to be its distinctive characteristic, sep­
arating it from all the comparable Indian societies, and
1 2probably from Zazzau, Alur, and other "sophisticated" 
segmentary sociefctes.
The fourth and fifth features of European feudalism 
are the system of vassalage and the development of seigniories. 
Vassalage was the institution established by the feudal 
contract, where an overlord protected his vassals some of 
whom held fiefs for services rendered to him, while others 
originally independent, sought vassalage for protection from
1. M.G. Smith, 1960.
2. Southall, 1953*
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enemies. Usually, fiefs were not legally hereditary,
though they tended to become so.
The seigniory, or manor, stood at the centre of the
political unit. Earlier, it was itself a large farm. Later,
the lord lived off rents from his tenant farmers. The lord
supported his own army by distributing fiefs to the men.
Here again, we find the contractual basis of European feudalism.
Vassals held their estates not by inalienable hereditary
right but by virtue of the overlord*s consent. To that
extent, the overlord exercised genuine control over his
vassals-short of authority however, since he was not assisted
by an administrative bureaucracy. Heredity, however, was
finally accepted informally in Prance and Germany, and legally 
In ItttLj
in Italy#<^ onIy lower fiefs were recognised as hereditary.
In Germany, at first only lower fiefs were so recognised, 
but later all became hereditary. In Prance, they all became 
hereditary, ,!Heredity, however, while it put a seal on the
"I
feudal system certainly compromised its very foundations’*.
It provided for the continuity of the estates, and positions, 
of lords of the system. But it destroyed the contractual 
basis of feudalism, and in doing so, it weakened the power 
of the overlord, and altered the nature of overlord-vassal 
relations. With the development of a cash economy, however,
1. Bl&ch, 1932, p. 207.
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political centralisation became more effective, first within 
the vassal territory, and then under the king, largely through 
the possibility of hiring both soldiers and administrators*
In any comparison outside Europe, we would expect 
the specific institutions to vary* We would not be surprised 
if instead of fiefs and vassals we have lesser chiefs who are 
vassals though not recipients of fiefs. But the three 
principles of feudalism - the replacement of kinship by
other ties as a structural principle, the power derived from
control of men (armed followers) rather than mere wealth, and 
the political contract binding overlords and vassals into a 
politically effective segment - must exist if we are to describe 
any system as feudal* In the case of at least one of the regions 
here studied, (Kerala), the third feature, (the political 
contract), exists in a very modified form. Vassals acquire 
their estates, privileges, and titles by hereditary right, 
and cannot be deprived of these except by conquest - which
was rare. At succession, however, every new incumbent had to
gain formal recognition from his overlord, and paid him a 
succession fee. The principle of heredity was more important 
than the overlord1 s recognition. The presence of the latter 
structure, however, might well qualify the Kerala system as 
belonging in a class with European feudal systems. The Punjab 
chiefsiand vassals correspond more closely to the European 
pattern insofar as the principle of heredity was incidental
to the formation of the chiefdoms, It was however universally 
accepted as the almost exclusive method of transmitting chiefly 
estates•
The importance of heredity in the Hindu systems is 
one significant divergence from European feudalism. The other 
is the absence of a king. Most of the feudal states of 
medieval Europe recognised a king, even if he was not very 
much more powerful than themselves. Bloch however says 
little about the role of the king, whether he in any way 
linked the feudal states together. If so, what was the 
actual extent of his influence, or power, and how was it 
exercised? There was no recognised king in Hindu systems.
The loose unity of feudal states, or chiefdoms, was here 
provided by the caste system. The status of chiefs was 
derived, formally, from caste membership which automatically 
ruled out the possibility of one pre-eminent king. Status 
in European feudalism derived from position vis-a-vis the 
king. The king stood at the apex of the social hierarchy, 
and status radiated downwards to royal and noble vassals, 
to lesser vassals, and to dependents. This must bring about 
a very different set of l!foreign,f relations. The European 
kings, acknowledging no equals within their sphere of feudal 
states, must look for brides and especially for bridegrooms 
beyond their political frontiers. To maintain their exclusiv­
eness inside their area, they must have some kind of interaction
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with equivalent families beyond their area. Political 
competition might then develop in a wider arena, in addition 
to the search for spouses. In the Hindu system, chiefs had 
caste equals across their borders, and occasionally within 
their borders. They did not have to go outside the region, 
since the dynastic duty to marry equal or higher, especially 
for the women, could be performed locally. Status was not 
linked directly to chiefship but to a caste which was not 
an exclusively chiefly group. In direct contrast to Europe, 
local marriages, hypergamoas in character, were prefered 
since they marked off the local chiefdom from its otherwise 
socially identical neighbours.
There is in Hindu systems not even the germinal 
centralisation of the feudal societies of Europe.
Marc Bloch again says little about the interactions 
between feudal states. The church was powerful, and in 
some ways stood outside and above the feudal states. But 
it did not impose its authority over them extensively or 
consistently. Kingship was weakly developed, and was in 
fact the slight edge of the king over his vassals, but not 
enough to dominate them. Feudal states, we know, were 
constantly at war with each other, or against the king.
Bloch does say, "Social and economic conditions thus, made 
for decentralization and produced a veritable parceling out 
of all the powers of the state, such as justice, the right
-1
to coin money, tools and the like”. But he makes no 
reference to dispersal or decentralisation of armed force 
that must necessarily be a concomitant of the dispersal 
of the powers of the state. It is this dispersal ("decentral­
isation11 implies a prior centralisation, which may apply to 
European feudalism, though this is doubtful outside Italy 
and perhaps southern Prance, hence the use of "dispersal’1) 
resulting in a number of roughly symmetrical political units, 
or segments, in regular interaction with each other of a kind 
that in the absence of a central authority, takes the form 
of recurrent but limited warfare. Systems of this kind are 
of frequent occurrence in almost all countries. They 
include medieval European feudal societies, independent 
Hindu caste societies, the warring states of medieval China 
and Japan, and several tribal societies in Africa. Without 
a more detailed comparison of these, it is not possible to 
extend the term "feudal" to all, or to coin a new term.
The use of the term "feudal" for societies outside medieval 
Europe must take into account the specific and general 
characteristics of European feudalism.
The dispersal of power, and the accompanying condition
1. Bloch, 1932, p. 207.
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of recurrent warfare, offered tentatively above as an 
additional characteristic of feudalism in Europe, and in 
similar (if not feudal) societies elsewhere, is one of the most 
striking characteristics of traditional Hindu caste societies, 
as will be shown in the rest of this thesis* It will there­
fore be fruitful to look at some sociological opinions
about the role of conflict in society.
1
It has been argued by Simmel that conflict has a 
cohesive role in society. He supports his argument with 
parallels from individual behaviour and emotions. He does 
not however consider conflict as a form of interaction 
that binds opposing groups together as effectively, (if very 
differently), as relations of cooperation. He considers it 
rather as a unifying force within each group. Thus,
"Enmities not merely prevent gradual disappearance of the 
boundaries within the society - and for this reason these 
enmities may be consciously promoted, as guarantee of the 
existing social constitution - but more than this, the 
enmities are directly productive sociologically. They give
2
classes and personalities their position toward each other..." 
Simmel says, pursuant to this, "within the closed circle 
hostility signifies, as a rule, the severing of relationships,
1. Simmel, 1904.
2. Simmel, ibid, p. 492.
39
-f
voluntary isolation, and the avoidance of contact"•
Hostility, even where it takes the form of avoidance can 
however only exist where there is contact, though it may 
be involuntary. To Simmel, therefore, conflict is a kind 
of interaction limited to outgroups, and absent from in­
groups. He concedes that...," sharper antagonism arises on h
the foundation of community of relationship than between 
2
strangers". But then we have two communities instead of 
the original one.
A different approach to the problem of conflict and 
its cohesive role is made by Gluckman.^ To him, regulated 
conflict has a cathartic value for society. "Conflicts are 
a part of social life and custom appears to exacerbate 
these conflicts: but in doing so custom also restrains the
f\\ L
conflicts from destroying the sider social order". Or, 
later, commenting on medieval European history* "I do feel 
that the principle that in some circumstances civil war 
can keep a nation united, might be applied more fully than 
it is".'’ Cross-cutting conflicts contribute to social
cohesion, a thesis partly borrowed by Gluckman from T.S.
£
Elliotu who was using it as a criterion of "creativeness and
1. Simmel, ibid. p. 505*
2. Ibid, p. 513.
3. Gluckman, 1963*
4. Ibid. p. 2.
5. Ibid, p. 48.
6. T.S. Eliot "Eotes TcDwards a Definition of Culture, " 
London, 1948.
progress". Gluckman makes out a better case for the cohesive
role of conflict than the speculative Simmel, but he too does
not see conflict as a positive interaction between two parties,
as in itself a social link, or bond, arising out of certain
political conditions. To Gluckman, localised or customary
conflict contributes to cohesion by preventing wider disruptive
conflicts. They are not themselves cohesive relations.
That relationships of conflict can be recurrent and
regular and structurally defined we know from both history
and anthropology. Such conflict may in extreme cases take
the form of war, occuring between distinct political units.
We can perhaps generalize Q. Wright1s statement on primitive
warfare to cover all societies with a small-scale political
organization. "War serves to distinguish this group as the
1
centre of social organization". Again, "Intermarriage and
the practice of exogamy, peaceful trade and other contacts
with neighbours, and ceremonial gatherings tend to amalgamate
neighbouring groups into larger but looser units. War tends
2
to counteract this process". War, therefore, is one way 
in which a political group, or Unit, resists merger with 
another group or groups. Again, we are told, war has an 
integrative function for the in-group. The wars between
1. Quincy Wright, 1942, p. 70.
2. Ibid , p. 70.
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in-groups, however, are not seen by Wright as the political 
concomitant, of the growth of affinal,trade, and other 
contacts.
Obviously not all wars are cohesive in their effects. 
Whether or not wars have such an effect will depend almost • 
entirely on the nature of the contending parties* and the 
relationships other than war, that exist between them, In 
Hans Speier's words, wars should be classified "according
A
to the social definition of the enemy". Speier classifies 
wars into three kinds, the absolute, the instrumental, and 
the agonistic, the last of which he calls not ’war* but 
'fighting*. Absolute war is resorted to for annihilation 
of the enemy, and is usually directed against an enemy who 
is culturally foreign. Instrumental war is fought to gain 
values that are held by the enemy, and the general mode is 
to defeat and dominate the enemy, even to preserve him if 
that is necessary for the acquisition of the values. Wars 
of colonisation fall into this category. The actual conduct 
of war, when absolute or instrumental, may not be easily 
predicted, since strategy is subservient to specific aims.
The third type, agonistic fighting, is not directed 
to specific aims. I quote at length. "The extreme opposite 
of the absolute war is the fight waged under conditions of
1. Hans Speier, 1941, p. 443
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studied equality and under strict observance of rules.
Measured in terms of destruction such a fight is highly 
inefficient and ludicrously ceremonious. However, the 
agonistic fight, as we know it from ancient Greece and 
also from other cultures, is not oriented toward the 
destruction of the enemy...
"Each agonistic fight is a contest between opponents 
who delight in measuring their strength according to 
certain rules of the ’game1. The opponents participate 
in a common culture or respect common cultural values 
even if they are representatives of different power 
structures. It is these common bonds which make the
contest possible...... The values (customs, laws, codes of
honour, etc.) transcend the conflict. The agonistic fight 
has the qualities of a play, with its freedom, its rules,
A
and its association from useful action".
Of the three kinds of war, the agonistic fight 
alone is in any sense an in-group conflict, involving like 
units the interrelations of which must vary greatly from 
society to society. It indicates some degree of integration 
already existing between units, towards which integration it 
is itself a contribution. We may call it limited or contained 
warfare, or even structured, or segmentary warfare. It is
1. Speier, ibid , p. 451•
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not necessarily civil war, nor rebellion, both of which 
imply a political integration, at least at the formal level, 
of contending parties within one system. It is genuinely 
war, armed conflict between politically independent units. 
However, it is, like civil war and rebellion, not disruptive 
of a social structure. It is in fact a recurrent process, 
and part of, an existing structure of society. It is itself 
an aspect of that society, performing various functions in 
the political sphere. It defines the political unit; it also 
links political units, in itself, as a form of interaction, 
and as an adjudicatory process to resolve the recurrent 
disputes arising between these political units.
The nature of caste, of political systems, and of 
political conflict, are the ingredients of the hypothesis 
to be set out below.
In traditional Hindu societies, which are small- 
scale societies, there is a regional caste stratification, 
characterised by a dispersal of power among members of the 
ruling caste, each of whom leads a political unit roughly 
equal to others, and relations between whom are necessarily 
relations of conflict and competition. There is a tendency 
for the conflict to result in modifications in the political 
balance between the units, and the powerful units become 
major centres of power, with lesser units clustering around 
them. There is however no absorption of lesser units into 
a larger one, and relations of conflict between units,
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separately or in clusters, persist.:. Political power is 
concentrated in the hands of the ruling caste, and political 
competition confined to it. The dispersal or power, with 
its concomitant factionalisation of the ruling caste is a 
guarantee of the caste hierarchy. The position of each 
chief vig’-a-vig' the others is derived from his domination 
of the vertical strata in his territories. Also, the social f 
equivalence of the chiefs entails the social equivalence of
I
their follower strata, and enables us to speak of the 
regional society covered by such equivalent chiefs and their 
chiefdoms as forming one social system.
In other words, territorial fragmentation of 
horizontal social strata is causally related to the arrangement 
of these strata into a firm hierarchy.
We shall see in the two examples of traditional Hindu 
societies studied in this work that we have a territorial 
fragmentation of castes, that they are hierarchically 
arranged, that the vertical units are in relations of 
recurrent conflict, that the conflict is contained within 
limits by a variety of sanctions, and that the pattern of 
conflict persists even when the specific causes of conflict 
have changed. Dispersal of power is the essential political 
characteristic of the caste system, and is ensured, in 
addition to the rules of warfare, by laws of inheritance and 
succession, by the general application of the principle of
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heredity which, by inhibiting the development of an
administrative system, prevented the emergence of powerful,
centralised units which could threaten the political balance
and, through it, the caste stratification. A threat to
caste stratification was also a threat to ritual values -
a point that cannot here be elaborated, but about which much
has been said by anthropologists interested in the purity -
pollution social and ritual complex. Such a threat, since
it affected not just specific social groups but the whole
texture of religous and moral beliefs, even, one might add,
of a world view, brought into play quite strong sanctions to
restrain it. In both the regions studied, we find that a change
towards some degree of political centralisation of a regional
society did not succeed. The major constant was the caste
system, and this, in addition to such factors as lack of
communications and local self-sufficiency - and Bailey has
specifically stated that the traditional caste system is
essentially a small-scale system - was a direct check on
political centralisation. The general failure of political
centralisation in Hindu societies, even during the periods
1
of imperial expansion in early centuries, is a symptom of 
the system. Or, in the general parlance of writers in India 
and England, it was the result of the tfevils’1 of the caste 
system.
Before going on to a description of the working of 
two Hindu societies of the traditional, fragmented kind,
1• Drekmeier, 1962, Basham, 1954, 1956, and others.
46
mainly from historical material, it is necessary, very
briefly, to discuss the relationship of anthropology and
history. The recent trend among anthropologists emphasising
the value of history to anthropology makes the use of
historical data in anthropological analysis quite respectable
although such use is nowhere near becoming a part of
anthropological convention. Some work has been done on the
role of history in the social life of groups, as a part of
their traditions and beliefs, and as a charter to legitimise
1
certain social relations. But this kind of history is
itself a social fact, and not a source of social facts. It
may in fact have some connection with real events, or people, 
but having been used for a social purpose these facts will 
have been distorted, or reshaped, or mingled with legend, 
and can never serve by themselves as a source of evidence 
about past events.
There are two cogent reasons for using historical 
data as sources of sociological facts. One is that this is 
a major way of studying social change. The other reason is 
that it makes possible the study of extinct societies or 
extinct social forms, which study is relevant for comparison 
with some contemporary societies. It is of course indispensable
1. Curmison, 1951; Barnes.
4 7
for the long-term aim of making out a typology of human 
societies. Where it is the earlier forms of existing 
societies that are taken up, as in the present work, the 
knowledge about the existing society is deepened even where 
it is not possible to trace exactly the steps by which the 
transformation occurred. It is not necessarily a study of 
social change, but it could be a fruitful source of such
A
studies. Evans-Pritchard has pointed out that historical 
knowledge is deeper, and provides a more varied experimental 
situation, unlike modern studies of social change which are 
mainly concerned with the effect of Europeans on tribal and 
other societies. Conversely, the contemporary study provides 
a useful perspective for analysis of historical material.
Too much however need not be made of this; the historical 
material is ultimately of fixed quantity. Whatever it lacks 
in information cannot be filled in any way, and all kinds of 
variables that must inevitably have affected the structure 
of that society cannot be accounted for, or a full comparison 
made with the existing successor society.
The strongest plea for the use of history, though not 
the first, has come from Evans-Pritchard. He says most 
social anthropology is concerned with description as is most
1. Evans Pritchard, 1962.
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history; it does not always generalise. And like us,
sociological historians have their models and ideal types
to help them represent the nature of the real.... Giv itas.
feudality, class, capitalism, revolution, are all general
1
abstractions implying an ideal type’*. Again, "An historical
fact [thus] shorn of its unique features escapes also
temporality. It is no longer a passing incident, a sort
of accident, but is, as it were, taken out of the flux of
time and achieves conceptual stability as a sociological 
2
proposition"There is therefore no basic difference
between the historian and social anthropologist. !,The fact
that an anthropologist studies people at first-hand and the
historian in documents is a technical not a methodological 
3
difference". Having eroded the boundaries between the 
two disciplines, Bvans-Pritchard prescribes that "an 
interpretation on functionalist lines (of the present in 
terms of the present) and on historical lines (of the past 
in terms of the present) must somehow be combined...."^
After his earlier stand in the same essay it seems inconsis­
tent that he should still separate functional from historical 
interpretation. It would be more logical to say that both
 ^• Ibid, p.•48•
2. Ibid, P. *9.
3. Ibid, P. 58.
4. Ibid, pp. 61-62.
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disciplines must use functional analysis for their different 
kinds of data. If such a development lies far in the future, 
we can at present at least claim to be able to make anthropol­
ogical analyses of historical data which is what the present 
work purports to be. The theoretical framework is derived 
from anthropology, and the data is almost entirely historical.
The use of historical data has become feasible 
relatively recently possibly because social anthropology has 
only recently concerned itself in a big way with political
systems and their workings.
1
As Evans-Pritchard points out, an important difference 
between the two disciplines is that history is concerned 
largely with political events and institutions, while social 
anthropology in addition concerns itself with kinship and 
community. In subject matter, therefore, history is more 
limited than social anthropology. But also it is a major 
potential contributor to political sociology. Apart from 
the recent emphasis on political systems, another factor that 
has brought history to the attention of anthropologists is 
the extension of investigation to literate societies, where 
written records are available.
There remains one big problem about the relation of
1. Evans-Pritchard, ibid, p. 59.
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history to social anthropology. What about the theories 
and concepts of history? How far are they developed? How 
do they compare with the theoretical development of social 
anthropology? One could go further and argue the merits 
of historical analysis (as conceived by professional historians 
and not by Evans-Pritchard), as opposed to anthropological, 
or functional, analysis. But that rnay be premature at the 
present stage, and is beyond the scope of the present study.
We can, however, take a brief look at a few historians1 
opinions on the purpose of history, and its role as a science. 
This cannot do full justice to the historians, but it will be 
useful to know something about what they have to say. We 
avoid the danger of using their histories and ignoring their 
theoretical and methodological perspectives.
Some of the problems that historians have faced at
the level of theory and methodology are parallel to those
that have confronted social anthropologists at various times.
I base the following discussion on what Bloch, Carr, Bury,
1
and Collingwood have had to say about history. Obviously, 
the discussion cannot be exhaustive.
The historians have been as concerned as social 
anthropologists about whether their discipline is a science
1. Bloch, 1954; Bury, 1903, 1930; Carr, 1961; Collingwood, 
1946.
or an art. They have also looked for causation and had to 
differentiate it from origins - a search that led to the 
definite emergence of social anthropology from ethnology. 
History has also had to face methodological proolems that 
again bring it close to social anthropology, arising out of 
the claim that it is a scientific, or, as Bury might say, 
a rational discipline, how far could interpretation be made 
objective? How did one check for bias in one’s sources, and 
how important was it to evaluate such bias? Should the 
approach be one of the clean slate, where the problem is 
formulated from the material, or was it necessary to commence 
with a problem? Then, was there a definite difference, a 
watershed, that separated modern from historical societies, 
a kind of watershed that has separated social anthropology from 
sociology?
The specific problems of history relate mainly to 
its sources and evidence, which is often uneven, and gets 
scantier as one goes back in time. Historians are also 
concerned about the role of accident, or what they call the 
Cleopatra’s nose theory. Would history have taken a 
different course if Cleopatra’s nose had been a different 
shape? This difficulty would seem to arise from the emphasis 
in history upon events and their temporal sequences , and the 
lack of emphasis on the casual relations between events.
But, as Evans-Pritchard says, MAn historical fact... shorn
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of its unique features escapes also temporality. It is no
longer a passing incident, a sort of accident, but is, as
it were, taken out of the flux of time and achieves conceptual
1
stability as a sociological proposition"• This is what his 
"historians-sociologues" try to do. Bury treats historical 
accident as a mutation v/hich is as important to historical 
progress as a mutation is to biological evolution. This 
fits his rigid conception of history as a record of human 
progress (which he is careful to separate from value judgments 
of good and bad). Here again the emphasis is on the temporal 
sequence, to the exclusion of any cross-temporal classification 
of events. To follow the argument among historians on whether 
history is a science or an art is like listening in to the 
parallel argument in social anthropology between Radcliffe- 
Brown and Evans-Pritchard. Radcliffe-Brown came out for a 
science of anthropology, and took his general perspectives 
from the natural sciences, modifying them to suit the 
material of the social sciences. To Evans-Pritchard, each 
society was a unique entity, only intuitively understood and 
therefore not amenable to scientific generalisation. The 
study of society was therefore an art.
1. Evans-Pritchard, 1962, see p. '-.2
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1
Marc Bloch says history is the science of “men in 
time"• This variable, time alone, separates history from 
other social sciences. This raises at once the problem of 
how important time is to explain human activities. To Bloch, 
knowledge of the past was necessary to an understanding of 
present beliefs. He does not however care for the "embryogenic 
obsession", the search for origins, which he says "was put to 
the service of value judgments". He uses the time factor to 
localise his historical phenomenon. And such localisation 
is also made with reference to a "total social situation".
To anthropology, time would be one aspect of a "total social 
situation". Bloch, however, does not make a complete break 
with classical history, but still calls the discipline a 
science of "men in time".
For Bury, time is a sufficient criterion for
historical studies. In fact it is a theoretical framework
in itself, for time is equal to progress. Taking this as his
2
first principle, Bury says, "I cannot imagine the slightest 
importance in facts or sequences of facts, unless they mean
1. Bloch, 1954, p. 27., HWe have called history the ‘science 
of men1. That is still far too ^aga^« It is necessary 
to add: * of men in time1".
2. Bury, 1930, quoted in Introduction by H. Temperley.
j
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something in forms of reason'1. Reason, which he did not
further define (was it common-sense? was it formal logic?
was it^set of predetermined premises?) was to him, in effect,
the working out of the implications of the idea of progress
in all specific research. He exalted this idea into "the
great transforming conception which enables history to
„ 1
define her scope".
Collingwood takes roughly the opposite view, 
following the Italian philosopher B. Croce who considered 
history an art. History, to Croce, was an intuitive vision 
of individuality and was therefore art. "Art is [thus] not 
an activity of the emotions, but a cognitive activity: it is 
knowledge of the individual. Science, on the contrary, is 
knowledge of the general: its work is to construct general 
concepts and to work out the relations between them, i^ ow
history is altogether concerned with concrete individual
2facts". Collingwood cannot however go along with Croce to 
think intuition is enough for a concrete subject like 
history. Croce, according to Collingwood, separated history 
as being radically different from natural sciences, but 
regarded it as directly related to philosophy. History 
provided the facts about which philosophy generalised.
1. Bury, 1903, P* 17*
2. Collingwood, 1946, p. 191*
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Though fascinated by Croce’s ideas, Collingwood does not
quite give up the idea of history as a science, He seems
to be Crocian when he equates the work of the historian with
1
that of the novelist. But, when evaluating the use made by
any historian of histories written by others, he definitely
2
talks of the ’’scientific historian” .
The controversy is heavily weighted, as in social
anthropology, towards acceptance that it is a science, albeit
a science that has different techniques from those of the
natural sciences. But there has been no body of theory
accepted as a whole by historians, and as a result, no
canalised controversy over theoretical problems. The pattern
is for every historian.interested in theory to put forward his
own general scheme with little reference to other work in
the same area. It is heartening for the holistic-minded
anthropologist to read in Bloch^ that civilisation is not a
mechanically arranged game of solitaire; the knowledge of
fragments studied by turns, each for its own sake, will never
produce the knowledge of the whole (it will not even produce
that of the fragments themselves); or to find in Collingwood
that the historical imagination should be structural not 
4
ornamental. But historians do not generally subscribe to
1. Ibid, p. 246.
2. Ibid, p. 279.
3. Bloch, 1954, p. 155.
4. ColliRgwood, 1946, p. 244.
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this view. And, more significantly, research hardly ever 
takes this as its organising principle.
History has had to face problems which did not 
affect social anthropology too much. The writing of histories 
has been one of the oldest intellectual pursuits of men. It 
has also been far from objective. Indeed it never tried to 
be. a major function of history in earlier times has been to 
support existing or emerging institutions. It has provided 
charters of legitimisation to persons oT groups in power, such 
as the churches in medieval Europe, the near legendary kings 
of ancient India, political parties in some countries, and 
nationalist groups everywhere. The tremendous backlog of 
bias is not easy to overcome. In fact, there is a case for 
not regarding earlier histories as history at all, but rather 
as self-images of the persons and groups concerned. When 
Groce says all history is contemporary history, this is 
what he means. Eut he gives no hope for the emergence at 
any time of an objective, scientific history.
Because nearly all literate societies have records 
of such self-images, or histories, and because these self- 
images have not been finally and fully relegated to the 
status of evidence rather than history, the theoretical 
historian is faced with a welter of material of very uneven 
value, and therefore full of obstacles to comparison, and 
unless history can see its way out to comparative studies,
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it will remain essentially a descriptive body of knowledge, 
a collection or unique facts. Further, historians must give 
up the emphasis on the time factor which makes them classify 
their facts primarily by the period in which they occurred, 
rather than by their nature. Time is important only to 
localise phenomena. Its possible importance to laws of 
social or historical development is a separate matter, and 
does not affect its relative unimportance to classification 
and comparison of social or historical types.
The position that history is a science raises the 
methodological problem of how to ensure objectivity, indeed 
of how far one can expect to be objective. Scepticism on 
this matter is as great among historians as it is among 
social anthropologists. In both cases, there has been a 
demand for a study of the academics themselves. Among
1
anthropologists, an extreme statement is made by Pocock 
who thinks that even the direct translation of vernacular texts 
into English imports a cultural bias into it. Less extremely, 
Evans-Pritchard says of historians and social anthropologists 
that both "are trying to do the same thing, to translate 
one set of ideas into terms of another, their own, • •. 
so that they may become intelligible, and they employ
1. Pocock, D. "Social Anthropology11, London and i*ew York,
1961.
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Carr;
similar means to that end”»1/for history, says that the
facts of history are lfrefracted through the mind of the
recorder” and his injunction amounts to "know your historian”.
Colourfully, he says, ”When you read a work of history,
always listen out for the buzzing. If you can detect none,
2
either you are tone deaf or your historian is a dull dog”.
He also says that ”the historian will get the kind of facts 
he wants”. This is almost exactly the danger pointed out to 
the field anthropologist and one that we cannot say has been
overcome. The most obvious example of a failure of this kind
is the widespread notion among anthropologists that social change 
in tribal and peasant societies is always a consequence of the 
impact of the west. Often this impact is so remote that it is 
only one element in a set of antecedent conditions, and it 
may not even be that. The impact, if any, may become effective 
via other societies, and not directly. But the notion, 
originating from the close connection between social anthropo­
logy and colonial administration persists.
All the historians under review here agree that there 
is a bias, latent or overt, in historical work. Only Bloch 
seems to think that it is possible, with sufficient care and
1. Evans-Pritchard, 1962, p. 58.
2. Carr , 1961 , p. 18.
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discipline, to overcome bias.
There is the more technical problem of evaluating
bias in the raw materials of research, and in all earlier
1
histories. Bloch, the most insistently scientific of the
historians, looks at historical evidence in the way an
anthropologist evaluates his informant’s bias. He thinks
that on the one hand allowances must be made for falsehoods,
distortion, and hidden motives in the determination of facts,
on the other that such falsehoods, distortion and motives are
themselves legitimate objects of study, and throw light upon
the conditions in which they occurred.
Bloch also has views on the choice of subject of
research. He thinks it is necessary to select subject matter,
and to make a purposeful selection. To avoid selection and
to take the facts as they come is to obtain "a purely superficial
order of contemporaneousness”. Selection implies abstraction,
or theoretical orientation^ and without this history cannot
2
become a science. He stresses the need to see a
civilization as a whole, but he also insists that the
historian must focus on the particular problem selected
3
from its related phenomena. Such selected problems should 
then be expanded to make cross-temporal comparisons.
1. Bloch, 1954, pp. 90-110.
2« Ibid, p. 147*
3. Ibid, pp. 155-156.
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A major problem in history is that of causation*
Social anthropology gave up the search for causes as
antecedent conditions and concentrated on the interrelations
of phenomena, or their functions within a social system*
Bloch comments on history’s 11 embryogenic obsession1* and the
1
confusion over the search for origins* Origins were
interpreted indiscriminately as either causes, or as
beginnings, and were generally used to support value judgments,
Bloch does not rule out the need for studying origins* But
he wants to make such studies more precise*
Bloch rejects any first cause of human institutions*
But he does not reject the idea of causes* To him, all
antecedent events of a fact may be classified according to
specifity* The most general antecedents are only implicit
in a situation* More specific antecedents are the causes
of any event or fact. Causes shade off into conditions.
This is a useful way to study any particular phenomenon,
a shorthand guide to empirical research, and a de-reification
of cause. But Bloch cannot quite give up the idea of a cause,
and he goes on to say, "Historical facts are, in essence,
2
psychological facts". Or, speaking of the spread of the 
Black Death, he attributes it to "certain social - and,
1* Ibid, p* 30.
2* Ibid, p* 194.
6 1
therefore in their underlying nature, mental - conditions. •
He in fact postulates human nature as a prime cause-eum- 
condition of historical and social facts. This is a kind of 
determinism rejected completely by Bury who prefers to explain 
phenomena as the result of accidental mutations. Carr rejects 
it too. He also rejects accidental causes: he thinks history 
must look for rational causes (functions?).
The continuing search for causes in history is an 
aspect of what could be called - and conventional historians 
will object to this - the temporal obsession. The constant 
emphasis on the time scale requires every historian to date 
his material in relation to an earlier period, and a 
theoretical justification is put forward that the earlier 
period is relevant also to know the causes (or perhaps pre­
conditions) of one's research.
Strong pleas are made by historians to make history 
more sociological. And from anthropologists we hear that 
social (and for some anthropologists cultural) anthropology 
should become more historical. It is too early to say 
whether there will be a rapprochement between the two 
disciplines in which the boundaries will blur or disappear.
For the present, standing on the anthropological side of the
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fence, we can enlarge our empirical fields almost endlessly 
if we include historical materials where these are available.
.and we enrich theoretical insights by such research, for we 
fill in the enormous gap between the small-scale tribal 
societies and trie large-scale modern societies which make 
up the stuff of present-day field research. The ”discovery" 
of the peasant communities which were units of a large-scale 
society seemed to fill the gap, and we heard about a 
continuum of social types. But the enormous number of 
social types directly antecedent to modern large-scale 
societies (most notable perhaps are feudal societies of 
medieval Europe) can only be known historically. Theoretically, 
these may prove to be more correctly intermediate types in 
the continuum, since it is not simply the scale of social 
interactions, or size of a community, that is relevant - a 
problem that always looms large with the field anthropologist- 
but the kind and complexity of these interactions.
1. Redfield, "The Primitive World and its Transformations” , 
Cornell University, 1953; f,The Little Community” , Chicago, 
1955.
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CHAPTER II 
THE CHIEFDOMS OF RERa LA
The first part of this chapter is an introduction to 
Kerala, being a brief description of its topography and 
ecology, its economy over the period covered in the present 
analysis, caste and whether we can speak of a Kerala caste 
system, systems of land tenure, laws of inheritance and 
succession. The second part describes the chiefdoms of 
Kerala from approximately the ninth to the early eighteenth 
century. Political interactions of the chiefdoms, their 
internal government, major rituals involving some of the more 
powerful chiefs, and political centralisation of southern 
Kerala during the eighteenth century, will be discussed in 
the next chapter.
Kerala is situated on the south-western extremity 
of the southern Indian peninsula. It lies roughly between 
latitudes 91 and 12!, and longitudes 75* and 77!* It is 
separated from the wide eastern plains by the Western Ghats 
which kept Kerala isolated from the mainstream of south 
Indian historical development. We would expect to find here 
a society and polity unaffected by the north-based Islamic 
empires, up to the time of British annexation in 1792. The 
model that emerges from the Kerala material provides a 
viable ideal type of an independent Hindu caste society#
Kerala can be divided into three geographical regions;
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the narrow coastal plain where rice was grown, with coconuts 
in the more sandy tracts, the foothills of the Ghats which 
were rich in pepper, and the inaccessible mountainous 
interior. Communications in the coastal region consisted 
largely of river and inland waterway traffic. In the interior, 
communications were more difficult. The annual rainfall is 
heavy, and neither rice nor pepper cultivation require 
irrigation. “The difficulty of communications and the lack 
of a centrally organised irrigation system may have been 
connected with the fact that Kerala had no regular land tax
A
until the 1730s"• The absence of a system of regular taxation 
is in its turn bound up with a political system characterised 
by a dispersal of power at every level. By contrast, the 
east coast has been the home of extensive southern empires, 
with a high degree of political centralisation.
In order not to give undue weight to the ecological 
factor, it is important to remember that though the east 
coast, like the Gangetic plain, made political centralisation 
a possibility, in fact in none of these regions did the pattern 
of dispersed power, which it is here contended is a 
concomitant of traditional caste systems, give way to a fully 
centralised system. The Hindu empires, from the Mauryas
1 . S c h n e id er and Gough, 1 9 6 1 , p . 3 0 2 .
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to the Marathas under Shivaji, invariably reverted to a
system of dispersed power. This reversion was not a
process of decentralization or disintegration, as it was
a failure of the process of centralisation to displace the
old system. In other woras, the empires could not succeed
because they went against the grain of the caste system.
Ecology alone does not explain the persistence of systems
of dispersed power.
Ecology does however explain local forms of such
systems, though the actual relationship is a little obscure-^
Thus, in Kerala we find that the narrow coastal plain widens
1
out to 70 miles in central Kerala, at Palghat and Hilambur.
The large chiefdoms ruled by families of the Samanthan caste 
were all located here. The chiefdoms ruled by Kshatriya 
families were almost always located on the coast, and were 
much smaller in extent. The correlation of size of chiefdom, 
caste of the chiefs, and geographical location is too marked 
to be accidental. Since overseas trade goes back to very 
early times - Kerala was known to the Romans - the coastal 
chiefdoms may have acquired a higher caste status. However, 
even the oldest traditions of Kerala do not mention this.
1. Innes, 1908, p.l
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The economic advantages of the coastal chiefdoms may account 
for their smaller size, compared to the inland chiefdoms,
CL
These could have made the smaller chiefdoms^viable political 
unit. Or competition may have been more acute, causing 
segmentation of the chiefdoms* By the time of the first 
records, there is an established pattern of coastal Kshatriya 
chiefdoms, and Samanthan chiefdoms in the wide interior region 
of central Kerala.
The economy of Kerala was basically agricultural, with 
local self-sufficiency in the major food crop, rice. There 
was however a regional and economic diversification in the 
production of spices, particularly pepper, and in their 
export overseas. Pepper was grown in the low-lying hills 
of the interior. It was brought down to the coast and 
carried from there in the ships of Middle Eastern merchants 
till the sixteenth century, and thereafter in European ships, 
to overseas markets. The regional specialisation of pepper 
cultivation forced economic interdependence on the chiefs 
of the interior and the coast. The existence of several 
chiefs in both kinds of regions introduced a strong element 
of conflict and competition. The breaking out of the 
Samanthan chief of inland Ernad towards the coast, which 
dominates the history of central Kerala for four or five 
centuries prior to the arrival of the Portuguese, was mainly 
an attempt to acquire a coastal outlet rather than to sell
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in another chief* s territory. In Chapter III, we shall see 
that conflict between the chiefdoms was not overtly economic, 
especially before the advent of the Portuguese. The economic 
diversification, clearly reflected in the caste status of the 
chiefs (Saraanthans versus Kshatriyas), forced upon them a 
close involvement of interests. Conflict between them was 
not therefore a formal expression of the equality of self- 
sufficient political units, or segments. Wars were fought 
for real gains of power.
The development of trade did not however substantially 
alter the social and political system. The trade was carried 
on by Moors from the Middle East, Christians who originated 
some centuries earlier than the Moors, and Jews, who also 
came before the Moors. They lived in the coastal cities, and 
the Moors at least never owned land till the eighteenth century* 
The Hindu castes continued to follow their traditional occupa­
tions,based on agriculture, while the chiefs taxed the trade and 
thus strengthened their position in their own chiefdoms.
At the same time, the formal element was also present 
at least at the time when the Portuguese first arrived. One 
of their earlier writers wrote that "all the kings of Calicut 
when newly come to power, had the custom of entering Cochin 
and depriving the King of his State and taking possession 
of it and afterwards they restored it to him again for life.
The King of Calicut observed this as a law, and the King of
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Cochin used to give him a tribute of elephants, and so he 
returned to Calicut, And the King of Cochin could not coin 
money, nor roof his house with tiles, under pain of losing 
his state”•1
The chiefs were themselves a part of this essentially 
agricultural society, and continued to be so until they were 
pensioned off by the British. Trade however provided them 
with additional resources, differentiating them from powerful 
landowners in their territories, and enabling them to 
concentrate on their rivals in other territories. It was 
the successful trade monopoly of the eighteenth century 
Travancore chiefs that enabled them to implement a policy 
of political centralisation.
The caste system of parts of Kerala has been described
2
by anthropologists. Information on Kerala castes is also 
available in official censuses upto 1941. This factual 
material is difficult to handle, partly because of its 
unevenness, and partly because of its quantity, especially 
in the censuses. There is a ready-made model of the caste 
system of Kerala in a Malayalam text, the Jatinirnayan.^
This model, locally recognised, is an important indication 
that there is such a thing as a Kerala caste system, and not
1. Barbosa, 1866. Barbosa wrote in 1520.
2. Gough, 1850, 1952, 1959, 1961; Miller, 1950, 1954.
3. Quoted in Ananthakrishna Iyer, 1925, P* 90.
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1
a collection of local caste systems, as argued by Bailey.
The Jatinirnayan model is not accurate, but it is a convenient
shorthand introduction to the caste system of Kerala* It
ignores detailed differences of caste as among the culturally
distinct areas of Kerala. "The political systems - and
consequently the internal caste divisions of the nayars and
the forms of their kinship system - differed in these three
2
areas"• That is, in north, central, and southern Kerala*
I deliberately use this model, for various reasons. The 
perspective here is the whole of Kerala , and not any one 
part of it. Then, the categorisation of castes in this 
model underlines the fact that though caste categories may 
have been largely cultural phenomena, indicating a shared 
value system and not interaction, they recognised a common 
social boundary* This recognition was a crucial determinant 
of potential interaction, and contained an indication of 
the direction in which changes could occur. Even if the 
potential interactions were not exploited in a stable system, 
their latent existence is not without sociological significance. 
The Jatinirnayan classifies all Kerala castes into six broad 
groups. The first are the i\iambuctiiris aixL other Brahmin castes, 
adding up to ten divisions. The second group are the
1* Bailey, 1963a, p. 108.
2. Gough and Schneider, 1961, p. 305*
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Antharalajati, consisting of twelve divisions of temple 
servants. The temple servant castes are intermediate in ritual 
status between the Brahmins and the third group, the Hayars. 
There are fourteen divisions of high status Hayars, and four 
of low status. Below them come the Kammalans, or artisan 
castes, of which there are six divisions. The fifth group 
of castes of which there are ten include low polluting 
castes whose occupations range from toddy tapping and 
agricultural labour to astrology. The last, and lowest, 
group are the Chandalans, of which four castes live in the 
plains, and four live in the mountains. They include castes 
that convey pollution to higher castes even if they are only 
seen.
The Jatinirnayan model surprisingly omits two of the
most important castes of Kerala, the Kshatriyas and the
Samanthans. These are and perhaps have always been numerically
small, but almost all the major chiefs of Kerala belonged to
one of these two castes. Ananthakrishna Iyer who does not
give the date or other details about the Jatinirnayan
rectifies this model. He places the Kshatriyas between the
Brahmins and the Antharalajati, and includes the Samanthans
in the Antharalajati, just above the Hayars. The work of
1
anthropologists in parts of central and north Kerala bears
1. Gough, Miller.
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out the general validity of the model presented above. We
are not here concerned with details about the forms of purity-
pollution avoidance between castes, nor with the detail of
traditional caste occupations, especially of the lower
specialist castes. The castes we are interested in are those
which were significant to political interaction.
The economy of Kerala, we saw earlier, was basically
agricultural. There were several kinds of land tenure,
1
north Kerala alone recognising a hundred kinds. Elsewhere
three main kinds of tenure were recognised. These closely
supported the stratification of castes on the accepted
ritual scale. The tenures were known as janmam, (or ownership),
kanara (or long lease), and verurapattam (or short sub-lease
for cultivation).
A janmamholding was normally the largest in a
village. It might include the whole village. It was a
freehold estate, exempt from taxation by any chief of the
district. An exception to this rule occurred in Travancore.
The Cochin ruling family owned estates in Travancore territory,
2
and these were liable to a tax known as rajabhogam. This 
was in fact a political tax, to prevent any claims of 
sovereignty by Cochin over its estates in Travancore
1. Gough, 1950.
2. Kagam Aiya, 1906.
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jurisdiction. no tax was levied on Brahmin owners, on
temples, or on Kshatriyas and Samanthans who did not have
political offices elsewhere.
Traditionally, janmaflis were said to belong exclusively
to Hambudiri Brahmins. A strong tradition exists that Kerala
was raised out of the sea by an ancient mythical hero of Hindu
mythology, Parasurama. He is said to have brought in the
1
itfarabudiris and to have divided Kerala among them. although
Harabudiris were considerable janmis, even after the Mysorean
invasion had caused many of them to lose their lands to
tenants and to the Muslim Moplahs, they were never the
exclusive owners of land in Kerala. The temple estates which
were also usually large, though managed directly by Brahmins,
were subject to a general supervision by chiefs. In chapter
III, we shall see that cheifs frequently battled over rights
of supervision, or koyma, in temples.
Jansna/*s were also held by Kshatriyas, Samanthans, and
Hayars of high status, and more rarely by the Arabalavasis,
or temple servants. Usually, each village had one major
janmi family which also exercised the functions of village 
2
headman.
A janmam holding was inalienable in theory. It 
could however be lost by being donated to a temple, to a
1. Innes, 1908, p. 40.
2. Miller, 1950.
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friend, or to a Sudra, that is Hayar, wife, or it might be 
1
dissipated. Selling a janmam was possible but it was a long
process.lasting several years, and a janmi could at any time
call off the sale, even after some instalments of the price
2
had been paid. It was always shameful to sell a janmam.
Each estate had attached to it a numoer of serfs of 
the untouchable castes of Cherumas or Parayans. a janmi could 
have his estates cultivated by these serfs. Usually, he leased 
all or part of his lands to long term tenants on a kanam 
tenure, He could lease on annual tenures to small cultivators, 
but this was usually done by the kanam tenants.
Kanam tenants held their leases nominally for twelve 
years, at the end of which they had to be renewed. Before 
the British, such renewal was almost obligatory on the janmi. 
British law tended to interpret the janmi-kauakkaran 
relation as a contractual one, and therefore easily terminable 
at the end of the twelve years. Kanakkarans were usually 
Hayars, who were warriors by profession. They were liable 
to be called up by the village headman to go to war on 
behalf of the local chief. Warring arid cultivation could 
be followed by the same men if wars were always seasonal.
This does not seem to have been the case. The only time wars
1. Slater, Vol. 1, 1918*
2. Miller, 1950.
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were halted were during the monsoons and at times of annual 
or other ritual festivals. The i\ayar kanakkaran therefore 
did not cultivate his lease himself. He sub-leased the land 
to small cultivators of a lower caste on an annual lease.
A kanam tenure involved no regular annual rent. 
Initially the kanakkaran paid a sum of money as a kind of 
mortgage to the janmi. At the twelve-yearly renewal, he paid 
some dues to the janmi.
The annual or verurapattara lessee paid an annual rent, 
largely in produce. The verumpattaradars were usually of the 
toddy tapping caste, or, possibly, Moplahs. The latter 
however are largely post-Tippu.
The several varieties found within each of these
A
three tenures are again dispensable information. What is of
interest is the correlation of caste to tenure; the more
valuable the tenure, the higher the caste of the holder.
The system performed some useful functions. It
linked the cash economy of the coast to the barter system
2
of the interior. The kanam payment to the janmi was in 
cash. Nayar soldiers were paid small cash amounts by their 
chiefs in addition to their rice allowance, and the kanam
1. Detailed in Logan, 1887; Innes, 1908; Buchanan, 1807; 
Hagam Aiya, 1906.
2. Gough, 1952, pp. 75-76.
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amounts must have come from this. The cultivators, selling
some of their crops (spices) to the coast, must also have had
their own access to cash. Another function of the system
1
was that it released the Gayars for military service.
The separation of ownership from control, and of control from 
military service and its hazards, ensured the stability of 
an essentially agricultural economy. The warriors were 
economically provided for with a minimum involvement in 
the agricultural sector. It is important to remember that 
most Hindu caste societies had military castes, but their 
systems of land tenure did not provide the near-perfect fit 
that Kerala did between the economic and political functions 
of castes.
The large religious tenures of Kerala belong to the 
landowning, non-political sector in the economy. On the one 
hand, they were exempt from war by ritual prescription, 
although they were never powerful enough to always keep 
outside or above the system of. warring relations among the 
chiefdoms. Moral and ritual sanctions, supported by the 
considerable agricultural wealth of both the temples and 
the Brahmins, gave to these tenures a special position in
1. Ibid.
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relation both to the chiefs who were of lower ritual status, 
and to the general population. Temple tenures were a frequent 
cause of conflict among chiefs. The disputes grew about 
the melkoyrna, that is, the right of general supervision.
Two other kinds of koyma right were recognised, the aga 
koyma or supervision of temple ceremonial, and the pura 
koyma or management of the temple properties. These koyma 
rights could be granted separately to different chiefs at 
the same time. An influential Brahmin manager could grant 
them en bloc to a chief other than the one in whose 
territory the temple stood. At the village level, managerial 
rights over temples were known as urayma. These were usually 
associated with a janmamholding. The village janrai who was 
also usually the headman, or desavagrzhi, therefore enjoyed 
a ritual office that supported his local authority. Urayma 
rights were transferable in exactly the same way as other 
janmamrights. A deed of sale, dated 1523 A.D., transfers to 
the buyer janmi rights in a desam (village), along with the 
desadhipatyam (authority over desam), the ambalam (temple), 
the ambalappadi urayma (rights in temple management), the 
lands of the devaswam ("wealth of the gods"), the Cheruma
1. Miller, 1950
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serfs attached to . the devaswam, and the lands and the slaves
-j
of the selling family. Nearly three hundred years later,
in 1810, a Palghat deed refers to the sale of a desam, its
desadhipatyam, two temples, the arabalappadi urayma and
" other temple dignities11, lands, slaves, retainers, the dues
2
of a desavazhi, and full rights in the desam.
Some of the temples performed a sanctuarial function.
The sanketam,^ or estate, of Sucindram in the far south was
used during the eighteenth century as a refuge by an
Attingal princess from her neighbouring enemy the chief of
Kayamkulam.^ The people of Nanjanad in its vicinity also
sheltered here during an invasion in 1719 by the Nayafcs of
5
the East Coast. In the latter case, the sanctuary was not 
6
respected. The sanketams have been compared to the churches 
of medieval Europe,^ but the latter were much more powerful 
than the sanketams. The church organisation was more 
extensive than the several principalities it covered, it 
had an independent administration, and had a high degree 
of centralisation. The medieval sanctuaries were more
1. Logan, Vol.II, deed no. 9.
2. Ibid, deed no. 49*
3. Gundert, 1872. One meaning of sanketam is given as,
"An asylum, holy refuge exempt from war and prof ana tion,f •
4. Pillay, 1953, P. *63.
5. Ibid. p. 259.
6. Ibid. p. 263.
7. Gough, 1961.
8 0
effective than the Kerala sanketams.
A sanketam has been defined as "the territorial
extent of the independent jurisdiction, spiritual and
temporal, of a pagoda (kshetra sanketam) or of a Brahmin
community in a particular locality (grama sanketam) within
the limits of which no acts calculated to pollute the temple
1
or the community were permitted by immemorial customs".
Another definition says it is "a religious corporation.
The lands belonging to a temple were under the control of a
separately constituted body of members, who in olden days
wielded unlimited powers within their jurisdiction. Even
the king had no control over these corporations except in
a general way. The lands belonging to the temples and
managed by the Yogaras were also exempt from the payment of
2
certain taxes and were under a special form of tenure".
The sanketams therefore had both a ritual status 
and an independent political status vis-a-vis chiefs, though 
their yogams were not the all-powerful despots in the 
sanketam, as implied in the second definition.
In the early nineteenth century, Travancore and 
Cochin states brought to British arbitration a dispute over 
the status and functions of the sanketams of Elankunnapuzha
1. Pillay, 1953, quoted on pp. 259-260, from Travancore 
Annual Report of Epigraphy, Vol.3*
2. Ibid, quoted on p. 260, from Travancore Archaeological 
Ser'L&S.s, V.
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and Annamanada temples. Travancore claimed that they were
independent territories. Cochin claimed they could act
independently only on questions of pollution. The award
went in favour of Cochin. This could however have been a
politic measure, or it may have been a cosequence of the
English idea of proper government, rather than a confirmation
of the traditional rights of sanketams.
Historical events indicate that there was no uniformity
in the powers enjoyed by the temple yogaras. These seem to
have varied according to immediate political circumstances.
If the local chiefs were weak, as in Travancore upto the
eighteenth century, the yogams were completely independent t
though they still did not have any formal political status.
Where a sanketam was strategically situated on the frontier
of a chiefdom, like Trichur in relation to Cochin to which
it was traditionally subordinate, its managing Brahmins could
side with their chief’s enemies. The Trichur Brahmins
continuously aided Cochin’s chief enemy the Zamorin, and it
was only after 1760 that Cochin punished them by confiscating
1
their estates. Generally the sanketams were not involved 
in the disputes of chiefs, where the jurisdiction of chiefs 
was not in doubt.
1. A. Govinda Wariar, 1928.
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The relative detachment of most sanketams from 
political conflict helped to preseve their large estates 
from dismemberment by conquest. Chiefly endowments and 
public contribution added to their wealth and made them into 
storehouses of the economic surplus of the region. The 
recurring wars over rights of supervision over temples were 
overtly fought for ritual prestige* but the wealth of the 
temples could hardly be irrelevant, although we have no 
evidence of how the chiefs tapped the wealth of the temples 
under their control.
The laws of inheritance, and especially of succession 
affected the political system. We shall see later that they 
provided a fruitful source of conflict. Here, a brief 
outline is given of the practices of the more important castes.
The laws of inheritance varied from caste to caste 
and from region to region. We shall see later, in this 
chapter and the next, how the laws of inheritance and 
succession affected the political system. The matrilineal 
principle was followed by all the ruling castes - the 
Kshatriyas, the Samanthans, and the Nayars - as well as by 
the lower sub-castes of Nayars who were the traditional 
warriors. The polluting castes, from toddy-tapper6 down, 
varied from patrilineal to matrilineal in different parts 
of Kerala. We are not concerned with these castes as they 
did not participate directly in the political system.
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Succession among the ruling castes went laterally 
through brothers, and then descended to the sisters1 sons. 
Positions inherited were chiefly titles, if any, held by the 
family. In a non-chiefly family, the headship of the joint 
family so descended. Where the family included the 
descendants of several women, lateral succession went by 
seniority of the descendant’s age and not by that of his 
mother. Apart from the recognised titles which were held 
by individual males, the joint family property was held in 
equal right by all members of the family. The property was 
normally both inalienable and impartible. Partition and 
transfer of the property could be affected by the mutual 
consent of all members of the family. Social consensus was 
against both partition and transfer. Partition among land­
owning Hayars was inevitable when the -family expanded, but 
however much a chiefly family expanded, it was not expected 
to make a complete partition. Its branches, or segments, might 
divide the property and build separate residences. But 
chiefly titles and the properties attached to these must 
still be shared by all segments. The division of these 
was generally regarded as disgraceful.
In central Kerala, the matrilineal castes also had 
matrilocal marriage, with the husband living with, or 
visiting his wife in her natal home. The family unit consisted 
of brothers, sisters, and the children of the latter. In
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northern Kerala , property rights descended through sisters1
sons, but on marriage a woman usually went to live in a
separate home with her husband* Her children could inherit
from him only his self-acquired property. His share of
ancestral property went to his sisters* sons* The conflict
latent in the recognition of both a man’s sons and his
sisters* sons often flared up in the north Kerala chiefdoms.
The rules of succession and inheritance followed in southern
Kerala in the eighteenth century were matrilineal* There
is some doubt about the rules followed in earlier centuries,
when it tS believed that Tamil influence was strong and that
possibly rules of inheritance and succession were patrilineal*
The liambudiri Brahmins- not a ruling caste, as we
have seen, but a powerful one in both ritual and economic
spheres^ were patrilineal* They at the same time practised
primogeniture.. The problem of younger sons was solved by
forbidding them to make legal marriages. The eldest alone
married a Hambudiri girl, and so provided legal heirs to
the family property. Younger sons were maintained by the
eldest. As for marriage, they contracted sambandham unions
with women of the matrilineal castes* The children of these
unions inherited from the mother, and were in no way a legal
1
liability to their Hambudiri fattier* Such hypergamous
1. Detailed in Schneider and Gough, 1961, pp. 319-320
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unions were sought after partly for status reasons by the
matrilineal castes. They were also sought after because
chiefly families could in this way avoid commitment to
ritual equality with fellow caste members, with many of
whom they might be involved in bitter political competition.
At the same time, they reinforced the solidarity of the
1
chiefdom, or the "block"• Hypergamous marriages between
Brahmins and the matrilineal ruling castes, just like the
hypergamous marriages between these ruling castes, served
to define the political unit, that is, the chiefdom.
The matrilineal rules of the Kerala castes, and
their near-perfect fit on the one hand with the patrilineal
Brahmins, and on the other hand with a military system
2
based on hereditary warriors, has fascinated many
3
anthropologists. Matriliny in itself is however not of 
direct relevance to the relationship of caste to traditional 
political organisation. It affects the detail of 
interaction, and is given here as necessary background material 
for the description of specific events and institutions in 
this chapter and the next.
Before describing the chiefdoras of Kerala, it is 
necessary to evaluate our sources. This is a necessary 
step if any measure of objectivity is to be attained. The
1. Bailey, 1963b, p. 108.
2. Gough, 1952, pp. 76-77.
3. These include Gough, Miller, Rao, Mencher, and Unni.?
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historians have warned that no source materials are free of 
some kind of bias, and for the anthropologist this is now 
accepted dogma. But in addition, sucja an evaluation is of 
interest in itself and reveals the climate of opinion in 
which these materials took shape. If the latter is a 
digression, it is nontheless important to the whole problem 
of using historical material.
My sources for Kerala fall into six broad categories.
Of these, four are charter-type histories, justifying some 
existing political situation. The remaining two are, firstly 
contemporary records of events which may include charter-type 
history, but are mainly descriptive; and secondly works of 
simple scholarship.
To take them in order, the first of the charter 
histories are the mythical variety. These are relatively 
old (probably pre-European), show local biases, and 
incorporate both legendary stories and factual accounts into
1
the same "history"• These are the Keralolpatti in Malayalam,
2
K'seralamahatmyam in Sanskrit and the Keralavartaman in 
3
Malayalam, untranslated, and probably pro-Muslim. The 
popular account is that of Keralolpatti (that is, "origin 
of Kerala11). It is largely a legitimisation of the Brahmin
1. K.V.K. Ayyar, 1938, PP* 313-314*
2. Gundert, 1844, PP.97-105*
3* India Office Library, on palm-leaves.
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power on the one hand, and of the existence of several 
chiefdoms on the other. Concerned mainly with the Zamorins,
it is nevertheless a regional history of Kerala. It is
1
thought to date to the seventeenth century. The Keralamahatmyam
also dates to this period. The value of these works as
source material is doubtful. !,The [keralamahatmyam], written
in indifferent Sanskrit, purports to be an excerpt from the
Agnl Purana, and exhibits throughout the tendency of the
Brahman to manufacture the sanctions of history for the
inflated pretensions of his caste. The keralolpatti, a
Malayalam work, though full of inconsistencies and vain
repetitions, suggests a more popular origin, and on that
2account is worthier of serious analysis1*.
The second category of charter histories is the 
work of local historians, writing in the early twentieth 
century. They wrote under the patronage of Kerala chiefs, 
some of whom still held their chiefdoms. Their work is 
painstaking, and includes materials from primary sources, 
such as manuscript records of the chiefly family concerned,
or temple records. The special historian of Cochin was
x L
K.P. Padraanabha Menon,-' of the Zamorin, K.V.K. Ayyar, and
5 6of Travancore the chief were Kagara ^iya and Velupillai.
1. Pillay, 1953, P. 12.
2. Innes, 1908, p. 39*
3« K.P. Padmanabha Menon, 1929*
4. K.V.K. Ayyar, 1931, 1938.
5. hagam Aiya, 1906.
6. Velupillai, 1940.
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They wrote in English and, if they were local men, in 
Malayalam as well. Their histories are not strictly 
speaking objective. At their worst, they have some obvious 
bowing and scraping to the patron, and at their best they 
are building up the image of the ruling family probably 
for the benefit of the imperial government. Their emphasis 
on the local unit however provides valuable factual 
information.
The third and fourth categories, the regional and 
the colonial historians, are less concerned with local units.
The regional historian, who is usually the regional patriot -
1 2  ^ 4and K.M. Panikkar, Rambiar, Gopalan, and Raja all fall
into this category - does not gain in objectivity though his
perspective is wider. On the contrary, the comparison with
other regions and indeed, other countries, vitiates analysis.
Regional consciousness, inextricably mixed up with national
consciousness, leads to an emotive view of history, and a
heavily biased, though not falsified, history. Though not
lacking in insights, on the whole this is among the less
useful sources. The loss of local detail is not compensated
by the wider perspective, since that perspective is not a
1. Panikkar, 1931, 1960.
2. Itembiar, 1963«
3. Gopalan, 1959*
4. Raja, 1953*
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theoretical but an ideological one.
The colonial histories are more subtle in their
bias. They are not concerned with local politics, except
insofar as they affected the colonial activities of the
succeeding waves of Europeans. Because ?they have no local
interests, there is a tendency among scholars to regard
them as having no bias. On their own scale however, bias
operates both in the selection of facts, and in their
interpretation. Their usefulness for local history must
1
always be limited. Logan, a late nineteenth century
historian-cum-administrator in Kerala, is an exception.
His scholarship is considerable, and he has translated
several Malayalam documents. He errs, however, on the
romantic side of colonialism, standing up for the subject
2 3
peoples. Other colonial historians are Innes, Alexander, 
Ferroli^ (a missionary), Drury,^ Duncan,^ and Galletti.^ 
None are free from what could be called a colonial bias.
Contemporary records have an obvious value in 
research. They are first hand accounts of events, 
interspersed with hearsay accounts current at the time.
They are exactly analogous to the information given to the 
anthropologist by individuals belonging to the groups he is
1. Logan, 1887, 1891*
2. Innes, 1908.
3. Alexander, 1946.
4. Ferroli, 1939*
5. Drury, i860.
6. Duncan, 1 819•
7* Galletti, 1911. "The Dutch in Malabar",Selections from the 
records of the Madras government, Madras,1911.
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studying* Bias in these accounts is almost entirely local, 
and achieves none of the scale of the theoretical and 
ideological biasses that colour both charter and supposedly 
objective histories. We might call it ”informant1s bias” . 
Such bias is part and parcel of the range of facts being 
analysed. Unfortunately, contemporary records are not 
exhaustive, and it is impossible to weight them as we do 
not know what has not been recorded. But if such information 
is uneven, it is the closest to reality that historical 
materials will ever reach. Contemporary records for Kerala 
are plentiful. Of these, the vernacular records have not 
yet been sufficiently explored. What we know of them is 
mainly through the local, the regional, and the colonial 
historians. European records are more easily accessible, 
though Dutch and Portuguese sources are not all translated. 
The Portuguese writings of Albuquerque1 and Barbosa,2 English
x L
accounts by Hamilton-' and Buchanan, the Tellicherry 
correspondence, and a Report by a Joint Commission^ from 
Bombay and Bengal immediately after Kerala was annexed are
1. Albuquerque, translated in 1877.
2. Barbosa, published 1866.
3. Hamilton, reissued 1930.
4. Buchanan, 1807*
3* Records of Port St. George, 1729-31 , 1749-50.
6. Report of a Joint Commission from Bombay and Bengal...
in 1792 and 1793* published 1862.
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some of the European sources used here. These serve as 
valuable checks on vernacular information, and also provide 
the occasional telling detail. They are however not a 
sufficient source for local history.
The last category, of simple scholarship, is a 
pitifully small one both in range of interest and in output.
It includes mainly brief articles discussing documents and 
inscriptions relating to ruling families or temples in 
Kerala, and are published in academic journals such as 
"Kerala Society Papers", mingled with other articles on 
culture, or history.
All six types of sources are used here, with an 
effort to cull the facts from each and cross-check where possible, 
and with no further attempt to explain their specific 
biasses as that is a major problem in itself.
The Kerala Chiefdoms 
During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, 
there were at least ninety chiefdoms in Kerala. Our 
information about these chiefdoms is uneven. It is also 
likely that some minor chiefs have escaped mention in the 
records. The lacunae however, could not be serious. Chiefs 
could only have escaped notice if they were very small and 
unimportant. Certainly, a map of Kerala with the known 
ninety odd chiefdoms marked on it shows no conspicuous blank
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spaces•
The Kerala chiefdoms were not equivalent political 
units* They varied in territorial extent from a few square 
miles to a few hundred square miles, we know, for example, 
that a large chiefdom like Kottayam in north Malabar covered
4
312 square miles, and Iruvalinad covered 45 square miles* 
Smaller chiefdoms, noticed by the Europeans, probably covered 
10 to 20 square miles. Of the remoter minor chiefs we 
know very little, and it is possible that their territories 
were more extensive, though they almost certainly were sparsely 
populated.
The variation in size correlated with a variation both 
in the power of the chief and of his caste status, though 
such correlation was only approximate, and not exact. The 
larger chiefdoms were favourably situated, either along the 
sea-coast, or in the wide plains area of central Kerala.
These chiefs belonged to the Kshatriya and Samanthan castes.
In all, twenty chiefs were Kshatriya, and five were Samanthans. 
Most of the Kshatriya chiefdoms were strung along the 
coastline. Of the Samanthan chiefs, only one (the Zamorin) 
commanded a good stretch of coast, and both traditional and 
documentary QQUrces indicate that he acquired this by 
conquest. His original territory was, like that of the
1. Buchanan, vol. II, 1807, P* 540
93
other Samanthan chiefs, a large inland area of low hills 
and valleys* This distribution of Kshatriya and Samanthan 
chiefs dates back at least to the Portuguese arrival, and 
probably goes back further* When or how the differentiation 
occured, we do not know. The higher caste status of coastal 
chiefs may have followed the development of overseas trade 
with the Middle East and South East Asia. Or the inland 
chiefs, the five Samanthan ruling families, may have grown 
from minor chiefs of iuayar caste as a result of the growing 
demand for the pepper which grew well in their low, hilly 
terrain. The small number of the Samanthan chiefs makes 
it very likely that they were such a splinter group, a sub­
caste in the making, which broke away from the i\ayars. Too 
small numerically to close their ranks, they generally 
contracted hypergamous marriages, with women taking Brahmin 
or Kshatriya consorts, and men marrying high hayar women.
The Samanthan chiefdoms were all located in central Kerala.
Intermingled with the major chiefdoms of the 
Kshatriya and Samanthan ruling families were a large number, 
at least fifty-seven, of minor chiefs, normally hayars 
but separated from the main body of the caste by titles 
such as Kaimal, Achanmar, kambiar, and Adiyodi. In some 
areas, kambiars and Adiyodis were separate castes, and we 
are not always sure whether for example, a kambiar chief 
is a Kayar with a title, or is of the kambiar caste. This
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is especially the case in north Kerala. It is also possible 
that the distinction between Hayar and Hambiar castes is not 
a clear one.
While there is no difference between Kshatriya and 
Samanthan chiefdoms in terras of size and resources, and they 
compete on equal terms, all the nayar dhiefdoms are in 
comparison smaller and weaker, and dependent to a varying 
degree on one or other powerful Kshatriya or Samanthan 
chiefdoms. They were generally located in remote or 
isolated areas, such as outlying mountains. There were also 
a small number of Brahmin chiefs. They were all located in 
central Kerala, none was very powerful in terms of economic 
resources or military power, though they generally enjoyed 
the high ritual status of all Kerala Brahmins.
The caste of the chief did not determine, in itself, 
the position of a chiefdom. Generally speaking, Kayar chiefs 
were the weakest, unable to escape domination by more powerful 
chiefs. The more powerful chiefs were always Kshatriya or 
Samanthan. There was however no regular pattern of domination 
between Samanthans and Kshatriyas. The Samanthan chief, the 
Zaraorin, had at least four Kshatriyas as his dependents.
The other Samanthan chiefs were powerful, but usually nominally 
dependent on a Kshatriya chief. Here, we need to step with 
caution. If we make allowance for the fact that the Zamorin 
broke out of his inland territory, won a place on the coast,
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and upset the existing balance of power, we could postulate 
an original consistent caste-oriented hierarchy of chiefdoms. 
This ”original hierarchy” dates too far beyond our documented 
period to be sufficiently proved. It is however a useful 
reminder that the system under consideration was not a static 
one. Theoretically, ajl the chiefdoms were sovereign 
independent units, since each had a right to engage in armed 
conflict on its own, a right supported by the method of 
recruiting an army by local chiefs from among local i\iayars.
In actual practice, the military capacity of the chiefdoms 
varied. The more powerful chiefdoms were able to impose 
their authority upon smaller chiefs, compelling them to pay 
tribute, to contribute IMayar levies in wars with other chiefs, 
to render services of a ritual kind where such domination 
was of long standing, and to deny them &£ certain privileges,
There were four major clusters of chiefdoms in Kerala, 
centred around the four powerful chiefdoms of Kolattunad, 
Ernad and its extensions, Cochin, and Travancore. The ruling 
families of these were respectively Kshatriya, Samanthan, 
Kshatriya and Kshatriya. The history of Kerala is largely 
the history of the struggles of these chiefs with each other. 
The other chiefdoms figure largely as dependents of one or 
other of these four. Territorial proximity was an essential 
condition of dependence, as it was indeed of all political
such their palaces.
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interaction* The major chiefdoms were ringed by dependent 
chiefdoms, ranging from quite powerful Kshatriya chiefdoms 
to the smaller Nayar chiefdoms that were large, near­
independent agricultural estates rather than chiefdoms.
The chiefdoms on the border of the cluster could, and often 
did, rebel against the central chiefdom, and might even join 
its enemies. The clusters were not formally recognised 
political entities, though in fact they persisted almost 
unchanged till the early eighteenth century.
If we examine each cluster of chiefdoms we find that 
there is invariably one central or core chiefdom, surrounded 
by a few powerful chiefs, with their dependent chiefs, and 
several smaller ones. The number of chiefdoms in each cluster 
ranges approximately from nineteen to twenty-three. The more 
powerful the core chief, the greater was his capacity to 
impose some degree of authority on dependent chiefs and to 
utilise their military potential to further his own interests. 
The Ernad cluster, led by Ernad1 s ruler, the Zamorin, (famous 
in early European records) was perhaps the most powerful.
The Zamorin, by extending his direct territorial rule to the 
area between Ernad and the sea, became the most powerful 
chief in that part of Kerala, and was able to impose effective 
control over nearly all his immediate neighbours. The 
Kolattunad cluster to his north was relatively weak, since 
the core chiefdom was not very powerful and was unable to
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exercise any real control over its dependent chiefdoms.
Cochin, south of the Zamorin, led the smallest cluster 
and this included a high proportion of small chiefs of 
ftayar or Kaimalx status. It was however a more tightly- 
knit cluster than Kolattunad, for example.
The southernmost cluster of chiefdorns.led by Travancore, 
was hardly a cluster at all up to the early eighteenth century. 
After that, it was systematically integrated until it became 
a full-fledged state. The earlier looseness of this cluster 
was possibly due to the rather special historical conditions 
that obtained in south Kerala. The various empires of the 
east coast had made frequent inroads into south Kerala, and 
levied taxes on its inhabitants. The indigenous dynasties 
of south Kerala were not dispossessed. But the effect on 
south Kerala seems to have been a weakening of the leading 
chiefly family, which split into several independent families, 
ruling independently of each other. j\ similar split occurred 
in Kolattunad, but only as late as the eighteenth century 
when the chiefdom was partitioned between two branches of 
the family.
It is significant that the Zamorin, himself a 
Samanthan, had no Samanthan dependents though he had eight 
Kshatriya chiefs dependent at various times. Cochin*s 
Kshatriya family could claim four dependent Saraanthans up 
to the early eighteenth century, while his Kshatriya
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dependents - three related families - passed out of his 
control either to the Zamorin or, in the seventeenth century, 
to the Dutch. The Kshatriya chiefs of Kolattunad counted one 
other Kshatriya family in their cluster, but this was powerful 
enough to be in practice independent. In Travancore, there 
were nine Kshatriya families of whom five were branches of 
the original family, two were branches of one of these, and 
two were said to be of foreign origin. We have seen that 
this was hardly a cluster at all.
It is reasonable to suppose that it would be difficult 
for one chief to exercise control over another from his own 
caste, more difficult even than to control a chief from a higher 
caste. The chances of holding a cluster together were 
better when the core chiefdom did not have to face a caste- 
fellow. This would account for the fact that the Zamorins, 
in their period of expansion, fully annexed territories held 
by Samanthan chiefs,- that is, dispossessed them - and only 
extended control, without annexation, over Kshatriya chiefs.
The leading Samanthan chiefdom of Valluvanad, though the immediate 
neighbour of the Zamorins and a continuous rival till the 
conflict shifted to the sea in the fourteenth century, was 
neither annexed (because too powerful) nor subjugated 
(because inherently more difficult to control by virtue of 
common caste). The lack of integration of the Travancore 
cluster is related to the presence of chiefs of the same 
caste. It is however not possible to say whether the
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proliferation of Kshatriya chiefs was the effect of the 
political weakening of the ruling dynasty (and thence of 
the cluster), or whether the political weakness was a 
consequence of the existence of several chiefs of the same 
caste. Imperial domination by the east coast provided the 
conditions for internal political weakness in Travancore.
The following is a diagrammatic representation of 
the clusters of chiefdoms in Kerala, upto the early eighteenth 
century, giving the caste of the chiefs? The scale of the 
diagram corresponds exactly to the map of Kerala given at 
the beginning of this chapter.
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The ruling families of all except Brahmin chiefdoms
followed matrilineal rules of succession and inheritance,
as observed in the matrilineal castes generally. Family
property was held jointly by the family which consisted of
consanguinal kin: brothers, sisters, the sisters1 children,
their daughters* children, and so on. In north Kerala a
man could and did often opt out of such a household to set
up a new home with a wife. The children however had rights
in the mothers* natal family. The double loyalty, to his
own sons, and to his sisters* sons, was a source of conflict
1
in north Kerala. The property was inalienable and impartible. 
When, however, the joint family, or tarawad, became too 
large, it could decide to partition the property among 
constituent segments, or tavazhis. Each tavazhi, (consisting 
again of brothers, sisters, and t he'.latter s * children), grew 
into a full tarawad in the course of time. The position of 
head of the family, or karnavan, descended by simple seniority 
through collaterals, to the sisters* sons.
The tavazhis of the ruling families also partitioned 
the family’s private property in this way. In fact there 
was much less partition among ruling families than among the 
ltfayars, for example. The residential unit had a much
1. Schneider and Gough, 1961, p. 392; Irines, Vol. I, 1908, 
pp. 57-58$ Logan, Vol. I, 1887, P* 345-
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greater generation depth than the average nayar family.
In 1950, one branch of the £amorin*s family had 172 members,
1
of eight generations, residing together. Reasons for less
frequent segmentation in ruling families given by Gough are
1), the fear of loss of power of the family, 2), formal
political offices, which separate the oldest males from
their families and thence from family conflicts, and 3)*
minimal involvement with the land, enabling individuals to
2
live apart though sharing the property. Political office, 
however, continued to descend as in the original tarawad, 
by seniority of age, except in the Travancore cluster of 
chiefdoms. Here, the partition was complete and the segments 
of the original family developed into five separate chiefdoms.
We know little of when or how this occurred. By the seventeenth 
century, it was a fait accompli. In Kolattunad, a complete 
partition occurred in mid-eighteenth century between two 
branches of the family.
The ruling families have a continuous existence from 
at least the ninth century onwards. Each one of them 
segmented into several branches. But, as we saw, there was 
no significant fragmentation of political units. Even in
1. Gough, 1950.
2. Ibid.
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the south, the five chiefdoms that grew out of the
Travancore family did not segment any further. In
Kolattunad, the partition came very late, was instigated
by the English interest in north Kerala, and was of a
limited extent. It was not a division among all the branches
of the family, but only between one hostile branch and the
rest. How the families avoided the problem of natural
increase is not at all clear. Unlike Rajasthan, where
chiefdoms were kept intact by the high incidence of death
in war among possible successors, the persons of chiefs and
their families were sacrosanct in war. There was no migration
to other territories. Since these families were wealthy,
their survival rates must have been quite high. The answer
may lie in marriage customs -a-higher age of marriage,
1
less stable marital unions.
The families which segmented lineally but continued 
to share the original chiefly offices of the family were 
rarely faced with extinction. The segments, among themselves, 
were usually able to provide heirs. Where the segments broke 
up however, as in the case of Travancore, the danger of 
extinction was constantly present, and they had to resort 
frequently to adoptions to continue the line. The
1. Gough, 1959, PP. 23-34.
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proliferation without separation of segments in a chiefly 
family thus ensured the continuity of the family. Such 
continuity was indispensable for the existence of the 
whole system of petty chiefdoms ruled by families of one 
or other of the ruling castes.
Each ruling family recognised a series of sthanams, 
or political statuses, to be held by its adult males. The 
powers of chiefship were shared differentially by these 
sthanaras , which were held on the basis of seniority of age. 
The segments of the ruling family shared succession to the 
sthanams, even after they had separated both residence and 
share in ancestral property from the original family, 
formally, at one time or other, the sthanams would be held 
collectively by all branches of the family. In practice, 
we find that a powerful branch could, and often did, 
reserve succession to sthanams to itself and possibly to 
a friendly or closely related branch, as occurred in both 
Cochin and Kolattunad.
The greatest number of sthanaras recognised in a 
Kerala chiefdom was six, among the Zarnorins. The smaller 
the chief dom, the fewer the sthanams it recognised, or, 
indeed needed. There is some evidence to show that the 
number of sthanams in a chiefdom varied according to its 
territorial extent and the ambitions of the ruling family.
A discussion of individual svarupams - that is,
ruling families - is closely involved with, their sthanams. 
The two are therefore dealt with together. Svarupams, as 
far as possible, are represented in a genealogical tree, 
but no attempt is made to date them accurately. They can 
only be vaguely assigned to a particular century.
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THE KOLASVARUPAM OF KOLATTUNAD
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The Kolasvarupam, a quite prolific family, has
instances of migration of segments of a ruling family which
was rare in Kerala. The British, tr purposes of granting
1
pensions prior to annexation, recognised five branches 
of the family in Kolattunad itself. Those who had migrated 
to Travancore and settled there were not recognised for a 
pension from the new British government. The recognised 
families were the Udayamangalam Mettale Kovilakam of the 
senior branch, and the Chenga, Kavinisseri, Tevanangatu and 
Padinhar Kovilakams of the junior Palli branch. The 
Chirakkal branch, by then,had monopolised succession to the 
chiefship. The pension to the chief was probably also a 
pension for the Chirakkal family, though this is not explicit 
in the pension list.
There were five recognised political statuses, the 
sthanams in the original Kolasvarupam. These were graded in 
rank. Succession to them was by seniority of age, taking 
all branches of the svarupam into account. The chief of the 
whole territory was known as the Kolathiri, and he ruled 
directly the central parts of K61attunad. His palaces,
1. See Pension List, Appendix.
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cremation ground, and temples were located here. The
Kolathiri sthanam was the seniormost.
The second and third sthanaras were respectively,
the Tekkelamkur i.e. southern viceroy, and the Vadakkelamkur,
i.e. northern viceroy. They ruled directly the southern
and northern parts respectively of Kolattunad. The ruling
family of Kadattanad chiefdom to the south of Kolattunad
is said to have sprung from a woman married to a Tekkelamkur.
1
The ruling family of Juilesvaram, to the immediate north,
is said to have originated from the marriage by elopement
of an Ernad princess to a Vadakkelamkur.
The fourth and fifth sthanams of Halamkur and
Anchamkur carried no share of territorial government. The
Kalamkur managed the Kolathiri householed and dispensed
2
titles and honours to Kayars and lower castes. The
3
Anchamkur was personal aide-de-camp to the Kolathiri.
4
There was also a female sthanam, the Achamma Muppusthanam 
held by the oldest woman member of the svarupam.
Succession to all sthanams was, as pointed out earlier, 
by seniority of age. It is very unlikely that formal 
succession went to the ablest, as stated by K.P. Padmanabha 
M e n o n . A  more realistic appraisal of Kolattunad dynastic
1. liow a part of south Canara.
2. K.P. Padmanabha Menon, Vol, II, 1929, P* 195•
3* Ibid. pp. 194-195*
4. Logan, Vol. I, 1887, P* 346.
5* K.P. Padmanabha Menon, Vol. I, 1924, p. 481.
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politics is given by Logan. ”0n examining the records it is 
found that, as a rule, the ablest member of the family, 
sometimes peaceably with the consent of all the members, 
sometimes by force, seized the reins of power at the earliest 
possible opportunity, and the rest of the family, although 
perhaps senior to himself, were mere puppets in his hands".1 
In the eighteenth century, severe conflicts arose about the 
succession because the rule was not allowed to operate as 
before, and English traders were actively interested that 
the sthanams be occupied by princes of the svarupam who 
were friendly to them. Logan is not free of a romantic bias 
in evaluating the political and other institutions of Kerala. 
Padmanabha Menon was Cochin’s historian extraordinary, 
interpreting to a foreign "overlord” government which in 
theory, and usually in practice, denied heredity as a basis 
of recruitment in government, and extolled merit. Their 
respective biases are evident in their account of the 
sthanams.
The events of the eighteenth century throw some light 
on the inside politics of the Kolasvarupam. The two main 
extraneous factors that affected Kolattunad at this time were, 
one, the development of European trading posts, especially by
1. Logan, Vol. I, 1887, P* 347*
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the English, and two, the invasions from the north by a
Canarese chief.
In 1708, the Vadakkelamkur (third sthanam) who was
1
then of the Palli Kovilakam granted the English a fort at
Tellicherry. In 1722, the Kolathiri himself granted certain
lands to the English, and these were confirmed in 1724 by
2
three "nephews1* of the Kolathiri. We do not know what 
branch of the family the Kolathiri belonged to, but the 
"nephews** were from two Udayamangalara (the senior) branches 
and the Palli (junior) branch. The svarupam was still 
ruling its traditional territory as one family. In 1730 
however, a Palli prince, and not the Kolathiri, promised 
the English that he would keep out other Europeans from the 
dependent chiefdoms of Iruvalinad, Randattara, and from 
Trentapatam.
Family dissension suddenly erupted into a major 
conflict in 1732, when the enemies^ of the Vadakkelamkur - 
but we are not told who exactly they were - invited the 
Canarese chief of Bednur to invade Kolattunad. Kottayam 
came to Kolattunad*s assistance when the Canarese reached 
its frontiers, and the English and the Dutch, suffering 
alike from the cutting off of rice supplies from Canara,
1. Logan, 1891, part I, Ro. III.
2. Logan, 1891, Part I, Ros. VIII & IX.
3. Innes, 1908* Vol. I, p. 59*
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A
joined to fight for the "safety of Malabar". By 1737, the
2
English succeeded in mediating a formal peace between the 
Kolathiri and Bednur, and Benur was not to cross the 
Valarpattanam river. This river boundary was "obstinately 
maintained"^ but the fighting went on.
The split in the Kolasvarupam now became crystallised, 
with the Vadakkelamkur, a Palli kovilakam man and immediate 
neighbour to Bednur by virtue of his chiefly duties in 
northern Kolattunad, fighting against Bednur, while the 
Anchamkur (fifth sthanam), an Udayamangalam man, joined 
Bednur.^ The English came out on the side of the Palli 
kovilakam.
The Vadakkelamkur, in 1749, an Udayamangalam man,
was persuaded to partition Kolattunad, and grant full rights
to the Palli branch to all the territory south of Taliparamba 
5
river. Later in the year, it was finally agreed to divide 
the territories at Cheria kunhu.^ This same agreement refers 
to the disputes "that have happened between my heirs and Unamen
7
and Cunhi Ramen of Palli Colote".
1. Ibid. p. 59»
2. Logan, 1891, Part, I, ho. XXXVIII.
3. Innes, 1908, Vol. I, p. 61.
4. Logan, 1891 , Part I, 1,0 . XXXVIII.
3. Logan, 1887, Vol. I,
6. Logan, 1891, Part I, translation of a grant in the Diary
of the Tellicherry Factory for 1749*
7. i.e. kovilakattu, "of kovilakarj/1 •
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A prince of the Chirakkal branch of the Palli
1
kovilakam, called by the English the Prince Regent,
imprisoned the Vadakkelamkur who was an Udayamangalam man,
He then released him, but the juniors of the latterfs family
objected and were thereupon driven into the forests by the
English. Around 1751* a new English factor at Tellicherry
2
decided to recognise the kolathiri, an Udaymangalam man,
and persuaded him to appoint a young prince from his own
family as the Regent. The factor was displeased with the
Chirakkal princes who were trying to subjugate Iruvalinad,
formerly a direct dependent of the kolathiri, and Kadattanad,
formerly controlled b9 whoever was the Tekkelarakur.
Chirakkal at once marched against its southern dependents*
The English found their proteges divided, and suspicious 
4of them, and proceeded to imprison the Kolathiri and his 
successor as hostages.
The Chirakkal prince fell in, and then out, of favour 
with the English* He died in 1759* At once the Regency,
recognised by the English, became the subject of a
succession dispute. The holder of the Vadakkelamkur sthanam, 
senior in age to the deceased prince, and the sister’s son
1. This is most probably the Tekkelarakur Sthanam.
2. K.P. Padmanabha Menon, Vol. II, 1929, P« 217*
3. Logan, 1891, Part I, no. LXVI.
4. K.P. Padmanabha Menon, Vol. II, 1929, P• 217*
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of the deceased (who had married his uncle’s daughter - 
a princess of Kadattanad by succession to her mother), 
were the rival contenders* The Vadakkelamkur won with 
English support. The French-backed nephew of the deceased 
had to leave the country.
The invasions from Mysore put an end to internal 
dissension for nearly three decades. After British annexation, 
in the settlement of the region, the family and its sthanaras 
again came up for discussion. In 1800, a inochulka was drawn 
up by two gramaras (Brahmin villages), the Herikod and 
Chuzhali Hambiars, and the principal mukhyasthans (landowners?) 
of Chirakkal district (the former chiefdom) , advising the 
English on the rights of the Chirakkal family.
"In obedience to the honourable English Company’s
orders that we point out the just mode of allotting the
1 2 
Cherical property as well as one-fifth of the collections
3
to the five Colghums of the Pally Colghum; upon due 
consideration of all the circumstances we give it as our joint 
opinion, that the Kelly and Puram amount of the Pally 
Colote^ property, be equally divided among the five Colghums, 
that the Cherical^ Colgham receive one-half of the one-fifth 
share of the collections, and that the residue be divided
1. i.e. privately owned by kovilakam, sthanam, etc.
2. Allotted by English, later replaced by pensions.
3* i.e. kovilakaras.
4. A measure of rice. Gundert, 1872.
5. A measure of rice, probably unhusked. Personal communication
by Mr. Sharad Chaxtdran.
6. i.e. Kovilakattu.
7. i.e. Chirakkal.
115
among the other Colghums to defray their expenses; that the
private property which may ... appear to have been acquired
by the Rajas of the Cherical Colghum be continued to the said
1
Colghum. That the property belonging to the Othenmungolum
Colghum be managed by the Rajas thereof. That in like manner
2
the private property of the Poothoowally Colghum be disposed 
of or granted thereto.
11 We concur in opinion that the above is agreeable to 
right and the customs of the country. The above-mentioned 
five Colghums are the Cherical, Cherical Padiniara, Cheanga, 
Teawaangoda and Kawanashery Colghums11.^
This document marks an important step taken by the 
English in resolving family disputes in Kolattunad. Just 
two years earlier, there had been armed encounters between 
princes of the ChirakKal and Chenga kovilakams, ended only 
when the latter were killed in an attempt on Puttur temple 
which was guarded by Chirakkal*s I\ayars. Earlier quarrels 
within or between kovilakams are not unknown,^ but we know little 
about the participants.
The sthanaras themselves became a matter of dispute 
even after other rights had been suitably partitioned among 
the kovilakams. After the 1749 partition, the Kolathiri
1. i.e. Udayamangalam.
2. i.e. Putupilli.
3. See gene-alogy, p. IQtf.
4. Logan, Vol. I, .1887, pp. 344-347; Hamilton, (1727), 1930 
ed. pp. 165-1o6.
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title receded in importance. The Udayamangalam family, 
confined to northern Kolattunad, dropped out of the picture, 
except as a counter used by the English to control the 
Chirakkal princes. The Chirakkal family were now the 
effective rulers, and the Kolathiri was replaced by 
Chirakkal raja as the premier sthanam. Kolathiri sthanam 
was recognised side by side, but shorn of its original power. 
From 1749 to the early nineteenth century, there was seven 
Chirakkal rajas. The last one sent his sister and her two 
sons to Travancore to protect them from Tippu Sultan before 
he had himself shot. In the confusion at the English take­
over, a Palangat (Padinhar?) man passed off as Chirakkal raja, 
but was succeeded by a genuine Chirakkal prince. The 
rightful Kolathiri at this time came from the Chenga 
kovilakam.^
The separation of titles and privileges, and the 
development, without supersession, of new titles, led to a 
dispute in 1821 between the Udayamangalam family and the 
Palli group of kovilakams. The British had granted a large 
pension to the Chirakkal Rajas and to the related kovilakams, 
and a small pension to Udayamangalam. They did not however 
deny the latter the right to claim the kolathiri sthanam.
1. Buchanan, 1807, Vol. II, pp. 557-558.
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Udayamangalam appealed for a higher pension as the rightful
claimant, at the time of appeal, to the Kolathiri sthanam*
But the English court refused to recognise any relation
1
between traditional sthanams and present privilege.
2
The pension list reflects the decaying Of the 
Kolattunad sthanams. Kot one of the original five sthanams 
merited a pension.
Kottayam Puravalya Kovil 
Puravalya kovil
Tekka (Southern) Padinyara (Western) Kizhakka ^(Eastern)
Kovilakam Kovilakam Kovilakam
The kovilakams of the Kottayam family were recognised 
as legitimate recipients of British pension. We know very 
little about the relations between the kovilakams until theI • - * •:-> '
I . V  *  S . ' . jr ‘- • ’ . . £• • * '■
British annexation. They were related to the ruling family
of Kurumbranad, of whom they are supposed to be a younger
branch.*^ They are believed to have acquired Kottayam by
4
conquest from Kolattunad. The Padinyara kovilakam, known 
also as Pazhachi, at one time owned Kadolly in Tamarasseri -
1. Logan 1891, footnote to Part I, Ko. XXXVIII quoted from 
Special Appeal Case Ko. 9, 1621, in Sadr Adalat.
2. See Appendix.
3. Buchanan, 1807, Vol. II, p. 499*
4. Ibid, p. 499*
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1
a territory south of Kurumbranad, held by the family*
2
There were four recognised sthanams for males -
the Mutta (Elder) Raja,^ the Elaya (Junior) Raja, the 
4
Munnamkur, the fourth is not specified anywhere* There was, 
however, a fourth sthanam, held at Tippu's invasion by the 
Padinyara kovilakam. This sthani, known as Pazhachi Raja, 
aided the British, but became a rebel after their
5 6annexc^ation, ostensibly due to a misunderstanding*
There was no recognised female sthanam, though
succession was matrilineal.^ The sthanams were not recognised
as recipients of British pensions. These were granted only
8
to the kovilakams*
Porlathiri Svarupam of Kadattanad.
9
Tradition has it that this family, originally Kayars 
of high status, conquered its chiefdom from Kolattunad.
It acquired its chief port Vadakkekara from Kolattunad as 
late as 1564 A.D.1^ Another tradition11 says they were
1. Ibid* p. 483.
2. Ibid, p. 483.
3. Logan, 1891, Part I, ho. XXX, 1736; Pt. II, ho. CLVII, 1797.
4. K.P. Padmanabha Menon, 1929, Vol. II, p. 234.
5. Buchanan, 1807, Vol. II, p. 484.
6. Logan, 1887, Vol. I, pp. 514-515.
7. K.P. Padmanabha Menon, 1929, Vol. II, p. 233* Logan, 1891.
8. See Appendix.
9. Listed among others by Buchanan.
10. Kunhi Kannan in Logan, Vol. II, 1887.
11. Keralolpafti, quoted in all local historians.
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originally chiefs of Poland, from which they were driven 
out in the thirteenth century by the Zamorin of Ernad. One 
of their princesses married a Tekkelamkur of Kolattunad, 
and her descendants became chiefs of Kadattanad.
The family split into tv/o kovilakams, both recognised
A
for British pensions. A letter from the kolathiri to
Tellicherry refers to the chief of Kadattanad as Putiya
2
kovilakattu Adiody, but there is no Putiya kovilakam in
the pension list. The sthanams, two male and one female,
were also recognised.^ The female sthanam of Porlathiri
Valiya (Senior) Rani was considered to be the highest of the 
L
three.
Achanmars^ of Randattara 
The four Achanmars are said to have split from two 
original families. Ro sthanams are mentioned here. Achan 
was a title conferred on important Rayars. The Randattara 
Achanmars were not Svarupis, or sovereign chiefs, and would 
not therefore recognise sthanams, but only headship of the 
family. They were not granted pensions because they had been
1• See Appendix.
2. Logan, 1891, Part I, Ro. LXVI, 1751.
3. See Appendix.
4. Logan, 1891, Part I, note to Ro. XIII, 1725.
5. A chiefly title used by Rayars. v
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allowed to retain their houses and a temple estate, free 
of tax.
The Iruvalinad Karat)iars
There were six Rambiar families, said to have grown 
1
out of two Adiyodi families. The Kizhakedatta , Mittangott,
Kampratta, and Chandroth are segments of one family. The
other family split into the Kariyad and the Rarangoli.
Three branches, or tavazhis, of the last-named are recognised 
2
for pensions. The other Rambiars (assuming that the pension 
list is exhaustive), did not segment any further.
Like the Achanmars, they have no recognised sthanams.
The Kurungoth Tadam (family)
This was a Nayar family, without sthanams, probably 
segmented judging from the separate pensions^ granted to 
its members. Whether these represented separate families 
is however uncertain.
The families so far described were the major units 
that make up the northern - most cluster around Kolattunad.
It seems clear that some amount of segmentation of families
1. High Rayars, either a sub-caste or title.
2. See Appendix.
3. See Appendix.
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was a common occurrence in all of them, though it was less 
frequent in the svarupams than in the Kayar joint family.
In the more powerful families, political status is defined and 
separated from headship of the family in the form of sthanams* 
iMayar chiefs do not recognise sthanams. They are merely 
heads of their families. Families where political functions 
are separated from domestic ones through sthanams also have 
the further elaboration of a severalty of sthanams. The 
recognition of up to six sthanams - the maximum for Kerala 
chiefdoms - ensured that power was distributed among branches 
of the family at the same time that it enabled the family 
to rule quite large areas effectively. It prevented any one 
branch from monopolising power formally. It also separated 
political functions from domestic ones arising out of head­
ship of the family. The more powerful the chiefdom, the 
greater the separation of political action from the field of 
kinship relations. Sthanams indicated a development of 
specifically political functions, and of a complex political 
organisation.
The Zamorins
The Zamorins, known as the Kediyiruppu svarupara from 
the village of their origin, originally ruled Ernad, an 
interior chiefdom just north of Valluvanad. They were 
Samanthan by caste, like the ruling families of the other
1. Gough, 1950; Schneider and Gough, 1901, p. 324.
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large interior chiefdoms of Valluvanad, Vadakkumkur and
Tekkumkur in central Kerala. The Zamorins alone of these
Samanthan chiefdoms - all rich in pepper - struck out
towards the coast and succeeded in annexing the chiefdom of
Polanad, probably before the establishment of Calicut city
1
in the eleventh century. There they founded, or developed,
the port of Calicut which became their capital. And they
conferred the title of Calicut Talacchanmar (i.e. a kind of
mayor of Calicut) on the eldest male in the family of the
wife of the dispossessed chief, who had made the annexation 
2
possible. Ernad, their original territory, receded in
importance, and was assigned to the holder of the second
sthanam of the Zamorins. Other coastal chiefdoms - Pynad,
Ramnad, and Cheranad - were also annexed, but we do not
know when, nor from whom. The only clue to the acquisition
of Cheranad is a statement made by the sixth sthani of the
Zamorins to Buchanan, that it was given to his family by the
Valluvanad raja for help against the northern Rayars.^
Pynad was obtained as a result of a marriage alliance 
4
with Kurumbranad. The Polanad family is believed to have 
become the ruling family of Kadattanad.
1. K.V.V. Ayyar, 1938, pp. 81-82.
2. Ibid., p. 82.
3. Buchanan, 1807.
4. K.V.V. Ayyar, 1938, p. 137.
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The near-legendary history of Zamorin expansion from
their original base in Ernad is confirmed by the kind of private
estates recognised as their property by the British after 
1
1792. Their possessions in Ernad and Calicut are all 
devaswams (temple estates) - a traditional form of wealth.
The vast estates they own in their own right^ as secular 
property, are all located in territories traditionally 
recognised as later conquests, or subjugations. Devaswams 
and brahmaswams (Brahmin estates) were also acquired in the 
latter expansion. But the holdings in the original 
territories are not secular. This is an indication, if a faint 
one, that before the economic expansion of Kerala through 
overseas trade - which was the direct cause of the political 
expansion of the Zamorins, land ownership was bound up with 
ritual values, and chiefs were probably limited in the scope 
for competition as much by the more limited land-based 
economy as by the fact that much of the land was held by 
Brahmins and temples. One writer says, “Kshetra-sambandham 
or temple connection became the true sine qua non of
p
kingship11. This is an extreme view of the importance of 
temples in early Kerala history, but it underlines their
1. Ibid, Appendix, V, pp. 328-330.
2. S. Ramanatha Aiyar, 1938, P* 18.
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role in the political system.
The Zamorins annexed some territories in the 
interior largely as a result of conflict with two powerful 
neighbours, Valluvanad and Palghat. This conflict lasted 
through the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries. Economic 
interests were probably involved, as the Zamorin breakthrough 
to the sea gave them an edge over the other interior chiefdoms, 
who were caste equals. These latter however do not appear 
to have tried to follow the same policy of seaward expansion, 
but rather to cut down the Zamorins to size. They were 
however severely handicapped because of this. Valluvanad, 
by the end of the fifteenth century, ceased to be an 
effective rival. It asserted its equality of status, however, 
by carrying on what could be called a ritual of war against 
the Zamorins, at the twelve-yearly ritual known,a8 the 
mahamakham. This ritual of war was scrupulously observed 
by Valluvanad upto the eighteenth century, when the 
mahamakharn ritual was itself suspended.
The Zamorins were aided by Moors in the conflict with 
Valluvanad. Their help gave the Zamorins an added advantage 
in the conflict. They provided an additional source of 
both armed force, and of financial resources. Their services
1. See Chapter III.
12 5
were recognized by the assignment of special ritual roles
in tbe mahamakhara ceremony to Moorish leading men. For the
Moors, military assistance to the Zamorins was an investment
in the security of their trade in the Zamorin*s territories.
The conflict with Valluvanad and with a southern
Kshatriya neighbour, Cochin, was in some way bound up with
1
an ancient conflict between two Brahmin factions. The
2
reforming faction, led by Panniyur gramam, was supported 
by the Zamorins. The orthodox Chovvara faction was 
supported by Cochin and Valluvanad. How important the 
Brahmins actually were at this period, we do not know. 
Traditional histories are strongly coloured by Brahmin bias, 
and they claim that originally the Brahmins ruled Kerala. 
They gave up their power when they began to quarrel by joint 
decision. For they invited rulers from the east coast to 
govern for twelve-year tenures. This system is said to have 
lasted till the ninth century, when the ruler at the time 
partitioned Kerala among the several Kshatriya and Samanthan 
chiefs.-^
The Brahmin factions may have resulted from the 
conflict of the chiefs, or at the least may have been 
aggravated by it. By the "European" period of Kerala1s
1. K.V.K. Ayyar 1938* pp. 97-101; K.P. Padmanabha Menon, 
Vol. I, 1924, p. 59.
2. Brahmin village.
3* The Keralolpatti history, detailed in K.V.K. ayyar, and 
in Logan.
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history, they had become largely legendary.
A pre-European conquest of the Zamorins was 
isedunganad whose Samanthan chief called them in because 
his nobles were intriguing with Valluvanad and Palghat.
The second sthani of the Zamorins, or Eralpad, led the 
campaign. He had to overcome various Kayars, two Patanayars, 
or army commanders, (one of whom led the Palghat army), a 
naduvazhi (district chief) of Valluvanad, and the Cheruma 
and Panan untouchables around Karimpuzha. These last were 
"conquered" by being won over. Combat, involving physical 
contact with the untouchables, was out of the question.
The Valluvanad raja had a koyma right over Tiruvegappara 
temple, and some lands, which he had earlier taken from a 
nayar chief. These were taken over by the Eralpad. Finally 
the Hedunganad chief himself was dispossessed, and granted 
instead a pension and a koyma right in Cherupulachery temple.
The Hedunganad campaign, though insufficiently 
documented, is more typical of pre-European Kerala warfare. 
Temple rights were important features in it. On the other
’ "i - * ■ V,‘ s  - v,/
hand, it is atypical insofar as the dispossession of a
; /
defeated chief was not a characteristic result of war in 
Kerala. The Zamorins, by a fortuitous expansion of overseas 
trade, were able to upset the political balance of the 
chiefdoms , and to make large annexations. Even so, in the 
course of nearly four centuries they had only annexed their
127
immediate neighbours on the coast, and expanded some way 
southwards at the expense of the smaller chiefs. In the 
sixteenth century, the Portuguese support to Cochin redressed 
the balance, and, though the Zamorins fought as fiercely as 
before, and they maintained, and even added to, their ring 
of dependent chiefs, there was no major annexation, or 
dispossession. The values of political behaviour strongly 
favoured a policy of "no dispossession". There are no 
written texts prescribing approved political behaviour 
between chiefs in Kerala, and there is no specific evidence 
that they were verbalised. But the breach of the "no 
dispossession" value, whether this was conscious or unconscious, 
did set in motion very strong forces of protest and armed 
hostility from the minor chiefs in the dispossessed chieffs 
territory. Shaykh Zaynu!d-Din commented on the moderation 
of the Zamorins in restoring defeated opponents, a comment 
probably based on contemporary values rather than on the 
actual facts. That the Zamorins were limited by some 
observance of this rule is evident from the limited expansion 
for the period covered. The expansion incorporated immediate 
neighbours - who Would in any case be the most closely 
controlled in the cluster around the Zamorins - and stopped 
when it came up against powerful chiefdoras with chiefs of
1. Zaynufd-Din, 1942.
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equal or higher caste, and themselves potential core
chiefdoms , with their own spheres of influence.
The Zamorins took the first step towards centralisation
by expanding territorially and displacing possible rivals.
They did not, however, take the crucial next step of developing
an administrative system which would allow for indefinite
expansion, such as appointing new officials to govern additional
territories, or establishing a uniform administration.
They merely expanded the existing form of government. From 
1
two sthanams, they developed six, at least three of which 
had definite territorial jurisdictions. Officials to 
administer the cities, perform ministerial functions, and 
command sections of the army, were all hereditary incumbents. 
They were in fact minor chiefs, who held their estates by 
inatienable right, but who by long subjection and tradition 
had become functionaries of the Zamorins.
The horizontal expansion was not matched by vertical 
consolidation, and this set a severe limit to the scope for 
political centralisation. We shall see later that Travancore 
succeeded, within a few decades, where the Zamorins failed 
in the ten centuries of their recorded history.
1. K.V.K. Ayyar, 1938, p. 9
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The Svarupara of the Zamorins was much less segmented
than that of Kolattunad. Till 1792, it had split into only
1
three kovilakams. (Gough claims this split occurred after
2
1792, K.V.K. Ayyar definitely dates it earlier. A first
split had already occurred during the pre-Portuguese conflict
with Valluvanad. A second one was not a split but the
creation of a kovilakam by adoption, in 1707 A.D.). After
1 7 9 2 , only one of these three kovilakams has again segmented
*
into three tavazhis^ in the British period. The lack of 
greater segmentation may have been due to fewer numbers, 
although the Zamorins only once had to resort to adoption, 
in the early eighteenth century. After 1792, they appear 
to have become prolific, with one of the kovilakams numbering 
17 2 members, over eight generations living in one highly
5
organised establishment.
Why did the Zamorins segment less than the Kolasvarupam?
Was the Samanthan family structure tighter than that of the
Kshatriyas? Were the political stakes higher for the
£
Zamorins? Gough gives three reasons for which svarupams
1. Gough, 1950.
2. K.V.K. Ayyar, 1938*
3. Gough, 1950.
4. Ibid.
5* Ibid.
6. Ibid.
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segmented 32ss than the taravads of high i\iayars. One was the 
stake in political office and power, which would diminish 
with segmentation. The second was the remoteness from agricu 
ltural activity, giving the svarupara the character of a vast 
corporation whose member-families - the potential segments - 
either shared the proceeds and lived apart as in north 
Malabar, or lived in separate apartments in the same palace 
as in south Malabar. The third reason was the institution 
of sthanams which prevented conflict among influential 
elders by distributing royal power, and by separating them 
from their own member-families.
The difference in rate of segmentation between 
svarupams cannot be fully explained by the sthanams, nor 
by the corporation-like organisation, since these were 
common to most svarupams. There were however differences in 
power, in terms of both financial and military resources, 
between svarupams. If svarupams were in general more 
powerful than Nayar tarawads, not all svarupams were 
equally powerful. Some were more powerful thau others, and 
the more powerful the svarupara, the less it segmented.
The segmentation of Travancore, upto the eighteenth century, 
among collaterals of one svarupam was a symptom of its 
weakness. The lack of much segmentation in the Zamorin 
family was a symptom of its strength.
One other factor is of significance as well. The
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less physically isolated a chiefdom was, the more it was 
likely to face opposition from neighbours. The extent 
and persistence of such opposition would inevitably affect 
segmentation. Cochin, for example, was not a powerful 
chiefdom, even after it gained European allies. The family 
did segment, and dissension among the branches was very 
common. Yet there was no outright partition of the 
territory as occurred in Kolattunad in the eighteenth century, 
and as is believed to have occurred at various times in the 
svarupams of Parappanad, Palghat, Kottayam-Kurumbranad, and 
Chavakkad.
The cluster of chiefdoms that came under the
influence of the Zamorins consisted of several Brahmin and
Kshatriya svarupams as well as sane Kayar and Kampati (that
2
is, degraded Brahmin ) chiefs. The Kshatriya svarupams had 
recognised sthanams, though the number was smaller than that 
for the Zamorins. There was also some degree of segmentation, 
ho details are available about sthanams in Brahmin svarupams , 
though at least one of them (Talapilly) segmented, into four 
branches. Kothing is known, about the family structure and 
offices of the lesser Kayar and hampati chiefs.
The Cochin-dominated cluster contained a number of
1. Gough, 1950.
2. Local traditions say they were degraded but not outcasted 
because they took up arms, and shed blood. They could be 
described as warrior Brahmins.
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minor chiefs with titles such as kartav and kaimal on tfre 
north, and towards the south, minor chiefs called madampis 
along the coast, with quite substantial Samanthan chiefs 
to the south-east in the interior. It is of great interest 
that there are no Kshatriya chiefs under the Kshatriya 
chief of Cochin, but there are several Samanthans. This 
situation is exactly parallel to that of the cluster around 
the Zamorin, himself a Samanthan, who had several Kshatriya 
chiefs under him but no Samanthans.
The Kolattunad cluster was much looser than the two 
in central Kerala. The Kshatriya Kolasvarupam counted one 
Kshatriya chief in his sphere of influence, in Kottayam.
This family were however, on the one hand said to be of 
foreign origin, and on the other were not in any respect 
actually controlled by the Kolasvarupam.
The absence of status equals in a position of super- 
and subordination i8 brought home forcefully in the structure 
of the fourth cluster, in Travancore, There, the five most 
important chiefs were collaterals, probably segments of the 
original Kshatriya svarupam. There was no system of ordination 
between the collateral chiefdoms upto the eighteenth century, 
vtfhen such ordination began to develop in the eighteenth 
century, it was finally established only by the abolition 
(through outright annexation) of the collateral chiefdoms 
by one of them. There was never a cluster of chiefdoms around
core svarupam. First, there was a number of roughly 
quivalent and closely linked chiefdoms. This gave way 
well-integrated, centralised state, a modern kind.
13 4
Chapter III
Political Interactions of the Chiefdoms of Kerala
The history of the chiefdoms of Kerala upto the 
time of the Mysorean invasions is mainly a record of their 
wars with each other. Ro chiefdom of any importance which 
was in physical contact with others seems to have been 
either able or willing to avoid war. Even the Brahmin 
chiefdoms were not exempt. The major conflict from the 
Portuguese advent to the eighteenth century was between 
the Zamorins and Cochin. The wars fought by these two 
svarupams, and the involvement of their dependent chiefdoms, 
will be used to illustrate the causes of war in Kerala, 
the techniques of war, and the recognised and implicit 
rules that limited these wars.
Broadly, the causes of war can be divided into 
two categories, the ritual and the secular. Ritual causes 
pertained mainly to the rights, or koyma, enjoyed by 
svarupams over temples and their estates. Sometimes they 
related to special ritual observances, or objects.
Secular causes pertained to acquisition of territory, 
competition for the profits of the overseas spice trade, 
protection of dependent chiefdoms, interference in the 
internal affairs of rival chiefdoms either in succession 
disputes or by giving support to a hostile faction. It is
13 5
thought by some writers that the European traders exacerbated
1
wars between chiefs* The evidence of tradition (Keralolpatti)
2
and early Arab writers is that the chiefdoms had always 
been at loggerheads. There was some change in the techniques 
of war, but none comparable to the much earlier introduction 
of gunpowder by the Arabs. They did, however, cause much 
of the conflict to centre on secular interests, especially 
trade, and conflicts over ritual rights and privileges 
became secondary. It must be pointed out that ritual rights 
involved economic interests, since temple estates were often 
vast reserves of landed wealth. But as commerce grew, and 
agriculture ceased to be the major source of wealth and 
especially of revenue to chiefs, conflicts became more 
clearly secular. Commerce, as we saw in Chapter II, was 
in the hands of non-Hindus, and was not tied in with 
considerations of ritual status or belief, as was agriculture.
There are specific references in the literature to 
wars over ritual matters between the Zamorins and Cochin.
Some of these are pre-European, and known only through 
traditional histories. The earliest reference is to two 
factions of XMambudiris, led respectively by the reformist
1. Schneider and Gough, 1961, p. 318.
2. Shaykh Zayndd-Din, 1942.
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gramara of Panniyur and the conservative gramam of Chovvara.
The Zamorins were the champions of Panniyur, while their 
rivals, Cochin and Valluvanad, supported Chovvara. The 
Brahmin chief of Tirumanasserinad, of the Panniyur faction 
(not marked in English maps of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries), was joined by the Zamorins, against Cochin and 
Valluvanad. During this war the Zamorins took from Valluvanad, 
with the help of the Moors, the control of Tirunavayi temple, 
though they allowed that one of the four managing trustees 
(uralans) be a representative of Valluvanad. This was an 
immense ritual gain. The performance of the duodecennial 
raahamakham ceremony at Tirunavayi (discussed later in this 
chapter) conferred ritual prestige on the chiefly performer, 
as was the case in all major temple rituals. Since the 
temple was located in the southern annexations of the 
Zamorins, its control confirmed and legitimised these 
annexations. In another conflict (this time with hedunganad) , 
the Zamorin!s heir, or second sthani, deprived the Valluvanad 
chief of his koyma right in Tiruvegappura temple,-^ which 
was in Ledunganad. On the other hand, when the chief of 
ftedunganad was dispossessed of his chiefdom, he was
1 . wambudiri village.
2. Logan, 1887, Vol. I, p. 164.
3. K.V.K. Ayyar, 1936, p. 124.
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compensated with a pension and a koyma right in
„ 1
Cherupulacherry temple.
The Pattinhattedam Hambudiri of Trichur was a very
powerful Brahmin. He denied that Cochin had a melkoyma
2
or Overlord* right in Trichur*s Vadakkunathan temple.
Trichur lay between Cochin and the Zamorin. The Hambudiri 
turned to the Zamorin in his quarrel and Trichur was, even 
in European times, a battlefield between the two chiefs.
The instances already cited probably date to two 
or three centuries before the Portuguese arrived. There 
were probably numerous such conflicts between other chiefs 
as well, but the material is sparse.
Shortly after the Portuguese arrived, in 1503, the 
Zamorin removed from Cochin a sacred stone used in the 
rituals of the svarupara, and placed it in the Brahmin 
chiefdom of Edapilly, which was hostile to Cochin. A 
member of the svarupam of Edapilly was believed to have 
given Mattancheri and Vypin^ to his Kshatriya wife of 
Cochin, rousing the anger of his family. The hostility 
of the Edapilly svarupam to Cochin was explained by 
reference to this tradition.
Ibid. p. 12b.
2. Ibid, p. 129.
3» Adjacent to Cochin.
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Some decades later, around 1536, the Crariganore 
chief asked Cochin to prevent the Zamorin from attending 
an annual Cranganore festival (related to the all-Kerala
4
tradition of the ancient perumals or east coast rulers).
Cochin declined, in order not to let the Portuguese into
Cranganore. The Zamorin, having won his way to this
assembly, immediately decided to perform some rituals on
the sacred stone he had placed in Edapilly. Cochin at
once called for Portuguese help, and succeeded in getting
back the stone before the monsoons brought the war to an
end. The Portuguese used the war to obtain economic
2
privileges from the Zamorin.
The next war over ritual privilege occurred in
3
1579* The Zamorin prevented Cochin from entering a temple 
near Cranganore. The matter was resolved by a war in which 
Cochin was defeated. The last such occurrence appears to 
be a war in 1742 between Cochin and the Zamorin over the manage­
ment of Triprayar temple,^ though we have no accessible details 
of this.
The competition for ritual privileges, as we saw, 
concealed economic and power motives, as commercial interests 
developed, providing the chiefs with sources of income addit-
1. K.P. Padmanabha Menon, 1924, Vol. I, p. 501.
2. K.V.K. Ayyar, 1936, pp. 203-204.
3* Zaynu'd-Din, 1942, p. 92.
4. K.V.K. iiyyar, 1936, p. 233.
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ional to what they got in fees and duties from their
agricultural ’subjects1, ritual seems to have lost
importance* There is, of course, the possibility that
the largely European sources of Kerala history after
the sixteenth century neglected to report wars, and aspects
of wars, in which they were not directly involved. Had
these been conspicuous, however, it is unlikely that they
would be overlooked either by European chronicles or by
the vested European interest in Kerala.
Among what have been called the secular causes of
war, the intervention in succession disputes, and protection
Of a feudatory occur throughout Kerala’s recorded, pre-
British history. Succession disputes in particular were a
fertile source of conflict both within chiefdoms and between
the allies of the contending factions. The earliest 
1
reference to a war over succession dates it to pre- 
Portuguese times, when the Cochin chiefship was disputed, 
and the Zamorin supported one faction in its claims.
Better authenticated succession disputes occurred 
from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, mainly in 
Cochin, but also in Kolattunad. We do not know of any such
1 . Ibid. pp. 1 2 9 -1 3 0 .
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dispute in the Zamorin family. Travancore had a succession 
dispute in the eighteenth century, but this was in many ways
aberrant, as we shall see in the section on Travancore.
The Cochin svarupam, when the Portuguese arrived, 
had already segmented into five tavazhis - Elaya, Matattinkal, 
Pallivirutti, Mutta, and Chaliyur. The first two became 
extinct by Visscherfs time. With such a prolific family, 
there were so many older men that when the senior male 
succeeded to the chiefship, he was usually an old man. He 
was then allowed to appoint a regent, a man from his own 
tavazhi, to rule for him. On the chief*s death, the regent 
did not become chief, but had to retire to a temple and r,
’ I S
live as a recluse. The succession went to the rightful 
heir - the eldest male from among all five tavazhis. In 
1510, the chief was an Elaya, a tavazhi friendly to the 
Portuguese. The latter therefore wanted his regent, also 
an Elaya, to become chief instead of retiring to a temple, 
as required by Cochin custom. They succeeded in keeping 
out the rightful heir, then a Mutta member, although the 
latter had the support of the Zamorin, Cochin nobles, and 
the Brahrnins. For the next hundred and fifty years, the
1. K.P. Padmanabha Menon, 1924, Vol. I, Visscher*s letter 
ho. IX, p. 4.
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Elaya tavazhi kept the chiefshi£ to itself. a Kerala
tradition claims that since the partition of Kerala in
the ninth century, the Elaya tavazhi monopolised the
2
succession because it alone had heirs at that time.
At some time during its Portuguese-supported monopoly,
the Elaya chiefs created a sinecure sthanam, the
Perurnpatappu Muppu, to be .held by the senior malejof the
excluded tavazhis (who would normally be either chief or
heir to the chiefship). This sthani was given the control
of one had, or district. The Elaya family was succeeded
by a Matattinkal, to which it had given heirs in adoption
in 1635» The two families thus merged. The Elaya had
made adoptions before this from the Matattinkal, a wealthy
tavazhi, as also from two other avarupams - the Villarvattam,
4
which was either the ruling family of Crangamore or a 
svarupara once located in the lands of Cochin*s hereditary 
minister the Paliath Achan (that is, i^ ayar lord of Paliam) , 
and absorbed by adoptions into the Paliam family.^
In the 1650s, the Elaya-Matattinkal tavazhis were 
in danger of extinction. They made adoptions from the
1. Gough, 1950.
2. K.P. Padmanabha Menon, 1924, Vol. I, p. 480.
3. Family, i.e. village name of Cochin Svarupam.
4. Logan, 1887, Vol. 2, Lo. 7»
5. K.P. Padmanabha Menon, 1924, Vol. I, pp. 450-461.
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three other tavazhis, and immediately a sharp dispute 
developed about the succession. The accounts of this
dispute are not consistent. It seems that the Pallivirutti
2
adoptee was favoured by the Portuguese, but this prince died.
4
A prince of the Ohaliyur branch was recognised, but again
the Portuguese bypassed them and put through the adoptions
5
of five princes of the Bettern svarupam. All through, the 
Portuguese were determined to keep out the heir of the 
Mutta tavazhi, a branch that was involved very early in 
Portuguese hostility to its claims. The Mutta and Chaliyur 
princes had friends among the southern chiefs, and the 
Mutta also had Zamorin support. When the Cochin chief died, 
the eldest Bettern adoptee was made chief with Portuguese and 
Cochin nayar support. The Zamorin, in support of the Mutta 
heir, marched on Cochin, aided by the Brahmin chief of 
Edapilly (traditionally hostile to Cochin), and the Samanthan 
chiefs of iilangad, Vadakkumkur, and Tekkumkur, who were 
feudatories of Cochin. The Bettem-Cochin chief was aided 
by the Brahmin chiefs of Purakkad, Parur and Azhvancheri, 
the Samanthan chief of Valluvanad (traditionally hostile 
to the Zamorins), and the Portuguese. The Zamorin inflicted
1. Gough, 1950; K.V.K. Ayyar, 1938, pp. 215-216.
2. Gough, 1950.
3. K.V.K. Ayyar, 1938, p. 215.
4. Gough, 1950.
5. Raja, 1953, p. 148.
6 . K.P. Padmanabha Menon, 1924, Vol. I, p. 190.
a severe defeat on Cochin, Meanwhile, the Mutta prince
had enlisted Dutch support at Colombo. The Portuguese now
decided to accept the Mutta!s claim, but reversed their
decision on winning some successes. The Dutch were persuaded
to give more support, the Purakkad Gayars were routed from
Cochin, the Paliath Achan openly joined the Dutch, and the
Chaliyur prince (the Mutta prince had died) was crowned
chief by the Dutch. By 1663, the Portuguese had surrendered
their power in Cochin to the Dutch.
The Dutch now favoured the Chaliyur tavazhi. They
supported the chief’s decision to adopt from Chaliyara in
1
1681, and this was effected in 1689* Parur, Alangad, and
p
Manakkulam opposed the adoption, and the Nayars of Cochin
again wanted a Bettern prince. The Zamorin supported the
Dutch and Chaliyur, and Bettern* s faction was defeated. A
similar dispute again arose in 1710. This time the Ayirur
Kshatriya family also opposed the Dutch-supported Chaliyur,
because they had their own candidate for adoption. Cochin
considered they had lost any such c^aim because they allowed
the Murianad harnbiars to make an adoption from them. The
3
Murianad .nambiars were not Kshatriyas.
The last instance of a succession dispute in
1. Alexander, 1946, p. 28.
2. One of the four branches of Talapilly’s svarupam.
3. Padmanabha Menon, 1929*
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independent Cochin occurred in 1752, when the heir to the 
sinecure Perixnipatappu Muppu sthanam was denied his claim*
The sthanam, created over two centuries earlier by the 
Elaya tavazhis as a sop to the three excluded tavazhis of 
Cochin, persisted long after the Elaya became extinct, 
but we do not know what qualifications were now required 
of the heir. This time the aggrieved party turned to 
Travancore, and he was settled, with his tavazhis, on some 
conquered Cochin territory as a feudatory of Travancore, and 
lost it when Travancore became an ally of Cochin in 1757*
The rules of succession in a svarupam ideally 
integrated the segments - the kovilakams - in a common 
succession to the recognised sthanams, even where the 
kovilakams were separate residential and property-owning 
units* In Cochin, we find the rules manipulated by one 
segment which was more powerful than the others. Some 
historical interpretations of the rules of succession in 
Cochin point to an internal inconsistency which was an 
inevitable source of friction* The Perumpatappu Muppu 
was thought to be the first sthanam, and not a sinecure 
sthanam created for dispossessed branches of the family.^
A
iilso, it was thought to entail reclusion, whereas in the inter­
pretation used above, it was the first sthanam* s regent
1. Gough, 1950.
2. K.V.K. .Ayyar, 193#, P* 126.
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who became a recluse - presumably in order to prevent him
from claiming the chiefship as of right, and he had no choice
in the matter. The view that the first sthani was a recluse
also says that this was so only when the incumbent was too
1
old to rule effectively. .another confusion in interpretation
2
arises from the view that whereas a recluse chief could set 
up a regent from his own tavazhi, this was not always the 
case. The second sthani might instead be entrusted with the 
functions of the chief. If there was a regent, he succeeded 
the recluse and not the eldest male. These explanations of 
Cochin’s rules of succession, though seeming to explain the 
recurring disputes over the succession, do not take into 
account the way in which politics in the svarupam modified 
the rules. Once the Elaya tavazhi had established an 
exclusive right to the Cochin chiefship, with Portuguese 
support, there seem to have been no arguments about the 
legal rights of other claimants. Such claimants could 
make an effective bid for the succession only if they had 
strong outside support.
Succession disputes are also important in Kolattunad. 
These arose partly out of an imbalance of power among the 
branches of the Kolasvarupam. One branch, the Palli, and
1. C. Acbyutha Menon, quoted by K.V.K. Ayyar, 1938, p. 128.
2 . ibid.
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especially its sub-branch, the Chirakkal, were supported 
by the English from their trading post in Tellicherry. By 
the middle of the eighteenth century the Chirakkal and the 
Udayamangalam branches, with British mediation, had 
partitioned Kolattunad.
The dissolution of the KolasvaruQpam has also been 
attributed to a conflict between a chief’s legal heirs, his
A
sister’s sons, and his natural heirs - his own sons. The 
Cochin parallel makes it likely that European interference 
was equally to blame. The absence of territorial segmentation 
in the other powerful chiefdoms, where Europeans had little 
political influence, supports this argument, However in 
Kolattunad there did exist a conflict between a man’s sons 
and his nephews. Paternity was more important here than in 
central and south Kerala. Succession everywhere passed 
through sisters, but in central and southern Kerala the joint 
family consisted of' brothers and sisters and the latter*s 
children, and men could not bequeath any part of the family 
property to their children, who were members of another 
joint family. In north Kerala, men set up homes with their 
wives and children. These children inherited from the 
mother’s family, to which they might return as adults.
They could also inherit from the father. Most of the chiefs
1. Innes, 1908, pp. 57-58
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in the Kolattunad cluster are believed to be descendants
of women with Kolattunad husbands. Kilesvaram is said to
have been given by a Kolathiri to the descendants of a
prince from his family and his Zamorin wife. Kadattanad
was given by a Kolattunad prince to his hayar wife from
Polanad (conquered by the Zamorin). Pynad, part of the
Zamorin1s territories, is said to have been given by a
Kurumbranad chief to his Zamorin wife - to the resentment
of other branches of his svarupam. The Chuzhali and Keriyot
Hambigrs claim descent from the Wayar wives of a Kolattunad
1
prince. According to Gough, these traditions have not been 
historically confirmed. That they are tenable is supported 
by two facts. Firstly, the Kayars of this area even now 
practice virilocal marriage with matrilineal succession. 
Secondly, we have a historical instance of such an occurrence, 
though this did not lead to the establishment of a new 
chiefdom.
In 1749, a Chirakkal prince married the sister of 
the Kadattanad chief. With this brother’s consent, he 
built a palace for his son by her in the territory of feudatory 
chiefs, in Iruvalinad. Finding these chiefs hostile, he 
gained the support of Kadattanad and the English to war 
on Iruvalinad, and to compel its Kambiars, among other 
things, to provide facilities for the maintenance of his
1. Gough, 1950
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son’s palace. He also wanted to provide a fief for this 
1
son, A new head of the English trading post at Tellicherry
2tended to favour the rival branch of the Kolasvarupam - which 
had partitioned Kolattunad with the Chirakkal family, and 
upset his plans. There is no evidence that his son got a 
fief.
In Travancore sons were, as everywhere in Kerala, 
not legal successors to office and ancestral property, nor 
were they permissive inheritors as in the north. In the 
eighteenth century however, the succession of Martanda Varma 
was disputed by his mother’s brothers* sons. The latter 
won support from an east coast patrilineal power on the 
grounds that they were the legal successors. When the 
general of the eastern army was given an explanation by 
Martanda Varma of the rules of matrilineal succession 
current in Kerala, he withdrew his support of the contenders. 
This situation arose not out of any internal inconsistency 
in the recognised rules, but from the manipulation of 
’foreign’ support by appealing to ’foreign* values.
Wars to protect vassals or allies were frequent.
The pre-Portuguese Zamorins acquired control of Tirumavayi 
temple and its mahamakham ritual in a war with Valluvanad
1. Records of Port St. George, Tellicherry Letters, Vol. XI, 
1749-50, letter no. 47.
2. Logan, 1887, Vol. I, p. 387.
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which they entered initially at the request of the Brahmin 
chief of Tirumanasserinad. In Ledunganad, they were called 
in by the Samanthan chief because some of his nobles were 
intriguing with Valluvanad and Palghat. The deliberate 
involvement by warring chiefdoms of neighbouring or interested 
chiefs into their wars - as protectors, as allies, or to 
serve mutual interests - is a constant theme of Kerala 
history. The clusters described in Chapter II were themselves 
the results of such manoeuvres, their persistence arising out 
of the relatively constant interests of the chiefdoms, and 
the lack of any major shifts in the balance of power.
The Portuguese, in 1519, noted a ’duel1 between a 
Cochin noble and a dependent of the Zamorin. ISach side put
A
out four thousand men, and the ensuing battle was intended 
to spark off a major war between Cochin and the Zamorin.
(We are not told who initiated this incident).
The Portuguese themselves worked through the 
existing system of political alliance and conflict. Afonso 
' Dalboquerque asked the Cochin chief to "attack some place in 
the interior" or "at least he should write to some lord of 
the mountainous country, who was on amicable terms with him,
p
to carry out such a manoeuvre...." The Cochin chief pleaded 
that "he went there for four or five months every year, and
1. Logan, 1887, Vol. I, pp. 322-323.
2. D fAlboquerque, Vol. I, p. 54.
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hereby expended all the revenues which he obtained from 
Cochin, and that*., the rivers could not be passed, but 
nevertheless he would write to certain lords his vassals 
and friends, to commence the war in the interior frontier 
country11 , which he did. The Zamorin had to leave Calicut
c(
with very few defences to fight the lord of the mountainous
country11 • The Portuguese, however, failed to take Calicut.
In 1550, a long and bitter war developed in central
Kerala. The Samanthan chief of inland Vadakkumhur asked
the Zamorin to adopt his brother to the fourth sthanam of 
2
the Zamorins* He visited the Zamorin to negotiate the 
matter, and soon after his return was invaded by Cochin.
The Vadakkumkur chief was a feudatory of Cochin. His 
negotiations with the Zamorin for an adoption were quite 
valid since both families were Samanthans. Obviously such 
an adoption threatened Cochin* s suzerainty, however nominal, 
over Vadakkumkur. In addition, Vadakkumkur was rich in 
pepper, and was known to the Portuguese as the near fabulous 
chiefdom of Pimenta. They also shared Cochins interest in 
keeping Vadakkumkur out of the Zamorin camp.
The war was an unusually bitter one. The Cochin 
invaders burnt the chief to death in his palace. In doing
1. Ibid. pp. 54-55.
2. Zaynu’d-Din, 1942
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this they invoked a severe sanction of retaliation, which
was an accepted custom in warfare. The death of a prince and
the burning of a palace must be avenged, even if it was only
some years later and at the cost of many other lives. The
immediate effect of the burning of the Vadakkumkur chief
was that the Vadakkumkur forces rallied together and drove
out the Portuguese and Cochin men. At the same time five
thousand men, known as chavers, entered Cochin to kill the
1
prince responsible for the death of their chief. They 
killed him in 1 5 6 1 .
The Zamorin entered the war for Vadakkumkur, with 
eighteen chiefs. These included some of his more powerful 
Kshatriya feudatories in Bettem and Kurumbranad, and the 
ftayar chiefs of Mangat (the Zamorin*s minister) and Kavalappara, 
and allies like Purakkad*s Brahmin chief. They marched on 
the capital, and three Cochin chiefs, successively, were 
killed in battle. In 1567 hostilities continued between 
Cochin and Vadakkumkur, and though Cochin, with Portuguese 
support, was on the whole successful, the Vadakkumkur 
forces succeeded in killing in battle the Cochin chief and 
two nephews, and a fortnight later the successor.
1. K.P. Padrnanabha Menon, 1924, Vol. I, p. 503, quoted from 
P.C. Danvers, 'The Portuguese in iisia* .
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The stakes in the Vadakkumkur war were high.
Cochin did not have an extensive hinterland of its own, and 
could thus not afford to lose control of Vadakkumkur. a h 
adoption between the Zamorin and Vadakkumkur would mean loss 
of influence and pov/er to Cochin. It would also mean the 
diversion of Vadakkumkur1s large pepper supplies to the 
Zamorin's ports. There the Portuguese interest coincided 
with that of Cochin. Hence the long and bitter war.
The institution of chavers, or martyrs, who avenged 
a chief's death, will be discussed later in this chapter, 
in the context of the maharaakkam ritual in which it played 
a dramatic part, and in the context of the rules by which 
warfare in Kerala was generally contained within such 
limits as to prevent disruption of the social and political 
system.
Apart from the extreme violence of the Vadakkumkur 
war, and its use of chavers, it is a fairly typical instance 
of how political alignments were used , and wars extended 
beyond the original dispute, a war was fought not only on 
the immediate issue, but over long term interests, and the 
interests of the supporting chiefdoms.
The European interference in t he politics of the 
chiefdoms made some difference insofar as commercial interests 
became important. Territorial acquisition was a relatively 
unimportant factor in wars. The first chiefs to go in for
15 3
it in a big way were the Zamorins, and this is at least 
partly explained, by the influence and the support of the 
Moors. These territorial wars came to an end when the 
Portuguese arrived, and threw their support behind the 
chiefs of Cochin.
The Zamorins now fought commercial wars with the 
Portuguese themselves, especially on the seas. Territorial 
acquisition again became important only in the eighteenth 
century, in Travancore.
Among themselves, the chiefs fought for real power 
in men and money and influence, including alliances with 
the Europeans. These were, however, inextricably mixed up 
with quarrels over ritual privilege, and the latter might 
be a thin disguise for a competing interest in real resources. 
In 1503, the Zamorin invaded Cochin, and made a straightforward 
demand that the Portuguese men left behind for the monsoons 
by their leader be handed over. Some moral arguments were 
also put forward, probably instigated by the Moorish memory 
of Christian-Muslim conflict in southern Europe. He tried 
to strengthen his hand by bringing up the traditional quarrel 
between Edapilly and Cochin, whereby the former's Brahmin chief 
claimed that parts of Cochin island had been theirs, and 
were wrongfully given to Cochin as a result of a sarabandham^
1• Common-law marriage.
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marriage between the two families.
A Cochin chief and two princes died in battle and 
Cochin was destroyed, but the Zamorin withdrew when the 
Portuguese fleet reappeared. Two hundred men from Cochin 
set out for Calicut, and killed and were killed till the 
last one died outside Calicut, with the revenge incomplete.
Eighteen years later, in 1521, when the Portuguese had 
concluded a peace with the Zamorin, there was no overt 
reason to start a war. The Cochin chief however, anxious 
to foul the peace, decided that he must avenge the 1 5 0 3  
killings and the destruction of Cochin, as required by Kerala 
custom. The custom decreed the use of chavers, and not war. 
Cochin however, decided to fight and was defeated, but 
succeeded in sabotaging the Zamorin-Portuguese peace.
Apart from the wars with the Europeans (whether 
Portuguese, Dutch, English or French) purely territorial 
wars-of-conquest - with neither ritual privileges involved, 
nor ties of political allegiance - were fought only by 
Martanda Varma of Travancore. He annexed to his nad, or 
district, all the chiefdoms to the north upto Cochin proper, 
and established an alternative form of government responsible 
directly to him. These were wars fought to win, and did 
not fit the patterns of contained warfare followed in Kerala 
upto the early eighteenth century.
To use the term "contained warfare" is to postulate
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limits, or rules, of containment. These limits are not 
necessarily set down in a manual of war, nor are they even 
always recognised customary prescriptions. Various factors 
in the ecology, the economy, the system of stratification 
and its division of labour, beliefs about status and about 
sacred things, could (and did) limit or contain warfare.
Specific rules of war, generally accepted in Kerala, 
decreed that sufficient notice of intent to fight be given. 
Surprise attacks were not honourable, and the hour of attack
A
was fixed by astrological calculation, and not expediencey.
In 1504, in a war against Cochin for example , "The Brahmins
with the Zamorin finally appointed Thursday, the 7th. May,
2
for the last attack"•
During a battle, chiefs of both sides were protected 
by a severe sanction of retaliation should they be killed. 
Chiefs did get. killed, and revenge was sought by chavers 
of the aggrieved chiefdom. But the killing of chiefs was 
not a feature of wars as it was, for example, in Rajasthan. 
There, war was a way to reduce the number of claimants to 
chiefdoms. The Kerala chiefs were more concerned to ensure 
the continuity of the family. Their families avoided 
segmentation for as long as possible - at times a few hundred
1. K.V.K. Ayyar, 1938, p. 175*
2. Logan, 1887, Vol. I, p. 3 1 1 .
3. Dutra, 1958, pp. 136-137«
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years - unlike the chiefly lineages of Rajasthan. There 
was no fear arising out of a multiplicity of heirs. This 
was resolved by the provision of a multiplicity of sthanams 
in each chiefly family - but there was a constant fear of 
extinction. "It has never been heard that any one of the 
junior brothers or sons of maternal aunts have slain one who
A
was senior in age so that he may soon succeed to the throne".
Frequent adoptions ensured that "The line of their heirs is...
2
never broken".
The obligation to avenge the death of a chief or
t
a prince and the burning of a chiefly palace, while t&ey did 
not prevent such destruction, nevertheless made it dangerous 
to kill chiefs in war, or to burn their palaces. The men 
(usually from a chief*s own army and his personal body-guard) 
were sworn to avenge his death even at the cost of their own 
lives. They hah to kill a chief or prince of the enemy, 
usually the one responsible for the death of their own.
It sometimes took years for them to exact vengeance. They, 
that is, their families, were given tax-free lands known as 
chavittu-virutti from which they were known as chavers.^
The chavers contributed to chiefly continuity by 
making it dangerous to kill members of chiefly lineages.
By custom, Rayar nobles could not be punished by
1. Zaynu!d-Din, 1942, Chapter III.
2. Ibid.
K.P. Padmanabha Menon, 1924, Vol. I, footnote on pp. 510- 
511* Logan derives the term from Chava, that is, death, 
and Eruka that is, to arise - 1 those who went forth to 
death1. 1687, Vol. II, p. CLXXIV.
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their chief's for defection or rebellion. They could only 
be brought to heel by war. There was therefore no crime 
of treason. The right of hayar nobles to fight at will set 
a limit to the accretions of power of any chief. If he became 
too powerful and endangered the existence of his nobles, they 
could desert to - or at least flirt with - a rival and so 
restore the balance. Sime a chief*s military resources 
were an agglomerate of the iNiayar levies of his nobles, their 
defection automatically reduced his strength to par. hayar 
soldiers in Cochin could be punished for treason if they 
fought the chief. The procedure was for their assembly 
(kuttam) to meet and register a protest. The chief sent 
his men to provoke a battle which ended in the rebels* 
punishment if they lost, their desertion if they won.2
Kerala chiefs were also required not to dispossess 
defeated chiefs of their traditional territories. They 
might whittle away the power of a chief by winning or 
forcing away his feudatories, and by refusing him some of 
the recognised privileges of svarupams, such as coining 
money. They might even annex some of his territories.
But the chief was left with most of his ancient chiefdom.
When Cochin protested at the alliance of the Portuguese with ?
I
the Zamorin, Afonso d’Albuquerque countered,
1. Panikkar, 1960, p. 235.
2. Miller, 1950.
his enemy\
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11 •.. if either of us has anything to complain of I am the 
one... if I have not destroyed the Zamorin it is solely 
because you, and the King of Cananor, whenever you see he 
is worsted, help him with your forces, and send him ships 
laden with supplies, sailing under safe-conduct from the 
King, ray lord; for you wish that this argument should be 
always going on;...” Even after this, . . . 11 both he and the 
King of Cananor, in order to obstruct this business, did 
not break off their communication with the Cairaais and the 
lords of the Malabar territory. All this Afonso 'D^lboquerque
p
learned afterwards. . . 11
This rule, broken first by the Zamorins during their 
pre-Portuguese expansion, was broken again by Travancore in 
the eighteenth century. The Travancore chiefs made a 
complete break with the fno dispossession, no annexation1 
rule, and brought into existence a form of government 
totally different even from that of the similarly motivated 
Zamorins.
-*uite as important as the recognised traditions 
relating to war, the system of values on the one hand, and 
the social and political system on the other, limited warfare.
Beliefs were held throughout Kerala about the sanctity 
of Brahmins and of temples, and about the pollution conveyed
1 • Ibid. p. 7 1 .
2 . k iau lboquerque , V o l.  IV ,  p . 69.
3. Panikkar, 1960, p. 236.
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by untouchable castes. War strategy had to be fought with 
due regard to these beliefs. We have several examples of 
how these beliefs affected the course of a war.
The Portuguese, planning an attack on Calicut, were 
told by Cochin’s Brahmin spies that the Zamorin ,fhad gone 
to an interior country to a war which was raging there, but 
in the city itself there were few haires, and on the Cerame , 
or jetty, they had made some wooden stages on which were 
placed six large bombards, and along the beach many holes 
had been dug, in order that the men as they landed should
fall into them, and that on the side of the houses of the
1 2 
Macuas there was not a single breastwork11. The Portuguese
thought it 11 best to land in front of the houses of the
Macuas, for there the water was smoothest and all could land
3
with least trouble*1. All Kerala chiefs were equally bound * 
to avoid Mukkuvan6 , and the Zamorin thought no fortifications 
were needed here. The Portuguese however were not bound by 
the ritual prescriptions of Kerala’s castes, and the loophole 
in the Zamorin*s defences was obviously of strategic value 
to them.
Untouchables were also avoided in war. Kayars 
could not fight untouchable soldiers, and where occasional
1 . i.e. Mukkuvans, caste of fishermen, and untouchables.
2. D^lboquerque, Vol. I, p. 58. Italics mine.
3. Ibid, p. 65»
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instances of such a possibility arose, as in the pre-
Portuguese Zamorin conquest of Hedunganad, they negotiated
a settlement rather than fight* A Kerala tradition says
that the Zamorins ordered that one child in every Mukkuvan
1
family be converted to Islam. Muslims largely manned
Calicut's navy, and the Zamorins could use converted Mukkuvans
in the navy. Either unconverted Mukkuvans were unwilling
to serve in a Muslim navy, or the Zamorins were unwilling
to let them serve.
The role of untouchables in war is well illustrated
in an incident in the 1304 war between the Zamorins and
Cochin with its Portuguese allies. When the Zamorin tried
to cross a ferry into Cochin, ”a curious incident, possible
only in Indian warfare, occurred, for a band of Cherumar,
who v^re there busy working in the fields, plucked up courage,
seized their spades and attacked the men who had crossed.
These, being more afraid of being polluted by the too near
approach of the low-caste men than by death at the hands
2
of Pacheco’s men, fled precipitately.
’’Pacheco expressed strong admiration of the Cherurnars* 
courage and wished to have them raised to the rank of hayars.
3
He was much astonished when told that this could not be done”. 
Brahmins on the other hand were protected by their
1. Miller, 1£30.
2. A Portuguese and his men.
3. Logan, 1887, Vol. I, p. 311*
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ritual purity. To kill a Brahmin was a crime puxiishable by 
death. Brahmins were also thought to be protected by the 
deities. Travancore, expanding northwards in the first half 
of the eighteenth century, was not immediately successful 
against the Brahmin chief of Purakkad, because the Travancore 
troops feared the anger of his protecting deity. Purakkad 
was finally annexed by intrigue. Brahmin chiefs formed a 
small and politically unimportant proportion of all the chiefs 
of Kerala. Their relative immunity - some Brahmin chiefs were 
politically (that is, militarily), active though they then 
tended to have a lower ritual status - did not soften conflicts 
between other chiefs, nor did it give these chiefs any 
significant mediatory, sanctuarial, or other function beyond 
that inherent in their ritual status as Brahmins. The 
sanctity of -uhe Brahmin, whether chief or otherwise, was 
however a value held by all.
A Dutch comment on the chiefdom of Edapilly confirms 
the ritual sanctity and privileges of Brahmin chiefs. M.oeps 
wrote, ”... it is expedient to know that this little state is 
a kind of asylum, like a free town, to which people who are 
afraid of persecution and punishment retreat, and where they 
are safe; and more especially when they are able to reach a 
temple or pagoda there. This privilege is acknowledged and 
respected by all Malabar kings. However I never could find 
out on what right or grounds this privilege is based, unless
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it be that this state obtained this privilege as a matter
of course on account of its ruler being priestly and very
pious chief of the principal priestly caste among the natives.
 nevertheless I would never suffer the native Christians
who have committed crimes and retreated to that little state
to be considered to be in an asylum, partly because the country
would become full of thieves and murderers... and partly
because it seems to me not proper that Roman Christians should
have recourse to heathen idols and temples.......On the other
1
hand, I once had a Canarese brought back from Repolim, who 
having greatly injured a Christian had retreated to that flace, 
partly because the crime was too great and too well-known, 
and partly to show that we are not at all bound to respect this 
assumed privilege. However the less this happens the better, 
because in case it was too often repeated, it would scandalise 
the native kings. If on account of necessity one has 
occasionally -recourse to such a measure, one ought to give 
strict orders not to approach the temples, and still less to
enter them in order to arrest the fugitive. He should only
2
be arrested when he is outside the pagoda’s limits".
Manipulation of ritual values paid dividends to 
foreign armies. The Portuguese landing near Mukkuvan houses
1. Portuguese term for Edapilly.
2. quoted in Padmanabha Menon, 1929, Vol. II, pp. 76-77.
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has already been cited. Tippu Sultan, in 1783, was able to
force the Zamorin out of the Palghat fort simply by exposing
the heads of Brahmins to his view. Even Hindus, if they
were non-Malayali, might ignore Kerala ritual values as 
A
whe>e the i^ayaks of Madura sacked and burned Sue indram 
devaswam which in Travancore was a recognised sanctuary.
The exclusive monopoly of a hereditary caste over 
the arts of war was also a vital factor in contained warfare. 
This is discussed more fully in Chapter V, largely in relation 
to political systen5 characterised by dispersal of power. The 
hereditary caste of warriors was known as i\ayars. Each 
chiefdom tended to have its own sub-caste of nayars. There 
were Vellodu Hayars - of Valluvanad, Eradi hayars from Ernad, 
with a small high status sub-caste in both areas known as 
Kiriyattil Hayars, and a similar high status sub-caste of 
Vellayma nayars in Cochin. Each chiefdora drew its soldiers 
from the locally resident sub-caste of hayars.
Because no other men could be recruited as soloiers, 
the nayars, through their village (desam) assemblies or 
through their chief dom (nacl.) assemblies, exercised considerable 
influence. Policy decisions were not disputed by them, unless 
they involved such Widely held values as the sanctity of 
Brahmins. But they could present grievances about conditions 
of service, including wages due for active service, or 
oppressive control by a chief. Their economic independence
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of their military leaders - village headmen or chiefs - 
limited the capacity of the latter to use them for the 
furtherance of their own policies. There were, however, 
no organised or regular relations between hayars of different 
chief’doms. They all fitted in roughly at the same status 
level vis-a-vis Brahmins above and untouchables below. But 
communications were limited to armed encounters, and 
probably to stray individual contacts. Such stray contacts 
might arise out of a pilgrimage by a chief and his family. 
Travancore*s eighteenth century adoptions from Kolattunad 
were arranged when members of the latter family happened to 
be in Travancore on a pilgrimage. Layer8 did not therefore 
check chiefly power by the threat of a horizontal combination 
across chiefdom frontiers - which would be a revolutionary 
situation. Rather, they used their local organisations, 
their economic independence, and their monopoly of the 
’occupation* of war as a check on chiefs.
Wherever it was possible for a chief to find an 
alternative source of recruitment, there was an immediate 
disturbance in the balance of power. The Zarnorin expansion 
before the sixteenth century was carried out largely with 
the help of the Moors. The centralisation of Travancore 
became viable only when the chief broke the power of his 
nayars (known as Pillais) and recruited soldiers from a 
low caste, the Maravas, of the east coast. Although the
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Layars were effective only within their residential chiefdoms, 
the general effect on Kerala policy was to maintain a relative 
equality of chiefdoms, at different levels. Their local power 
set a ceiling on the development of the local chiefaom.
In the absence of good communications , chiefs could 
not go far afield to find soldiers. Vfithin their chiefdoms 
they could not recruit from other castes without creating a 
serious disequilibrium both in the status system and its
1
ritual values, and in the nicely balanced economic system.
The armies of Kerala chiefs were never pliable instruments 
of chiefly policy and ambitions, and insofar as they formed 
one status category in Kerala - wedged in ritually, politically, 
and economically, between other status categories - they 
functioned as keepers of the whole system, and provided no 
avenues for a change in the system.
Contained warfare, we shall see in Chapter V, is a 
necessary factor in the dispersal - or non-centralisation - 
of power.
The rituals of Kerala 
Borne of the major rituals of Kerala had a strong 
political content. Some of these rituals were performed by 
and for chiefs, for example the Ariyittuvalcha (throwing 
of rice) or succession ritual, performed by the Zamorins, Cochin,
1. See Chapter II, system of land tenure.
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and Valluvanad. Other rituals were actually temple ceremonies
which underlined on the one hand, the ritual distinctions
between castes, on the other the power of the chief - as in
the annual Bhagavathi festival in Aflgadipuram, in the
2
Valluvanad chiefs Tirumannam^cunnu temple. The mahamakham 
ceremony, performed every twelve years at Tirunavayi by the 
Zamorin, was more conspicuously a portrayal of the chief's 
power than of the ritual distinctions between castes. This 
could be attributed to the bias of the records - documents of 
the Zamorin*s family, or non-anthropological European 
interpretations. Yet the twelve years between ceremonies 
make it likely that the mahamakham did not run to the pattern 
for annual temple festivals, and that it was indeed largely 
a Zamorin ritual, rather than a Tirunavayi one.
Travancore, after its spectacular political career 
of centralisation, undertook a raurajapara ceremony which was 
not a recurrent festival like the mahamakham or Valluvanad*s 
Bhagavati festival.
.All these festivals will be discussed except the 
Cochin ariyittuvalcha which has not been described in any
1. Bhadrakali festival in a Coorg village, ref. Srinivas, 
1952, pp. 186-202, although Srinivas interprets the 
village festival as an aspect of village solidarity 
rather than as separation of castes.
2. Miller, 1950.
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of the histories. The temple festivals and succession 
rituals of other chiefdoms are not sufficiently known.
A
The Zamorin1s .ariyittuvalcha 
The death ceremonies, or tiruvantali, of a Zamorin 
were performed wherever he died - usually Zamorins appear 
to have died in Ponnani, or in Trichur or Cranganore. 
Participants in these ceremonies were male collaterals of 
the chief, Brahmins, and attikkurissis, or Sudra funeral 
priests who attended on ^ayars. The tiruvantali was a 
domestic ritual, not a political one. The period of death 
pollution to be observed was fourteen days, and this was 
utilised to make preparations for the succession of the new 
Zamorin, which was a much larger affair. The succession 
ritual of ariyittuvalcha was performed in the town where 
the old Zamorin had died, and ended with a journey to Calicut 
and further rituals there.
The business of government during the fourteen days 
was attended to by the hereditary chief minister, the Marjgat 
Achan. Two hambudiris attended to the correspondence. The 
heir, the branches of the family, nambudiris and all those 
who were expected to attend the ariyittuvalcha, were informed 
by letter that the Zamorin had died of rheumatism - the
1. Based on K.V.K. Ayyar, 193&> PP« 17-35«
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unvarying official cause of death, though he may have died 
of some other complaint.
At the ariyittuvalcha itself there were present both 
invitees and participants.
The participants included nambudiri Brahmins of high 
status, sthanis of the chiefdorm but not branches of the 
chiefly family, hereditary officials of the chiefdom, palace 
officials, and some - not all - feudatories.
The Azhvancheri Tamprakkal, a leading .wambudiri, 
came to the town but stayed away from the ceremony. The 
Zamorin had to visit him, and make the genuflections 
appropriate to the latterfs high ritual status. Other 
Aambudiris had specific functions in the ritual.
The sthanis each received recognition in the ritual.
The presiding Brahmin whispered to each one the incantation 
appropriate to the sthanam. All were expected to escort the 
new Zamorin for part of the journey to Calicut. One sthanam, 
the second, or Eralpad, grew in importance as vice-chief in 
Hedungaraad. This was reflected in the development of a 
separate ariyittuvalcha for the succeeding Eralpad, in 
i'iedunganad itself. This followed the Zamorin*s ariyittuvalcha, 
of which it was a small-scale replica. Kis escorts were 
local ttayar nobles, and only one important hambudiri attended.
Hereditary officials of the Zamorins, and their 
palace officials, carried out the major part of the ritual.
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The kangat Achan (minister; , Dharmoth Panikkar (instructor 
in arms), and Tinayancheri Elayatu (ordnance commander) had 
specific roles. The Mangat Achan had to act out the 
departure of the ancestor of a nayar who had rebelled during 
a period of mourning for a Zamorin, when arms were normally 
laid down. This is a highly ritualised performance, and 
the nayar in question is not one of the Zamorin1 s important 
feudatories, and nothing is known of the family’s position 
when it had rebelled. This part of the ariyittuvalcha is a 
dramatisation of a traditional historical event, on an 
analogy with Gluckman’s analysis of rituals of rebellion in 
Africa, this could be interpreted as an enactment of the 
hostility of small nayar nobles - probably desavazhis - 
to the Zamorin. The ritual, however, involves only one of 
the several nayar nobles. It provides for no release of 
tension for potential rebels. On the contrary, it unequivocally 
confirms the over-riding power of the Zamorins over his Wayars; 
such power consisting of the ability to suppress armed revolt 
rather than in the imposition of authority.
Palace officials included the masseur, the jewel 
keeper, the astrologer, and others. These were also hereditary 
officials# The rituals they performed have no political 
content. They themselves belonged to castes of low status 
and specialised occupation, and did noir participate 
significantly in the sphere of power relations, nor in the
A
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structure of authority within chiefdoms or villages, nor 
even in essential economic activity.
The Zamorins controlled, and influenced a larger 
number of lesser chiefdoms than the three other major 
chiefdoms of Kolattunad, Cochin, and Travancore. But only 
two of these played a part in the ariyittuvalcha rituals.
These were the Kshatriya chief of Bettem and the Brahmin 
chief of Punattur. The latter had always been a close ally, 
but Bettem had frequently sided with the Portuguese, and one 
chief even became a Christian. (The only other direct 
conversion in Kerala was that of a Parappanad chief, forcibly, 
by Tippu Sultan. The chief of Cananore, the only Muslim 
chief in Kerala, is believed to have been a nayar originally, 
but his conversion is very far back in history, and is based 
only on tradition).
Punattur and Bettem lay along the Zamorin1s southern 
boundary, close to Cochin’s northern boundary. This was 
roughly the area where Cochin and the Zamorin, at feast from 
Portuguese times, and probably earlier, fought out most of 
their battles. Th$$ accounts for the singling out of 
Punattur and Bettem for the ariyittuvalcha. Their ritual 
duties were few, and not of a kind to emphasise political 
participation of ritually unequal chiefs. The Zamorin and 
Bettem together entered the tank for a purificatory bath.
Or, both Bettem and Punattur held the hands of the Zamorin
171
daring the final dinner. The ritual role of these high caste 
chiefs was a formal confirmation of a strategic alliance. They 
were weaker than the Zamorin, but unlike the rebellious nayar 
family, whose punishment is ritually enacted in the 
ariyittuvalcha, they were treated as important allies.
Svarupams could not be punished for desertion or rebellion.
The invitees, as distinct from participants, included 
almost everyone who was anything in the Zamorin1s own 
territories, and, at a higher level, in all Kerala.
.. * ; v  - ■ 4* * * ■ v . ■ c\■ > r% •   „ H
Outside invitees included the chiefly svarupams,
ABrahmins, and minority interests such as a Tamil Brahmin, f'
\y
some Chettis (traders from the east coast), a Homan Catholic ^
\ V \
bishop, Muslim priests, and the English factor of Tellicherry. \ 
The invited Brahmins were leading Hambudiris of Kerala, 
including heads of the major temples of Tirunavayi, Trichur, 
Taliparamba, and Chittur.
The svarupams invited from outside the Zamorin 
cluster included the northern chiefdoms of Kolattunad, 
isilesvaram, Kottayam, and Kadattanad - with whom the Zamorins 
had a largely indifferent relation. They also included 
Travancore, Kayamkulara, and Pantalam - so far south that 
again relations were, till the eighteenth century, indifferent. 
Vadakkumkur came because of links through adoption with the 
Zamorins, and a common interest in opposing Cochin.
The chiefs conspicuously absent were Palghat,
<
r
*
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Valluvanad, and Cochin, all neighbours to the Zamorins and 
involved in intense conflict with them. Valluvanad and 
Cochin did, however, get invited from 1937 onwards - nearly 
a century and a half after the chiefs had lost their chiefdoms 
to the BritishI
Other svarupams that came were to a greater or lesser 
degree within the Zamorin*s cluster, and included Brahmin, 
Kshatriya and Hayar chiefs, but no Samanthans. The only 
Samanthans in the list are nilesvaram and Vadakkumkur 
(see above) with both of whom the Zamorins had kinship links.
From the Zamorin1s own territories came Harabudiri 
janmis, liayar nobles, and Hampatis, or warrior Brahmins.
These constituted an economic aristocracy, as the major 
landowners; through them the Zamorins built up their armies 
as well as exercised the authority of a naduvazhi, or chief. 
(See section on ’Government of the Chiefdoms*in this chapter). 
These men represented the local territorial units of which 
the Zamorin*s chiefdom was constituted.
The last category of invitees included officials of 
different grades. Most of these had some role in the 
ariyittuvalcha, They were all hereditary officials. The 
highest grade included the ministers Mangat iichan and Cheruli 
itchan (minister to the second sthani), the Dharmoth Panikkar, 
the TTinayancheri Elayatu, the Talachhanmars or administrators 
of Calicut and /iliparamba, and the Karnavappad (from Karnavan- 
head of taravad; pad =authority) of Manjeri, and Tirumulpad
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(of chiefly status, but not a chief, either Samanthan or 
Kshatriya) of Lilambur. These high grade officials were 
equal to the smaller chiefs. They held large hereditary 
estates, with their own armed nayars, and an almost independent 
internal jurisdiction. Traditionally however, they performed 
administrative or other functions for the Zamorins. Most of 
them were Layars of higher sub-caste.
Low-grade officials - also hereditary, and again, 
largely participant - were palace staff. They were probably 
of nayar caste, but had neither the estates nor the powerful 
offices of the higher officials. Besides these there were 
ritual functionaries, drummers, an astrologer, and a low- 
caste funeral priest. The Zamorin*s personal army, the 
Lokar (or Ten Thousand), and some Moplahs also attended the 
ariyittuvalcha.
After the ariyittuvalcha rituals were completed, the 
Zamorin signed olas (palm leaves) declaring his assumption 
of the four chiefly rights of amkam (trial by battle),
Chumkam (collection of customs), kappalottam (navigation), 
and panamati (minting). The Zamorin also confirmed his 
higher officials in their offices. Since these were 
hereditary, such confirmation was in the nature of a formal 
recognition of these offices, and of the re-establishment 
of the custpmary relations of the Zamorin to the officials.
Like the olas for the Zamorin*s assumption of the chiefly 
privileges, this act of confirmation expressed the continuity
17 4
of the chiefship and its attendant offices, after the 
fourteen-day suspension of government, and the change of 
personnel. Confirmation was also required for the succession 
to these offices.
Valluvanad chiefs also celebrated an ariyittuvalcha
for a succeeding chief. Participants in this ritual were
the hereditary officials of Valluvanad, the major desavazhis,
the leading local hambudiri, and some leading Kerala 
1
Eambudiris, at least one of whom had an important role in
the Zamorin’s ariyittuvalcha as well. Valluvanad, though
always independent itself, did not, in historical times, have 
any feudatories. The ariyittuvalcha was therefore mainly a
Valluvanad affair# We do not know who attended it, but it is
doubtful if it attracted as many Kshatriya, Brahmin, and 
Samanthan chiefs as the Zarnorins.
Temple festivals in the temples of the chiefs 
reflected ritual values as well as the power of the chiefs. 
This was so in the annual festival in the Valluvanad chief’s 
Bhagavati temple. This festival, lasting six months, was 
inaugurated in the house of the local iMambudiri (also an 
ariyittuvalcha participant), moved in succession to other 
temples, and culminated in an eleven-day festival in the
1. Miller, 1950
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chiefs temple. Here the ritual carefully separated groups
of castes according to their degree of purity. Parts of
the ritual emphasised the power of the chief.
The Valluvanad festival is the typical one. iiuiong
the Coorgs too, major festivals underlined the ritual
1
distinctions between the castes. The absence of political 
content from them is attributable to the changed political 
system at the time of observation.
A more unusual festival was the mahamakham, celebrated 
by the Zamorins at the Tirunavayi temple. This was performed 
once in twelve years, when Jupiter entered the sign of Leo.
Some Zamorins performed it a second time when Jupiter was
2 3in Cancer, as did the reigning Zarnorin in 694 and 1695»
In the year preceding a mahamakham another ceremony, the Tai 
Puyam, was perforaied. It was an elaborate and expensive 
ceremony and could, as in the duplicated mahamakham, provide 
scope for a conspicuous display of wealth and power. Appro­
priately, the last mahamakham was performed in 1743* The 
power of the Zamorins, by 1755 when the next celebration 
was due, had suffered severe blows from the expanding 
Travancore state, followed by the kysore invasions from 
which it never recovered.
(V
A full description of the matimakham performed in
1. Srinivas, 1952; see above, p.l£>4
2. K.V.K. Ayyar, 1938, p. 104.
3. Ibid, pp. 225-226.
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1683 is available in Logan1s researches into documents 
belonging to the Zamorin family. I give a summary of this 
account v/ith important passages reproduced. 1 he language in 
these passages is Logan1 s ,and not a translation of the 
documents, except in specified parts.
The ceremony lasted for twenty-eight days, in the 
month of Makaram (January to February). Temporary wooden 
structures were put up at Tirunavayi, the material being 
floated down river from the Zamorin*s Aliparamba Chirakkal 
(estates) in territory controlled by the second sthani.
Two months before the commencement, a circular was sent out. 
This reads, in the chronicles, 1tRoyal writing to the Akampati 
Janam (body-guards).
"On the 5th Makaram 858 is Mahamakha Talpuyam (time of the 
eight lunar asterism in the festival season) and the Lokars 
(chief people of each locality) are required to attend at 
Tirunavayi as in olden times.
"Mangat Raman and Tinayancheri are sent to collect and bring 
you in regular order for the Mahamakham.
"You must come to Tirunavayi on the 3rd of Makaram to fight
and foil as usual. But all of you should come for the 
2Mahamakham"•
1. Logan, 1887, Vol. I, pp. 152-169.
2. Ibid. p. 165.
At Tirunavayi, the sthanis, the senior officials, 
and the Rayars took up allocated positions, roughly shown 
in the following diagram:
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the mahamakham at tirunavayi
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The Zamorin made frequent appearances on the 
Vakkayur terrace, holding the sword of the last ’emperor*,^ 
Cheraman Perumal who, by tradition, had partitioned Kerala 
among its several chiefs in 825 A.D.; ••••"'but it is not 
alone on it that the Zamorin depends for his safety, for 
the plain below him is covered with the thirty thousand 
Nayars of Erand, the ten thousand of Polanad, and number­
less petty dependent chieftains, each counting his fight-
p
ing men by the hundred or the thousand, or by thousands*"
At the stage when an elephant is formally "caparisoned 
with a chain of solid gold", a number of Nayars, chavers 
or martyrs, from four leading Nayar tarwads of Valluvanad 
"step forth from the crowd and receive the last blessings 
and farewells of their friends and relatives. They 
have just partaken of the last meal they are to eat on 
earth at the house of the temple representative of their 
chieftain*••• On this particular occasion it is one 
of the house of Putumanna Panikkar^ who heads the fray*
He is joined by seventeen of his friends - Nayars or 
Mappilla or other arms - bearing caste men.•• But... 
notwithstanding their delight and skill and dexterity in
1. Ibid..p.166.
Ibid.,p.166.
3* The other three were Chandratthil, Kolkat, and Verkot 
Panikkars.
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their weapons, the result is inevitable, and is prosaically
recorded in the chronicle thus: "The number of Chavers who
came and died early morning the liext day after the elephant
began to be adorned with gold trappings - being Putumanna
1
Kantur Menon and followers - were 18".
During the last ten days, every appearance of the
Zamorin at his dais was the occasion for Valluvanad chavers
to make their attempt on his life. The Zamorin was carefully
guarded, and the guards, for the first seven days, wer^, in
turn, the thirty thousand Ernad Rayars, Elaya Vakkayil Vellodi,
the fifth, fourth, third, and second sthanis, and the ten
thousand nayars of Poland led by Calicut Talacchanrnar and
Ernad Menon. On these days the Zamorin went in procession,
closely guarded, to the temple and the river. On the last
three days, there was no procession, and both Zamorin and
second sthani made appearances on their respective daises.
On the second and third of these days, the third sthani and
2
the Bettem Raja stood on the dais, facing the Zamorin.
On the eleventh day, the chavers made a final assault, after 
which the second sthani and the Tirumanasseri chief were carried 
to the temple end of the palisaded lane. They walked towards 
the Zamorin, prostrating themselves four times en route, and 
finally took their places on his right hand.
"after this, so the chro.ndcle runs, it was the duty
1. Ibid. pp. 166-167.
2. K.V.K. ayyar, 1938, pp. 114-115.
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of the men who had formed the body-guard to march up with 
music and pomp to make obeisance. On this occasion however, 
a large portion of the body-guard seems to have been displeased, 
for they left without fulfilling their duty....
"The Ernad Menon and the Calicut Talachanna hayar 
with their followers were the only chiefs who made obeisance 
in due form to the Zamorin on this occasion, and possibly 
by the time of the next festival (1695 -A.D.) of which 
Hamilton wrote, the dissatisfaction may have increased among 
his followers, and the Zamorin18 life even may have been 
endangered, as Hamilton alleges, probably through lack of 
men to guard him. Tradition asserts that the Chaver who 
managed on one occasion to get through the guards and up to 
the Zamorin1s seat belonged to the family of the Chandrattil 
Panikkar.
"The chronicle winds up with a list of the Chavers 
slain on this occasion, viz:-
When the Zamorin was taking his stand on the terrace
apparently at the commencement of the festivities . . . . . 5
On the day the elephant was adorned, as already related ..18
"The next day of Chandrattil Panikkar and followers,
the number who came and died ....11
"Of Verkot Panikkar and followers , the number that
came and died the third day . . . . 1 2
"The number who came up to Vakkayur and died in
the four days  4
18 2
"The number of Chavers who were arrested at the 
place where Kalattil Itti Karunakara Menon was,
and brought tied to Vakkayur and put to death  1
"The number of Chavers arrested on the day of the
sacrifice, v/hen all the persons together made the
obeisance below Vakkayur at the time when the Zamorin
v/as taking his stand, and left tied to the bars, and
who v/ere afterwards brought to Vakkayur and after the
ceremony was over and the Zamorin had returned to
the palace were put to the sword  4
Total
Chavers also appeared, and died, at the pre-fnaharnakham
2
ceremony of Taipuyara, celebrated in 1656, 1670, and 1730.
Several points stand out. as in the ariyittuvalcha, 
the branches of the family are not recognised in the 
mahamakham. They have no ritual roles per se, and there 
is no mention of residential arrangements for them at 
Tirunavayi. Kinshipy at the basis of the system of sthanams, 
is not formally relevant to it. The sthanams, however, are 
all-important. Each has his or her own camp, and the male 
sthanis perform guard duties during the last climactic period. 
The second sthani in particular is marked off from the other
1• Ibid , p. 16 8 .
2. K.V.K. Ayyar, 1938, p. 118, based on Calicut Granthavari 
("chronicle")•
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junior sthanis, both in the location of his camp across the
river and in his participation in the ceremonies. His camp
was a smaller replica of the Zamorin1s. .as in the ariyittuvalcha,
the second sthani is treated as a kind of minor Zamorin.
This makes for the separation of the Zamorin from the immediate
heir in ritual; by recognition of the latter*s importance,
within the traditional forms of expressing importance, the
possibility of his being a danger to the Zamorin was minimised.
At the same time, the importance of this sthanam made the
succession to Zamorin a smooth transition. We have no
1
instances of regicide among Zamorins, or, indeed, in other 
chiefdoms. .and succession disputes, common enough in 
Cochin and elsewhere, are not known to have occurred, though 
this may be because they were confined to the family since no 
outside chiefs were powerful enough to interfere and make 
capital out of them.
The mahamakham was also attended by the armies of 
the Zamorin and of his feudatories and dependents. They 
were present fully armed, showed off their military skill 
in contests, and provided a guard for the Zamorin.
The hereditary officials, the Mangat iichan, Tinayancheri 
Elayatu, Dharmoth Panikkar, and Ernad Menon were present, with 
separate camps for each. Other officials, commanding bodies 
of Eayars, or administering the cities, were also present.
1. Dalboquerque (Vol. IV., Chapter XV) claimed a Zamorin was 
poisoned at his instance in 1513* This is very doubtful.
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Because at the 1683 mahamakham, only the Zamorin* s own army -
the Ernad and Polanad nayars - made obeisance to him, we know
nothing about the range of dependent chiefs who were expected
to do this as well. That these chiefs had a large measure
of independence is apparent from their right to withhold
obeisance. The chronicle does not say what steps the
Zamorin took later. But during the ceremony no ritual
sanctions operated to compel obeisance.
The purely local character of the mahamakham (that
is, local to the Zamorin*s jurisdiction), has at times been
overlooked. One view is that the "Rakshapurushan or
protector of the festival was the acknowledged suzerain of 
1
Malabar.. .,f , and that the mahamakham symbolised central
authority. Or, the assemblage is considered to be a vast
2
kuttam where justice was dispensed by the Zamorin, or "for 
the discussion of affairs of national concern".^ Logan, who 
had a closer knowledge of Kerala customs than the Jesuits,
f
refers to major local festivals, held annually at Taliparamba
in Kolattunad, in Kurumbranad, Palghat town, G-uruvayur (near
, L
Ponnani), and in Valluvanad. The mahamakham however, he
did not include with these. After stating that the festival
must traditionally be celebrated by the chief of the
1 . Innes, 1 9 0 8 , p. 459*
2. Ferroli, 1939, Vol. I, quotes from Licholas Pimenta of
the Society of Jesus, writing in 1b0l-1b02.
3* K.P. Padmanabha Menon, 1924, Vol. I, p. 231.
4. Logan, 1887, Vol. I, p. 162.
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locality where it occurred, Logan claims a much wider function 
for the festival as celebrated by the Zamorins. Upto 1743, 
and the last mahamakham, the Zamorins presided ’*as Suzerains 
of Keralam, including Travancore’* , and all those who 
acknowledged their suzerainty sent flags of fealty. 1 The 
presence of other chiefs, or of their flags, is not necessarily 
a sign of subordination, At the ariyittuvalcha installation 
of the Zamorins invitees included almost all the major chiefs 
of Kerala, except the few with whom the Zamorins were engaged 
in a long and continuing conf lict. The assumption that the 
Zamorins were overlords of Kerala is an untenable one. The 
size and grandeur of the mahamakham symbolised the power of 
the Zamorins, and the considerable edge they had over rival 
chiefs. It was not a symbol of central authority, or even
of a claim to be the central authority.
2
Dismissing Hamilton’s interpretation of the mahamakham 
as a ritual of deposition by suicide of the Zamorins, and
3
Duncan’s view that it marked the end of the twelve-yearly 
term of the Zamorins, arid an occasion for renewals of land 
grants, Logan accepts only the latter part of Duncan’s views*
1. Ibid , p. 164•
2. Hamilton, (1737) 1930 ed., pp. 171-172, discussed later.
3. J. Duncan in Transactions of the Bombay Library Society,
Vol. I, early nineteenth century.
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He says that at the festival ’’all feudal ties were broken, 
and the parties assembled in public conclave at Tirunavayi,
readjusted at such times all existing relations among
1 2 
themselves” . The twelve-yearly renewal of kanam grants
supports Logan’s views, bpt the ’’feudal ties” were less
comjf&ctual than he implies. The renewal of kanam grants was
a formality. The renewal of the feudal ties (administrative
offices? minor chiefly titles? land grants?) could not have
been more than this.
The mahamakham was clearly a local ritual festival 
celebrated in Tirunavayi temple. Its performance was the 
duty and the privilege of the chief, who had a koyma right 
over the temple. The struggle for the koyma right in 
Tirunavayi was confined to the original claimant, the 
Valluvanad chief, and the Zamorin who had taken it by 
conquering the territory around the temple. Wars over 
ritual privileges, including koyma rights over temples, 
as we saw earlier, were a common feature in pre-British 
Kerala. Tirunavayi became the object of a military struggle 
in the same way.
The function of the chavers of Valluvanad at the 
mahamakham was to register a formal protest against the
1. Logan, 1887, Vol. I, p. 164.
2. See Chapter II for land tenures.
usurpation by the Zamorins of a privilege formerly enjoyed 
by Valluvanad chiefs. The military struggle ended when the 
Zamorins became so powerful that Valluvanad was no longer 
an effective rival. ‘ But chavers, who were normally used 
during or as a consequence of wars, continued to be used
if-
by Valluvanad at the mahamakham. as expected of chavers, 
they were prepared to die avenging their chief:. Unlike a 
war, however, at the mahamakham they were certain to die, 
and they were equally certain not to succeed in killing the
presiding Zamorin. It was therefore only a formal, if
1
bloody, protest. Hamilton’s account that the Zamorin was
nearly killed at the 1 6 9 5 mahamakham is based purely on
hearsay. The chavers, drawn from leading Hayar families,
had no choice in appearing at the mahamakham. Their
families were granted estates on this account, and if the
chavers avoided their duties they were outcasted by their
own group, and had to leave the chiefdom. Logan qj otes
the Ilaya (second, or junior) raja of Valluvanad as saying
that he had lost much of his original rajyam, or chiefdom,
2
because of defecting chavers.
On the part of the Zamorins, they countenanced 
the presence of the chavers insofar as they continued to
1. Hamilton, (1737) 1930, ed., pp. 171-172
2. Logan, 1887, Vol. II, p. CLXXIV.
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allow a representative of Valluvanad to be one of the four 
managing trustees of Tirunavayi. uThe former Raja (Valluvanad), 
however, had until quite lately a voice in the management of 
the temple, and was represented by one of the four Brahman 
karalars; but now (i.e. 1 9 0 8 ) all rights are vested in the
-J
Zamorin....” It was in the house of this karalar that 
the chavers ate their “last meal... on earth”. Presumably, 
the Zamorin could have got rid of this karalar as a step 
(not necessarily effective) in putting an end to the chaver 
incursions at the mahamakham.
The form that political interaction between equivalent 
and proximate chiefdoms took, as we have seen, was mainly 
war. Valluvanad and Ernad had been equivalent chiefdoms.
Both were large inland chiefdoms, with Samanthan chief's.
Both were engaged in constant warfare in the pre-Portuguese 
period, until the Zamorin out-grew Ernad and increased his 
territories seawards and to the south, while Valluvanad*s 
territory shrank. The equivalence of formal caste status 
was not now paralleled by political equivalence, as expressed 
in the capacity to war against each other. The resulting danger 
to caste equivalence was minimised by a show (a ritual?) of 
war, wherein chavers, normally appanages of war, were sent 
to die at the mahamakham. The Valluvanad chavers, by their
1. Innes, 1908, p. 456.
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action, reiterated the equality of caste status of the
Valluvanad chiefs with the Zamorins,
note: The mahamakham ceremony, especially its chaver
episodes, has fascinated early winters, nearly all of whom
1
misunderstood it, Hamilton, writing of the 1695 celebration,
thought that formerly Zamorins ended twelve-year reigns by
2
cutting their own throats at the mahamakham, Frazer, using 
Portuguese writers, Hamilton, and Logan as his sources, 
describes the ceremony in a section called ,fKings killed at 
the End of a Fixed Term11, He does not commit himself, 
however, to the position that succession among the Zamorins 
was by institutionalised regicide. The most he says is that 
" the king of Calicut staked his crown and his life on uhe 
issue of battle" at the Mahamakham, which he translates as 
the Great Sacrifice,*' Our evidence is that the only blood 
spilt at the mahamakham for the historical period was that 
of the chavers.
The government of the chiefdoms 
The chiefdoms, as we have seen in Chapter II, were 
unecp al in terms of both the power and the ritual status of 
the ruling families. They tended to form into a loose cluster,
1. Hamilton, (1737) 1930 ed,, pp. 171-i-72.
2. Frazer, Part III of "The Golden Bough", 1911, PP« 46-58. 
3* Ibid, p. 49»
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with one dominant chiefdom at the core, the rest linked to 
it by ties of subservience which varied from a nominal 
submission with de facto independence, to a more complete 
subjection. Some of the forms that this subjection could take
A
were the payment to the dominant chiefdom of a succession fee 
when a dead chief was succeeded by his heir, and accession 
only after a royal writ was issued; annual payment of a 
protection fee (in Cochin), and of a tribute, and gifts 
at the yearly ceremonies; attendance at the succession 
rituals of the chief of the dominant chiefdom, and at the 
mahamakham (of the Zamorins); adoptions to be made only with 
such chief’s consent; contribution of armed Gayars, which 
formed the basis of the power of a dominant chiefdom, vis-a- 
vis other clusters.
An excellent example of the relations of a subject 
chiefdom to its "overlord” is available in a temple chronicle 
account of the action taken by Cochin against fekkemkur, 
for the latter*s misconduct. "At half past nine on the
p
night of the 18th of Vrischigam of the Puthuvaypu year 188 
(704 k.E.)^Thekkenkoor killed Devaswam Perum Parayan.^
That day, the Sankethaur was dissolved. Know that when
1. Miller, 1930. The following account of government in
the chiefdoms draws heavily on Miller.
2. The eighth month, November, in the sign of Scorpio.
Gundert, 1 8 7 2 .
3. That is, 1529 A.D.
4. Untouchable attached to devaswam.
5« The temple estate. See Chapter II.
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twelve months had passed, Thekkenkoor had to forfeit his
A
koyma sthanam. For this and his other encroachments within
the Sanketham, it was decided by the arbitrators nominated
2 3
by Perumpadapil Swaroopam, Porkala Mattathu Vasudevan,
L
Pariyalil Rarayanan Kumaran and the other arbitrators who
had assembled for the purpose, that a statue of the Pariah
must be made, that paddy fields and lands must be given for
the expenses of the Parayans during their fasting, that an
offering of a silver pot must be made and that the Perumpadapil
Svaroopam as the suzerain of Thekkenkoor must, by way of
penalty for the outrageous acts of the latter, present to the
pagoda an elephant and its stick and Thotty, ana that the
£
Sanketham may then be renewed".
The account is interesting for the light it throws 
on the relations of chiefs with the temples and of chiefs 
with each other. We have seen earlier that chiefs had certain 
rights of supervision and management over temple estates, 
and that two or three chiefs might share such rights in one 
temple. In the above mentioned temple probably Elankunnapuzha 
itself - Tekkemkur had a koyma right, and Cochin who appointed 
the arbitrators, presumably had the melkoyma"^ right. The
1. Right of supervision. See Chapter II.
2. Ruling family of Cochin.
3. Personal name.
4. 11
3. Elephant stick.
6 . Chronicles of Elankunnappuzha temple, quoted by K.P. 
Padmanabha Menon, 1933, Vol. Ill, pp. 517-318.
7. See Chapter II.
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document specifically states that Cochin is suzerain to 
Texkemkur. .a s such, the Cochin ruler was responsible for the 
absolution of his feudatory for misconduct in the temple 
jurisdiction. He was directly responsible to the temple 
authorities probably the yogam - though the document, as 
quoted in Padrnanabha Menon, does not state this. The temples 
therefore recognised the relations of ordination that existed 
among chiefs who were involved in the temple management.
The subjection of lesser chiefs stopped short of an 
established authoritarian relationship. In the temple 
dispute, Cochin was not asked to punish Tekkemkur, but 
rather to intercede for the latter*s absolution. The 
exaction of tributes, fees, and armed men was primarily 
sanctioned by the military power of the leading chief, and 
only secondarily by his ritual status or his traditional position. 
There was no machinery of government in the way of processes 
of law or administrative organisation by which he could levy 
tributes and men from lesser chiefdoms. In the case of a 
conflict between a dominant chiefdom and one of its dependents, 
the final arbiter was the greater might of the former. Such 
might included both his own military resources, and those 
he could call upon from other related or friendly or closely 
subjected chiefdoms.
The relations oetweem equivalent chiefdoms were 
segmentary. The relations between unequal chiefdoms had
19 3
authoritative content, but were not crystallised into an 
administrative order. They continued to be theoretically 
and potentially segmentary.
Within a chiefdom, however, patterns of authority 
were sufficiently established to permit us to talk of 
administrative interaction, or of ordered government. We 
shall see that here, again, the typical form of administration, 
a bureaucracy, did not develop. Instead, the existing social 
groups (castes) which at one axis, the horizontal, made far 
a fragmented political system, at the other, vertical or 
hierarchical axis, made for a system of ordered, authoritative 
relations. The hierarchical axis is essential to the existence 
of relationships of authority, or ordination. These 
hierarchical relations, of significance in a political 
context, were not separated from vertical relations in other 
contexts such as ritual purity, or economic activity. In 
other words, there was a development of authoritative 
relationships as distinct from segmentary ones, but there was 
no separation of these into distinct institutions. There 
was a specialisation of function without a concomitant 
specialisation of structure.
The administrative functions were performed by 
persons of relevant caste status, who held a good economic
1. M.G. Smith, 1960.
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position and, related to this, an administrative-cum-political
office. The smallest administrative unit v/as the desam, or
village. normally, in a desam, one family of high caste
owned most of the land on janmam tenure. This janmi family
owned the title, and performed the functions, of desavazhi
or village headmen. They were usually Isayars of high status,
(hiriyattil subcaste in Zamorin areas, Vellayraa in Cochin; , 1
though some desarns had Hambudiri, Ambalavasi, or Samanthan 
2
desavazhis. A desavazhi was expected to supervise village 
ceremonies, marriages, temple administration and ritual, and 
law and order in the desam, and to supply and lead a body of 
armed men when required by a chief. He also had the duty of 
managing the devaswam of the village temple. Actual 
administration of the temple was in the hands of hereditary 
administrators, or uralans, who were usually heads of four 
prominent local Rayar tarawads. The trusteeship right, or 
urayma, of an extinct tarawad could be added by a desavazhi 
to his jenmam rights.
The desavazhi was responsible for local law and order 
to a chief, and was in some ways controlled by him. The 
transfer by sale or otherwise of a desam required a chief*s 
approval. The desavazhi performed very limited judicial 
functions, usually for lower castes. Higher castes settled
1. Gough, 1950.
2. Miller, 1950
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disputes in their own assemblies in which the desavazhi, as 
representative of a chief, seems to have had no particular 
power, Criminal offences entailing sentences of death were 
judged by chiefs, and not by caste assemblies nor by desavazhis.
Desams were grouped together to form nads, under 
naduvazhis. a n§duvazhi, who was more chief than headmen, 
was also desavazhi of at least one desam* The naduvazhi 
therefore was the core desavazhi of a cluster of desams*
Apart from the larger size of the nads, the difference 
between the clusters of desams and the clusters of chiefdoms 
(nads) lies in the more distinctly authoritative interaction 
in the former, compared to the latter* The desavazhi 
formally recognised the authority of the naduvazhi. This was, 
however, not necessarily supported by any real control of 
the desavazhis by the naduvazhi* That would depend on how 
powerful the naduvazhi was.
Waduvazhis were of unequal position both in strength 
and caste status. They ranged from small nayar chiefs, 
commanding bodies of about one hundred men (e.g. Cochin’s
-j
seventy-two Madampis) and always dependent on some chief, 
to the svarupams, of independent status, often at the 
centre of a cluster. If they were not a core chiefdom, 
they were either isolated and independent, (like Valluvanad)
1. Miller, 1950. Alexander, 1946, thinks madampis are the 
same as desavazhis (p. 144).
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or they were involved in a cluster in a relation of formal 
dependence but actual alliance, and occasional hostility.
The breakdov/n of such alliances was frequent. The formal 
dependence of such a svarupam was usually expressed in the 
denial to it of a right to coin money, or to tile palace 
roofs, or to enter a war on its own. This latter stricture 
was not very effective since every svarupam maintained its 
own body of armed men, made up from its desam levies, and 
subject to its control via its desavazhis and not to the 
"overlord"•
The more powerful svarupams were able to incorporate 
neighbouring nads under their jurisdiction by conquest, 
presumably reducing the conquered naduvazhi to headship of his 
own desam. Occasionally a svarupam became more powerful by 
acquiring the rights of other naduvazhis either b^  arranging 
adoptions with them, or through their extinction. The 
government under a svarupam was much more complex than under 
a naduvazhi. There was a greater division of powers and functions 
among senior males of the svarupam in the form of the sthanams, 
than in the nad or desam where the head of the respective 
taravad which held hereditary right to office alone held 
that office. The svarupams recognised upto six sthanams 
(as among Zamorins). Some also recognised one or two female 
sthanams. The female sthani had a formal status, and 
probably also domestic functions as eldest female of the
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joint svarupam* But she had no political or administrative 
functions in the chiefdan. Kolattunad, the Zamorin, and 
Travancore had female sthanams.
In addition to these, they also had special offices 
entailing administrative functions which were held in 
hereditary right by certain families. There were hereditary 
ministers in Valluvanad, Ernad (Zamorin), Cochin, and probably 
Kolattunad, The Zarnorins had a hereditary secretary, record- 
keeper, various court officials, mayors for some of the larger, 
towns like Calicut, and Aliparampa, and army commanders. 
Administrative functions were separated from political inter­
action by the delegation of these to a body of officials, leaving 
the svarupams free to concentrate on their relations to other 
svarupams or even naduvazhis. But the assignation of these 
offices along the grain of caste status, and the confirmation 
of this by making the offices hereditary, ensured that 
governmental specialisation neither disrupted the existing 
pattern of social relations, nor provided an alternate 
status system. The rulers could not escape the limitations 
set on their power by a stratification into castes. Their 
officials were embedded in these castes and were not, and 
could not be, perfect instruments of their policies. The 
ruler could not arrogate more power to himself than was
1. K.V.K. Ayyar, 1936, p. 325*
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consistent with, the existing social system with its typical
distribution of powers. He could not centralise. Among
the Zamorins, the only officials at the direct command of
the svarupam and liable to dismissal were the stewards and
agents who managed the private estates of the svarupam,
customs collectors, collectors of fines and other dues, and
judges. These were assisted by four assessors, always selected
1
by them and not by the Zamorin.
The svarupams interfered little in the naduvazhis* 
administration. They could intervene if there was a 
miscarriage of justice by the naduvazhi. Sentence of death 
could only be passed by them. There was however no regular 
process by which they functioned as the highest authority in 
their territories. Physical proximity, which made the 
sanction of force more real, would make neighbouring nads 
more closely subject.
There is a close relation between the lack of an 
organised administrative machinery and the method of 
collecting revenues followed by the chiefs. Except in 
Travancore, which was at various times ruled by invaders 
from the east coast, land taxes were unknown in Kerala upto 
the eighteenth century. Some sporadic collections were
1. Buchanan, 1807, Vol. II, p. 394
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made in the early decades of the century by the Kolattunad 
chiefs, to finance defences against the Canarese invasion. 
Regular taxation however was for the first time imposed in 
1784-5 by TippoSultan, the invader from Mysore, and this 
was continued by the English when they took over in 1792,
The English abolished the customary dues such as succession 
fees, gifts, et cetera, of the chiefs, as also the supplying 
of nayar soldiers. An English view based on information 
supplied by Koplahs to an English Joint Commissioner of the 
1790s, is: "This view (i.e. of the Moplahs) was in every 
sense most natural; the ancient government of divided author­
ities had been superseded by the organised rule first of 
the Mysoreans, and afterwards of the Honourable Company, 
and what else could be expected than that the ancient 
government share of the produce should go along with the 
authority?" (Logan*s italics)
Romanticising prior to this piece of rationalisation, 
the same author describes Kerala’s political system before 
settlement. "The nayars who paid * no revenue to anyone* were
simply fragments of a government which had at one time
2
levied this pattam throughout the province. The subdivision 
and re-subdivision of the authority of government were 
perfectly marvellous and probably unparalleled in the
1. Logan, 1887, Vol. I, p. 510.
2. Per Logan, derived from pad=authority, and varam=share.
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history of any country in the world. The great families - 
the Zamorin, Kolattunad, Walluvanad, Palghat, Kottayam, 
Kadattanad, Kurumbranad, etc. - were petty suzerains, each with 
numbers of vassals, more or less independent, and more or 
less fluctuating in numbers. The subdivisions of authority 
did not cease till the lowest stratum of agricultural society 
was reached.
”The society thus constituted was on a thoroughly 
sound basis for the strongest men had opportunities of 
coming to the front (so to speak). The great bulk of the 
payers of the pattam were themselves nayars.... These ^ayars 
naturally attached themselves to the strongest individuals 
of their community, taking with them of course the pattam 
or authority*s share of the produce, which formed a substantial 
object of ambition to the pushing men of the community.
11 In this way numberless petty chieftains arose, and 
the great families waxed or waned as they were able to 
attract to their following larger or fewer numbers of these 
petty chieftains. *iNo revenue* was in one sense levied from 
the petty chiefs who thus flocked round the standards of 
the great families, for the petty chiefs themselves enjoyed
i
the ancient land revenue assessment”.
This statement of the nature of a polity is both 
amateurish and subjective. It underlines, however, the
1. Logan, 1887, Vol. I, pp. 509-510.
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relationship of administration to centralisation. A 
fragmented political system (and Logan does see it as one 
system, not a collection of small systems) goes with the 
absence of organised government since the 11 fragments” 
individually collect and enjoy revenue from land, and are 
not required to give regularly out of this to any central 
power.
The armies of the chiefdoms, like the administration, 
were not separate institutions. Warring, like administration, 
was a specialised function performed by certain specialised 
groups. But these groups were not confined to warring.
They had other roles in both ritual and economic spheres of 
activity, to which their warrior role was linked. Warriors 
were almost always nayars by caste. Some use was made by 
the Zamoriris of tooplah soldiers, but mainly they used koplahs 
for their navy - where the nayars would not venture.
Conventional land wars, then, were fought with armies of 
Layar soldiers. These nayars were hereditary warriors.
They were paid small sums of money, and some rice, when on 
active duty. Otherwise, they lived off the proceeds from
A
their customary kanara tenures. Some l^ayars might be maintained 
as a standing army, like the Zamorin1s Lokar - a body of ten 
thousand men. We do not know how they were paid. There was
1• See Chapter II.
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no custom, however, of paying men or officers with grants 
of laud which could only be transmitted by descent, barring 
failure of heirs.
The nayars in a desam gathered under the leadership 
of their desavazhi. a chief’s army was at any time made up 
of such desam-based units. How the desavazhis made sure of 
their levies, we do not know. As the leading jenmis in their 
desams they were in. a position to exert political and 
economic pressure on less powerful Layar taravads, just as 
they were themselves subject to pressure - more political 
and military than economic - from the naduvazhis. The 
traditions of warriorcraf't among nayars however were very 
strong, and there is no record of difficulties in recruitment 
of soldiers.
The nayar levies could not be freely manipulated by 
chiefs for a number of reasons, as we have seen, warriors 
were born and not made. The chiefs had to accept iMayars as 
their only soldiers. They expanded their armies by bringing 
in desavazhis with their small bands of' Hayars. But they 
exercised little direct control over the nayars. The iiayars 
were linked to their desavazhis by several ties, as tenants 
to owners, as ritual inferiors, possibly as hypergaraous 
affines, as long-staging neighbours, and as long-standing 
soldiers. The chief could make use of the Layars only through 
the desavazhis. Payments, made in both cash and kind, were
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limited, being made only on active duty. Spoliation of the 
enemy was not an accepted mode of rewarding soldiers on 
active duty. The nayars had their own caste assemblies, and 
were not subject to internal interference either in peace or 
in war. The nad kuttam, or nad assembly, seems to have had 
the power to protest if a chief did not honour his ooligations 
to the nayars of that nad. If the protest flared into armed
1
hostility, the uayars, if they won, deserted their allegiance.
Hayars did not only fight in units for a powerful
chief. The units themselves might be in conflict with other
like units. Where a region was dominated by a powerful chief,
such feuds were less likely to develop. The weaker the chief,
the greater the possibility that disputes would be resolved
by feuds. Lorth Kerala, with a weak ruling family in Kolattunad,
had more powerful desavazhis than central Kerala. They were
2
known as yajamanans. They frequently quarrelled over 
reclamation of waste lands, and such quarrels easily developed 
into family feuds - Hayar tenants might join the feud.
The armies of hereditary warriors, grouped into 
territorial units which reflected the fragmented political 
system of Kerala, were an important element in what has been 
described earlier as contained warfare. Contained warfare
1. Miller, 1950
2. Ibid.
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serves the purpose of the adjudication of conflicting interests 
of competing groups - here, chiefdoms. It is necessarily not 
disruptive of a political system, though it may cause changes 
in detail of the boundaries or alliances of specific chiefdoms. 
One can go further and say it was an integrative element in : 
the society. It held together otherwise discrete territorial 
units in a relation of intensive and continuous interaction, 
including armed hostility with some, and military co-operation 
with others. We have here a society that was territorially 
segmented. The segments were, on the one hand, politically 
evenly balanced. On the other hand they were closely knit by 
caste and kinship ties, by a non-territorially segmented, 
ritually and economically powerful caste of Brahmins, by a 
common and always competing interest in the traditional 
reserves of wealth, the devaswams ana sankethams, and in the 
more modern sources of wealth in the overseas spice trade.
The causes for conflict between political segments were 
ever present. There was no machinery of government to 
resolve conflict. Wars were inevitable. Because the segments 
were closely related by caste and kinship, by an all-Kerala 
Brahmin caste, and by a common value-system (a common 
language, a shared legendary history, certain forms of 
worship and specifically regional temples being the more 
tangible aspects of such a value-system) wars were fought to 
rule, a chief who fought without regard to the traditionally 
defined limits - there were no manuals of war, comparable to
20 5
the texts expounding on appropriate behaviour for Brahmins - 
threatened the existing balance of segments, and of their 
caste and kinship.orientations.
The legitimacy of war in Kerala, if not its rules, is 
supported by the story of the Keralolpatti legendary history. 
The country was partitioned in the ninth century by the last 
Perumal (east coast viceroy). This Perumal gave the Zamorin 
a sword and an injunction to fight and conquer, and he gave
1
the Valluvanad chief his shield with which to defend himself.
Travancore - A Phase of Political Centralisation
The Travancore cluster of chiefdoms was the least
centralised of the four clusters in Kerala. Unlike the
other three, no one. chiefdom predominated. Pour major
chiefdoms were under collateral branches of the Kshatriya
family, Tiruppappur svarupam, which ruled Travancore proper.
They were the Cheravai family at Kayamkulam, Pokam at
Peritally, the Elayadath svarupam, and *»uilon. The
collateral tie was maintained by frequent adoptions among
them, at least some of which did not have the purpose of
preventing extinction. In 1574-5* a prince and princess of
the Trippappur svarupam (of Travancore proper) were adopted
2
by the Cheravai family. In 1621-2, a tripartite adoption
1. K.V.K. iiyyar, 1933, 61.
2. Varma Raja, 1928, p. 4.
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took place between Trippappur, Cheravai, and the Pokara family.
In this transaction, the chief of Trippappur who was also
chief of Cheravai, was adopted as brother to the Pokam chief,
along with a prince and two princesses of Attingal. iittingal
was the maternal family of Trippappur, controlling independent
2
estates but not fully a chiefdom. A subsequent agreement 
between the Cheravai-Trippappur and Pokam “brothers*1 specified 
that the latter would not make any alliance without the 
approval of the former - obviously the initial motive behind 
the adoption.
Another tripartite adoption occurred in 1b22-3, 
this time being an adoption by Cheravai from Elayadath svarupam, 
while Elayadath took three Cheravai princes and three Attingal 
princesses.
Adoptions did not necessitate the severance of natal 
ties. The dual family membership of adoptees reinforced 
kinship bonds between the collateral families, and offset 
to some extent the political effects of segmentation. In 
the nucleated clusters north of Travancore the core chiefdoms 
imposed some degree of control whereby conflict within the 
cluster was inhibited, and enemies were sought outside it.
1. Varma Raja, 1930, p. 114.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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In Travancore, with no true nucleus of power since the 
five major chiefdoms v/ere more or less equally placed in 
territories and resources, and were all caste equals, the 
ties of adoption provided a measure of cohesion. Conflict 
among the chiefdoms however was not uncommon, though we 
know of no regular wars. This may have been due not only 
to kinship ties among them, but also to the threat of 
military incursions from the east coast.
Before the seventeenth century, these families were 
probably still one svarupam. They shared in the management 
of the Padmanabhaswami temple at Trivandrum. The control of 
the temple was exercised by the senior sthanam known as 
Kulasekhara Perumal, succession to which went to the eldest 
male of the related families. The formal control of the 
temple was vested in the Tiruppappur svarupam, and the 
Kulasekhara Perumal had to be initiated to this svarupam 
(if he did not already belong to it) to acquire control of 
the temple.1
By the seventeenth century the sthanams had
2
disappeared. Temple inscriptions for earlier periods 
refer to senior and junior chiefs, and they come from any 
of the branches 11 the system of co-partnership or the
1. Varma Raja, 1928.
2. Reproduced in nagam Aiya, 1906; K.K. Pillay, 1953»
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practice of junior members of the royal family being
associated with the ruling sovereign, since, in addition
to this fact, the names of three different families to which
the rulers belonged are mentioned, the position, in several
1
instances, becomes distressingly complex". The sthanams did 
not develop into a clear hierarchical order of princes, spanning 
the segments of the family both by a shared succession and 
by a distribution of the chiefly powers of the family.
The lack of well-defined sthanams is directly 
correlated to the dispersal of the segments of the family.
In chapter II we saw that the institution of sthanams 
contributed to the political stability of a chiefdom. The 
more powerful and relatively centralised chiefdoms tended 
to have a definite order of sthanams. The territorial dispersal 
of the Travancore collaterals crystallised into political 
dispersal, and the sthanams lost all significance. This is 
admittedly a hypothetical view of the early history of 
Travancore. The authenticated case of Kolattunad, however, 
fully supports it. The eighteenth century partition of 
Kolattunad between two branches of the original svarupam 
was followed by the loss of function of the sthanams. The 
new chiefs were known by their territory or family name - 
as were the five southern Kshatriya chiefs. The sthanams
1. K.K. Pillay, 1933, pp. 35-36
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shrank to mere titles, and under the British, fell into 
disuse.
In both cases, foreign invasions may have caused 
the breaking up of a chiefdom, Kolattunad split after a 
Canarese invasion. Travancore had split by the sixteenth 
century. There had been frequent invasions both before 
and after that period, from the east coast.
Conflict with like political units - other Kerala 
chiefdoms - made for internal cohesion of a chiefdom.
Conflict with outside powers was unpredictable and unequal, 
and yet largely localised. [The Mysoreans - Hyder All and 
Tippu Sultan - were excluded: they threatened not individual 
chiefs but the whole system, with its supporting values; 
they roused the combined if not always effective opposition 
of all the chiefs]. External conflict upset the internal 
balance of power in the involved chiefdoms. In Kolattunad, 
a rival faction made contact with the invaders (who were 
territorially and culturally accessible to them, in contrast 
to the Muslims from Mysore). This culminated in a partition 
of the chiefdom. A similar situation existed in Travancore, 
which worked out also in the same way.
The sthanams in other chiefdoms integrated the 
chiefdom and at the same time prevented its complete 
centralisation. They reflected the power of the chiefly 
family over its territory, but they kept such power dispersed
2 10
among the branches of the family. They made for a coherence
that was short of centralisation, and set a limit to
political development. The very strength of the Zamorin
sthanams prevented centralisation of the chiefdom.
Travancore never developed sthanams, but later it
went the furthest of all the Kerala chiefdoms in political
centralisation, producing a bureaucratic state in the
eighteenth century.
A brief history of Travancore in the eighteenth
century traces the steps by which this state was formed.
The Sri Padmanabhaswami temple at Trivandrum, we
have seen, was managed by the Tiruppappur svarupam, but was
of concern to its four collaterals as well. The management,
or yogam, of the temple consisted of six Potti Brahmins (of
distant Canarese origin), a narabudiri sanyasi (nambudiris
are, and were, rare in Travancore), a Rayar noble, and only
half a vote to the chief. Hence its name, Ettara, i.e.
Eight-and-a-Half', YOgarn. The Pottis held large janrnams.
The devaswam estates were leased to the Ettuvittil Pillamar
(Eight Rayar nobles). The Yogam allowed the Pillamars to
partition the devaswam estates, and this encouraged them
2
to become rebellious. The latter burnt the chief!s palace
1. K.K. Pillay, 1953, p. 152.
2. Panikkar, 1960, p. 232.
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(during 1661-7) when he tried to reform the devaswam. They
quarrelled with the yogam, and the temple had to be closed
from 1673 to 1678, when an Attingal princess and a Cheravai
1
prince reopened it. The Pillamars then usurped the rented 
estates of the devaswam. The ruling family, at the turn of 
the century, was powerless in its own territories.
In 1718, two princes and two princesses were adopted 
from Kolattunad. In 1729, the son of the older princess, 
Martanda Varma, became by succession, chief of the Tiruppappur 
svarupam. Even before accession, Martanda Varma had advised
his predecessor to curb the Pillamars, and to this end an
2
array was acquired from the east coast. Rormally, the 
Pillamars would contribute levies of Rayar soldiers to the 
chief!s army. The "foreign'army, however, was "too masterful" 
and Martanda Varma replaced it with mercenary recruits from 
the Maravars of the east coast.^ The hiatus between armies 
led to further eruptions from the Pillamars, who now 
instigated the sons of the previous chief to claim the 
succession. The Travancore succession was, as in other 
Kerala chiefdoms, unequivocally matrilineal, and these claims
1. Ragam Aiya, 1906, Vol. I, p. 304.
2. Claimed by Panikkar as comiixg from the Mogul governor
of the Carnatic, by Raja as partly from Carnatic, partly 
from the Pandya kiiigs of Madura.
3* Velu Pillai states tnat Panikkar and Kagam iiiya are wrong 
in claiming Maravar recruitment, and that Martanda Varmafs 
innovation was to disband mercenaries aid to recruit local 
men. He does not say who these mercenaries were. His 
implication is that the expansion of Travancore was effected 
by using a nationalist army. Velu Pillai, 1940, Vol. II, 
pp. 268-9*
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failed. The claimants were Killed in incidents in 1733* 
and soon after the Pillamars were arrested and hanged.
The Pottis on the temple yogam were either banished or
i
hanged. Having removed all rival centres of power within
Travancore, Martanda Varma now turned his attention to his
neighbouring chiefs.
In the next two decades Martanda Varma annexed, at
times with difficulty, the collateral chiefdoms of (^uilon,
Kayamkulam, and Elayadam, the Brahmin chiefdom of Purakkad,
and the pepper-rich Samanthan chiefdoms of Vadakkumkur and
Tekkumkur. The latter two were previously linked to Cochin.
Cochin’s feudatories Parur (Brahmin) and ^langad (Samanthan)
were annexed by Martanda Varma*s successor.
A few incidents in these annexations are of interest.
In the case of i^uilon and Elayadam, the ruling families
became extinct and Martanda Varma refused to let them continue
by adoptions. (*uilon*s ally Kayamkulam disputed this, and
as a consequence was annexed. Then Kayamkulam*s allies,
Purakkad, Vadakkumkur and Tekkumkur were annexed. In the
latter campaigns, the use of "foreign11 (east coast) Brahmins
2
by Vadakkumkur and Tekkumkur in their armies was offset by
1. Hagara ^iya, 1906, Vol. I, p. 33&.
2. Ibid, p. 350.
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Travancore sending out a contingent of fishermen, to fight
with whom would convey pollution. The Brahmins fled.
Purakkad was protected by the soldiers' fear of fighting a
Brahmin chief. Purakkad was won by buying off its army
leaders, nfter annexation the local nayars in Purakkad,
Vadakkumkur, and Tekkumkur, supported by Cochin and its nobles,
revolted and. were suppressed. The Kayamkulam Hayars revolted
and were punished. The punishment of Kayar nobles is
considered by Panikkar to be the first serious blow to the
1
political system of Kerala. Chiefs in Kerala, when faced 
with noble rebels, could suppress them by their superior 
armed strength. They could not punish them, for there were 
no established relations of authority between them. -Martanda 
Varma, by punishing them, denied their independence even on 
a purely nominal level, and asserted a relation of super­
ordination over them. This was exactly what he had done 
earlier to the Pillamar. His right to suppress nayars 
traditionally subordinate to another chief was being 
questioned in Kayamkulam arid further north.
With the annexation of Parur, i\langad and the Cochin 
territory of Karappuram, the new Travancore was completely 
formed. Further expansions became difficult because now
1. Panikkar, 1960, p. 23b.
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it would involve conflict with the still powerful Zamorins.
The Mysorean invasions, beginning in 17b2, froze all political 
development in Kerala. But Travancore had ceased to be a 
chiefdom even before this. It was now a state.
The new centralised state of Travancore raises the 
question of why and how the chiefdom became a state, a 
brilliant analysis of the economics of expansion and
1
centralisation in Travancore is made by A *R• Das Gupta.
He attributes it to the general growth of trade in Malabar 
after the fall of the Safavi dynasty of Persia. The Dutch 
Company as well as traders all along the Indian west coast 
had large interests in Persia. They now turned to Malabar, 
to its pepper. Martanda Varma took full advantage of this 
development.
Chiefs made profits out of trade by taxing it, and 
by encouraging the smuggling of pepper to avoid the European 
coastal control of the trade. But they exercised little 
control over it. They protected their merchants, and their 
friendship could make trade for an outside group such as the 
Dutch easier. But they could not guarantee supplies of 
pepper. This was also the case in Travancore, till 1741.
In this year, Martanda Varma defeated the Dutch decisively
1. Das Gupta, i 961•
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at Colachel, and ended their attempt to win a monopoly of
the pepper trade. This trade had been swelled by the
annexation of his collateral chiefdoms, and was now being
diverted overland to the east coast.
In 1743-44, Martanda Varma informed the English that
he was taking over the pepper trade. ..."by the kings taking
the Pepper into his own hands last year under pretence of
knowing what quantity his Kingdom Produced, the Hon1ble
1
Companys trade was absolutely ruin'd..." By 1750, all
private trade had been abolished. The English could only
trade with Martanda Varma. The Dutch lost twice over.
They lost their footing in Travancore. .And their volume
of trade through Cochin decreased because of Travancore!s
northward territorial expansion. They only succeeded in
shutting Travancore off from trade by sea. Travancore
therefore sold for profit overland to Coromandel. It sold to
the English and Dutch only as much as was dictated by
2
political necessity.
Martanda Varma, by establishing a state monopoly 
first over pepper and then over other commodities of trade, 
acquired the means with which to maintain both an administrative 
bureaucracy and a regular army.
One factor (not discussed by Das Gupta) that gave
(nu)
1. Records of Fort St. George, Anjengo Consultations,/1935, 
dated 22 August. ^
2. Das Gupta, 1961.
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a fillip to centralisation, was the policy of t he English
factory at Anjengo at the beginning of the eighteenth
century. Their trade had suffered at the hands of the
Pillamars, and they were as anxious as the chiefs to see
their power broken. They set themselves out to support
the chief against the Pillamars. They were not averse,
for example, to supplying arms to the chiefs of Travancore.^
Martanda Varma, however, planned his own political strategy,
and proceeded to centralise his territories far beyond the
convenience of the English. Where he got his ideas is not
at all certain. He was served by a Tamil general and a
2Dutch artillery expert - they may have influenced him.
Or it could have been an accelerating process following from
the initial need to reinstate the power of the ruling family.
3
Again, it might be a case of genuine innovation, without 
reference to precedent. The English barter of arms for 
pepper undoubtedly contributed to Travancore1s capacity to 
conquer and annex.
If the "why" of Travancore centralisation is uncertain, 
we are on firm ground when we look for the ways in which 
centralisation was effected.
1. Records of Port St. George, Anjengo Consultations,
(1747), 1935.
2. Panikkar calls the new Travancore "a Tamilian conception".
3. Das Gupta supports this view.
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Earlier we saw that political interaction occurred 
within a framework of stated and unstated rules of conduct, 
Martanda Varma ignored or broke these rules. He refused 
to recognise the inalienable rights of chiefs and the 
continuity of chiefly families. He did this by refusing 
them the right to adopt when in danger of extinction, and 
taking their chiefdoms by escheat. Where there was no such 
excuse, he simply dispossessed a defeated chief. He punished 
his nobles, by arrest and hanging, instead of subduing them 
with a military operation. This implies some administrative 
machinery at his command, and a will to use it in this way.
He also punished nobles in annexed territories. This 
punishment was an aspect of the establishment of his authority, 
of a fully ordinate relation instead of the unstable 
ordination that existed between unequal but independent chief­
doms. The breaking of the yogam was a denial of the general 
ritual immunity of Brahmins to the political attentions of 
chiefs.
The army recruited from the karavar caste was also 
a break with tradition. By recruiting from a non-Malayali 
caste, Martanda Varma freed himself from dependence on his 
nobles for levies of warriors. Because his kWlT*''" rr aits 
were paid regular salaries - unlike hayar soldiers whose#^ 
main livelihood was derived not from the chief but from 
customary rights in land - they formed a pliable, controllable,
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instrument of policy. The later recruitment of inayars did 
not change this situation, as they were no more exclusively 
the warriors of Travancore. The smaller chiefs who could 
deflect their loyalty had been broken. And the army was * 
reorganised.
The territorial expansion was not confined to an 
extension of sphere of influence 4 that is, to the formation 
of a cluster. All rival centres of power were eradicated in 
the extended territories, which were brought under the direct 
control of Martanda Varma. This was made possible by the 
establishment of a bureaucratic administration, a large 
part of the bureaucratic development arose directly out 
of the attempt to monopolise the pepper trade. After the 
first announcement to this effect in 1743*44, officials, 
appointed by the Travancore chief, became important since 
they told both Europeans and local merchants who was to 
trade with whom, and they had powers to enforce their decisions 
Later, the English were told they could make contracts only 
with the government• i^fter two ^ears of trade losses, the 
English had to agree in 1749« Private trade was completely 
abolished. Unauthorized trade was punishable by death.
Buyers were appointed. They bought up all pepper at a fixed 
low rate. Posts were established in Travancore to prevent 
unauthorised pepper export. Other goods were added to the 
government monopoly, such as tobacco and arecanut. They were
1. Das Gupta, 1961.
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stored by the government, and sold at government rates.
The profits were enormous, though the cultivators got little 
of them. They were invested in a standing army of fifty- 
thousand men, a defence works on the northern frontier known 
as the Travancore Lines (indicating a saturation point in 
territorial expansion), roads, some palaces, and feeding- 
houses for Brahmins, and additions to Sri Padmanabhaswami 
temple. The tfTravancore System11 , as Das Gupta calls the 
bureaucratic organisation, was built up by the Tamil minister- 
cum-general of Martanda Varma. A graded hierarchy of admin­
istrative offices, filled by appointment, was established.
This covered the whole of Travancore. It was begun in 1743, 
and was noted by the English at Anjengo. Maintenance of 
law and order and the collection of taxes were its main 
functions.
These political innovations were accompanied by the
development of appropriate rituals. Martanda Varma
performed for the first time a murajapam in 1751 on the
1
advice oi Brahmins, to expiate the sins of war. (Asoka,
the ancient centraliser, propagated Buddhism for similar reasons).
The mahamakham reflected the internal structure of the chiefdom
1. nagarn Aiya, 1906, Vol. I, p. 361.
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of the Zamorins. The murajapam emphasised the subjection 
of the chief to the deity Sri Padmanabhaswami, and to ritual 
values generally. Thus, it was a festival for Brahmins, 
not for other chiefs of Kerala. This appeal to ritual 
values, and to the least localised caste in Kerala, and 
the avoidance of any reference to the political system - 
traditional or new - is an attempt to legitimise politically 
upstart and disruptive techniques within the existing system 
of values. The appointed bureaucrats and mercenary soldiers 
were not in competition with the central authority, or were 
not meant to be. Neighbouring chiefs were there on 
sufferance, not because Travancore recognised an order of 
society where there was a multiplicity of chiefs. Neither 
of these categories were assigned a role at the murajapam. 
That was a ritual reflecting the one central authority 
and its relation to society.
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CHAPTER IV 
Sikh Political Organisation.
The present chapter consists of three sections.
The first section is an introduction to the Punjab region, 
its topography, its ethnic heterogeneity, the territorial 
location of the political community which forms the sub­
ject matter of the rest of the chapter, and a brief history 
of its origin, caste, religion, economy, and systems of 
land tenure.
The second section describes the traditional pol­
itical system of the Punjab. As defined in Chapter I, 
by a traditional political system is meant the typical 
political relationships found in the established, stable 
caste societies in India when they were not under outside 
domination, and before they were 11 bureaucratised1* under 
British rule, and later by the Indian Constitution of 1947. 
In the Punjab, such a ’traditional* system of political 
relations came after a long period of imperial domination 
by Muslim rulers at Delhi. There is, therefore, no 
definite temporal connotation to the term though again, 
such a connotation is not entirely absent.
Antiquity is irrelevant to the way the word 
traditional is used in this thesis. Also, the tirae-span
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covered is irrelevant to the analysis of the system, of 
the Punjab as of Kerala, though it is of interest in 
evaluating social change* The traditional system of 
Kerala existed continuously for eight centuries, per­
haps more* And this system underwent significant 
changes internally (that is, not due to outside political 
domination) for six to seven decades in the eighteenth 
century. In the Punjab, after the ancient Hindu kings, 
there were no sovereign local rulers right up to the 
eighteenth century. The area was either overrun by 
invasions from the north, or was held, however uncertainly, 
as part of the territories of empire-building Islamic 
dynasties. Local chiefs in the Punjab won their indep­
endence in the 1760’s, and formed a political community 
which is here called traditional in the same sense that 
the much older system of Kerala is traditional. This 
lasted for only three decades, till it underwent internal 
changes, resulting in a different, more centralised 
political system which lasted for nearly six decades - until 
annexation by the British in 1848. The disparity in the 
period covered for each of the two regions does not affect 
the general hypothesis that the typical stratification of
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Hindu societies (into castes) is always accompanied by 
a political system characterised by dispersal of power*
Changes in the direction of political centralisation 
are the result of economic and political factors within add 
outside the system. Neither the typical dispersal of power 
nor centralisation are affected by the length of time that 
the system has existed, v&hough the ways in which power is 
dispersed or centralised is affected by the temporal factor.
The Sikh chiefs of the first three decades of their 
existence as a political community, who form the subject 
matter of the second section of this chapter, are directly 
comparable to the Kerala chiefs* We shall see later that 
in spite of differences in caste stratification, in degree 
of stability of political interactions, and of the influence 
upon these of the ritual status of chiefs, they can be 
regarded as variants of the type of political relations 
that are characteristic of traditional caste systems, 
such as in Kerala.
The latter six decades, of political centralisation, 
in the Punjab are described and discussed in the third section. 
This is again comparable to Kerala in the eighteenth century 
when its southern chiefdom Travancore began to centralise.
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Historians might speculate whether the centralisation 
of Travancore, as also of the Punjab, was due to 
English expansion, or developing trade overseas in 
Kerala, or the decay of the Mughals in the Punjab, or 
better communications everywhere in India. This would 
require a detailed study of the whole sub-continent, and 
even then it may not be possible to do more than speculate. 
In the present analysis of political centralisation in 
the two regions, the focus is not on its "preconditions*' 
or antecedent causes and conditions, but on the detail of 
how it was brought about, how it was limited by the 
earlier political and social forms, and how it functioned 
after it came into existence.
The choice of the Punjab as a unit comparable to 
Kerala, or indeed to any other region in India, may 
legitimately be questioned. The main variable here 
is Sikh religion. There was a sizeable percentage of 
Hindus, with a recognised and recognisable caste system, 
in Punjab, but after the Islamic invasions began, they 
had no political authority other than the very limited 
local powers delegated to them by an imperial bureaucracy, 
It was only in the seventeenth century that some Hindus 
organised themselves into a militant group which attempted
2 2 5
to seize power, in the sense of liberation (if one may 
use an evaluative term), and which succeeded in doing so 
nearly a century later.
This group, the Sikhs, formed the political
community of the Punjab from the break-up of the Mughals
to the English conquest. Here again, their territories
did not quite coincide with the Punjab province of the
British. The Himalayan tract, consisting of several
Rajput states, formed a separate political system, very
1
much like that of Rajasthan in detail, and with what 
might be called the classical political structure of 
Hindu societies. It was relatively unaffected by in­
vasions or immigrations that swept through the plains.
The sub-Himalayan region had no distinct political con­
figuration. Its population was more involved with the 
plains areas, but it did not provide a territorial base 
for aspiring chiefs. The eastern parts were mainly 
Hindu, the western were Muslim. The latter bordered the 
north-western region which was mainly Muslim and is now 
in West Pakistan. The fourth region, the Indo-Gangetic
1 .  D u t r a ,  1958*
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plain in Punjab, was the one in wbich the Sikh political 
system was based, and within which it centralised. It 
is this plains area where the majority of the Sikh popu­
lation lived. It is here that Sikh chiefdoms, or misls, 
developed into independent political units within the 
Sikh system.
Punjab was politically much more heterogeneous than 
Kerala, even if we confine ourselves to its 11 typical1* area, 
the central plains. The heterogeneity was both cultural
and political, whereas Ifc Kerala the heterogeneity was
In
almost entirely cultural. Tfce Punjab, Hindus, Sikhs, 
and Muslims were intermingled everywhere though usually one 
or the other of them predominated in each area. Religion 
was the major criterion of difference, but the differences 
were carried over into matters of food, clothing, customary 
practices and beliefs, and in the structure of the family, 
laws of inheritance and succession, the of women,
and so on. Politically, the Muslims participated in a 
government of fairly wide scale, with its centre in some 
distant place like Delhi, or Kabul. Although most political 
interaction must necessarily have been local, Muslims 
could aspire to offices in local or regional administration,
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and even more so up to the centre at Delhi. The 
Hindus in Punjab, as in other parts of north India, 
served in Muslim administration. When they did ac­
quire power, they held it independently, and not as 
subsidiaries of a distant centre. The political orient­
ation of each religious group in Punjab varied markedly.
The Hindus and Sikhs had close affinities with 
each other and both differed strongly from the Muslims - 
partly culturally, but more significantly in having a 
joint interest in opposing the Muslim ruling group. In 
fact the Sikhs could be regarded as a politically activated 
offshoot of Hindu society in Punjab, and both stood in 
radical political opposition to the Muslims. The Sikhs 
and Hindus at no time, before the very recent linguistic 
dispute of the last decade or so, are known to have opposed 
each other politically, even after thd danger of external 
opposition was removed.
Of the three religious communities, variously 
involved in political interaction, or competition for 
power, we are concerned only with the Sikhs. There again 
we are only concerned with them as a political community 
with established territorial powers, and not with their 
evolution into such a community. This development will be
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only briefly traced for the purpose of providing a 
historical perspective for the material, but not as a 
subject for analysis* The early history of the Sikhs 
also gives us a major link with the hypothesis of the 
present work, pertaining to caste, and justifies the 
choice of the Sikhs as comparable with Kerala. In 
other words, it gives some evidence that the Sikhs are 
a special case of caste stratification.
The founder of Sikhism was Guru Nanak (1469-1539 A.D.). 
His ideas appear to have grown out of the impact of Islam 
on Hinduism which had begun to manifest itself as early as 
the beginning of the fourteenth century in the teachings of 
Ramanand. The main emphasis of Ranak was on monotheism 
and personal purity, and a denial of the scheme of ritual 
values including the role of the Brahmins, and the observance 
of ceremonial. The ritual hierarchy, typical of Hindu 
societies, and contrasting sharply with the egalitarian 
self-image of Islamic societies, was here under attack.
Ranak was himself a Khatri, a literate trading caste which 
ranked higher than the Jat peasant-cultivator caste, but 
lower than the Rajput caste who were traditionally a 
ruling caste. Little is known about the early Rajputs of
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the Punjab* They were probably more deeply affected by 
the establishment of Muslim power than lower, non-ruling 
castes. They were converted in very large numbers to 
Islam. This may have been a result of a Muslim policy 
to break political opposition. Or it may have been a 
desperate Rajput effort to retain some of their old 
powers and privileges under the new rulers. By Ranak*s 
time - that is, the early days of the Mughal empire - 
the Rajputs would appear to have lost their political 
identity, at least in the lowland areas.
Ranak*s teachings were essentially reformist 
Hindu. He retained the belief in transmigration, but his 
reforms did not operate only at the level of metaphysics. 
He also elaborated a moral code for his followers thus 
providing a basis for community. But there appears to 
have been no attempt to organise a society in consonance 
with the belief that ritual differences in status were 
not important, and followers of Ranak always retained 
caste membership and status.
The tenth guru to preach Ranak*s philosophy was 
Gobind Singh (1675-1708 A.D.). Ranak had flourished 
at a time when the early Afghan empire of the Tughlaks 
had decayed, around 1414 A.D. , and for over a century,
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weak Muslim dynasties ruled in north India. The founder 
of the Mughal empire, Babar, established himself in 
India during Ranak*s lifetime. By the time of Guru 
Gobind Singh, the Mughal empire had passed its zenith 
and was already on the decline. Gobind Singh died a 
year after the last great Mughal, Aurangzeb.
Gobind Singh converted the followers of Ranak 
from a reformist Hindu sect into a political group, 
making a definite bid for power. Until then, there had 
been no established political interaction between the ruling 
Muslim dynasties at Delhi or their provincial governors 
in the Punjab, and the subject people, the Hindus. Any 
bid for power would essentially involve militancy. And 
local militancy would not have succeeded if the central, 
imperial government were still powerful.
The emergent political group was given a definite 
form by Gobind Singh. He instituted a baptismal ceremony
for all followers and required them to adopt diacritical 
1
marks. This at once cut off the followers finora the 
parent community, and constituted them into a separate 
group. The immediate consequence was that high-caste
1. The five 11 ks**: kes * hair, kanga * comb, kirpan * dagger,
kara = iron bangle, kachh *= drawers.
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Hindus who had retained ritual status even as followers 
of Ranak did not join, and there was large-scale con­
version of the relatively low caste of Jats. Gobind 
Singh seems to have made no attempt to compromise with the 
Brahmins and Rajputs to keep their following.
The Sikhs, therefore, though anti-caste in ex­
pressed values, were in fact a caste-stratum if seen in 
relation to the Hindu society in which they were embedded. 
This raises the problem of why the Jats and not the Rajputs 
made the bid for political power. Both had a stake in the 
land, and both needed to be free of the land taxes imposed 
by an imperial government. And yet the traditional rulers, 
the Rajputs, did not use Sikhism to regain power. They 
remained a subject Hindu population in the east, and ac­
quired citizenship by conversion to Islam in the west.
The only answer appears to be that the ability to oppose 
Islamic groups required a flexibility of structure, and 
of organisation, which for the Rajputs would be self- 
defeating. If they sought to acquire power, they could 
only do so by loosening ritual restrictions. This meant 
that they weakened their existing status. As a caste, 
they had much to lose, though they might acquire leadership
232
of the Hindus, The Jats had little to lose in ritual 
status. They formed a numerically large stratum, and 
would in any case provide a large part of the armed 
forces, even if leadership were kept by the Rajputs,
The waiving of ritual status as a qualification for 
political leadership provided a natural avenue for the 
Jats,
The Sikhs, therefore, may legitimately be con­
sidered a special case of caste. They were not a com­
plete society in themselves, with exclusive or almost
exclusive control of a territory and its economy. They
1
are much more like a dominant (and not ruling) caste,
wedged into a caste system of the usual kind, with
Brahmins at the top and untouchables at the bottom.
There was however a vital difference between the Sikhs
as a group, and castes, dominant or otherwise, as groups.
The Sikh community was in fact a congregation and not a 
2
community. Membership was not by heredity, but by formal
1. In Srinivas1 sense. See Chapter I.
2. Weber, 1957# PP* 302-321,
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recruitment, and even when subsequent generations of
Sikhs automatically took their fathers’ religion, they
had to undergo formal baptism# Technically therefore,
membership was open to anyone who wished to associate
himself with the special interests of this group. This
associational quality gave to the Sikhs a flexibility
and capacity to organise around a common interest im-
1
possible for the "organic” caste-comraunities. Leaders 
could come up on the basis, not of birth, but of the 
ability to fulfil the explicit purposes of the congregation, 
in this case the protection of the followers against 
Islamic persecution.
Caste stratification, therefore, is relevant to 
an understanding of the Sikfc society. It is relevant 
negatively, in so far as it places the Sikhs into a wider 
structural perspective, as a group interacting with other 
groups in their territories, and not an isolated entity. 
Their bid for power, which hit at the Rajput’s traditional 
rule - at the same time as it was overtly directed against 
the Muslims, gave them a local political dominance. "Old 
Settlement Reports are full of remarks about the decadence,
1. Weber, ibid. .p.338»
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if not the virtual disappearance, of the Rajput gentry
1
in those districts where Sikh sway was most absolute*1* 
Positively, we know that the Sikhs never completely 
abolished caste difference within their own ranks, as we 
can see from the retention of traditions of caste of 
origin, and of related rules of marriage and inheritance. 
i\or did they cut loose from traditional ritual inter­
actions with specifically Hindu castes. ,fHindus and 
Sikhs, except Kukas, are greatly ruled by Brahmins.
Every one has a parohit or priest for every-day life, 
and a pada or superior priest (who must be a learned man, 
read in the Scriptures) for marriage and other celebrations.
Whatever observances a Brahmin enjoins must be performed 
2
Again, "Nearly all Sikh villagers reverence and
make use of the Brahmin almost as freely as do their Hindu 
3
neighbours." The records of the last months of Ranjit
4
Singh*s life, (1839)» are full of references to gifts of money, 
food, clothes, jewels and livestock made to Brahmins for his 
recovery from illness. It is not unlikely however that the
1. H.A.Rose, vol.l, 1919, p.12.
2. Gupta ,Vol.Ill,1944, pp. 159]l60, quoted from Ludhianana 
District Gazetteer.
3* Ibid.,p.160,quoted from Census Report, 1881.
4. Ganda Singh, 1952.
2 3  5
relationship with Brahmins varied both in space and time.
In the heart of Sikh country, or the Manjha tract between 
the Sutlej and the Ravi - tributaries of the Indus- it is 
probable that Brahmins were less important to the Sikhs.
This is also likely to have been the case during the period 
of Sikh expansion in the eighteenth century, when they were 
involved in militant opposition to the prevailing govern­
ment. Ranjit Singh’s cordiality to Brahmins was probably 
a function of his need to stabilise his empire which included 
specifically Hindu castes, and some of which provided him with 
almost all his administrators, and some generals. But his 
attitude to Brahmins was not novel for the Sikhs, who had 
never carried out fully that part of their teachings which 
denied caste difference and ritual observance.
The period during which the Sikhs developed from a 
militant religious sect into a political community with a 
more or less clear-cut territorial jurisdiction lasted from 
1708 to 1763* During this period, there was a series of 
military invasions by Afghan rulers who came to acquire 
plundered wealth, and met little opposition from the decay­
ing Mughal dynasty and its governors in the north.
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The Afghans showed no political interest, and they 
returned with plunder, making no serious effort at political 
consolidation. The Sikhs became powerful enough, after an 
early career of guerilla warfare, to face the Afghans and 
finally defeat them in 1763, with the destruction of the 
city of Sirfcind.
From 1763 to 1799, when Ranjit Singh captured Lahore, 
the Sikhs exercised political power in Punjab. The first 
shape of the emergent system is the one considered in the 
present thesis as characteristic of caste societies.
This system forms the subject matter of the next section.
Before describing the system it will be useful to 
say something about the economy of the region. The cor­
relation of economic factors to political conflict, its 
causes, its alignments, and the effect on stratification, 
is much more easily discernable in Kerala.than in Punjab. 
Production of spices, and their export overseas, were a major 
factor in Kerala politics. The economic prizes were less 
obvious in Punjab. The Sikhs had started out with a long 
tradition of peasant proprietorship as Jats, and are not 
on record as big landowners under the Muslims. Most of their
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genealogies claim an origin from Rajput clans of 
Rajasthan, and founding ancestors, the first immigrants, 
are dated roughly to the 15th or 16th centuries, so that 
they were probably not dispossessed landlords under the 
Muslims who were by then the established rulers. Kone 
of them are known to have engaged in trade, nor did any 
of the wealth gained by trade find its way to them before 
they acquired power. This may have been partly due to the 
fact that local wealth was almost entirely agricultural 
and that Punjsfrwas only on a trade route from Delhi to 
Afghanistan, and that commercial activity here was part 
of a wider economy, linked to the Islamic empires. In 
Kerala, the local chiefs controlled most of the trade, and 
we can speak of a localised economy, from the point of view 
of the chiefs though not from that of the Moors or 
Europeans. In Punjab, local produce was aainly livestock 
and grain, and markets were confined to neighbouring 
territories such as Afghanistan in the north and Bikaner 
in the south. The revenues of this trade went to which­
ever imperial government waw in power. .^But in Punjab, as 
in Kerala, the owners of land and the traders formed 
distinct groups. The traders were mainly the Hindu castes
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of Khatris in west, Aroras in central, and Agrawals 
in south and east Punjab, all traders by tradition.
Land was owned mainly by Rajputs and Jats, who again 
tended to be Muslims in the west, Sikhs in the centre, 
and Hindus in the east and south. The Sikhs as we saw, 
were mainly Jats. The struggle for power occurred among 
these landbased groups, particularly the Muslims and the 
Sikhs. The Hindus were more passive politically, and 
their proximity to Delhi is probably only a fractional ex­
planation of the passivity. The politically motivated 
among them apparently joined the Sikh ranks. The point 
to note here is that the new rulers came, not from urban or 
wealthy groups, but from the ranks of the landowners.
In Kerala we saw that the system of land tenure 
was ideally suited to the political system. Ownership 
was vested very largely in a caste - Brahmins - and 
institutions - temples - that were not subject to dis­
placement or dispossession, a constant risk in a system 
characterized by recurrent armed conflict. Nor were the 
actual cultivators, the low-caste tenants and labourers, 
concerned in the business of politics and war. The caste
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which provided the bulk of the army, on the other hand, 
was supported by a kind of tenancy (the kanam tenure) 
which was stable, and which allowed sub-lease to cultivators. 
So that they were freed for war by not bearing directly the 
responsibility of either ownership or cultivation of the land 
which was still the primary source of production in Kerala.
The Sikhs, probably small peasant proprietors under 
the Islamic empires, had four main kinds of tenure. These 
were more directly linked to the political system than in 
Kerala. The holding of land itself conferred power, and 
the extent of power depended directly on the size of the 
holding. In Kerala, land ownership was not invariably an 
indeM of power in political relationships. On the contrary, 
in theory it indicated social and economic privilege derived 
from ritual status. Brahmins were the original owners of 
all the land. In fact, Kshatriya,Samanthan and Hayar 
chiefs held large estates, the size of which undoubtedly 
determined the extent of their power. But much land was 
held by Brahmins and by temples and was thus politically 
neutralised.
In Punjab, there were village tenures, such as the 
zaraindari and pattidari,1 and there were tenures derived
1. Punjab Gazetteer, 1888-9, PP*137-138*
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directly from political office and interaction, such as
1
raisldari, tabadari and jagirdari.
In the communal tenures, all villagers shared
ownership of village lands, and the lands that each
cultivated were held by him as a tenant of the community.
Under the British, they had a joint responsibility to pay
the revenue. In 1888, the most prevalent kind of tenure
was one where estates were held partly in common by a
village and partly by individual owners in it. The
next in extent of incidence was one where "possession
2
is the measure of the right in all lands." Less pre­
valent tenures were those where village lands were divided 
according to ancestral or customary shares, subject to the 
law of inheritance, villages paying revenue as a unit, the 
individual estates, and lessees of the British Government. 
The communal tenures are known as pattidari (i.e., holders
of shares), and the community is called a bhyachara, or
3
brotherhood. The zamindari tenure is also communal, but
zamindars are usually individual owners, and their estates
4
are larger than the shares of the pattidars. In both kinds
1. Gupta ,1944, Vol.II,pp. 24-26.
2. Punjab Gazetteer, 1888-9, table on p. 136.
3* This is a local form of tenure not to be confused with the 
zamindaris conferred by the central power,Mughal or other, 
for loyalty or services.
4. Punjab Gazetteer, 1888-9, Table XV.
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of tenure, we have a community of land owners of almost 
equal status.
The other tenures are not as independent as the 
communal tenures, and are probably not as old. They 
reflect political interdependencies and could only have 
developed after the Sikhs acquired power. They certainly 
were not continued by the British after 1848. The rais- 
ldari tenure was land allotted to men not native to the 
village by leading men of the raisl - a loose confederation 
of Sikhs, of which more later - in return for services 
rendered; the land was given as outright gift, and was 
not resumed if the recipient transferred his loyalties 
to another misl. The tabadari tenure was granted by 
leading men to their retainers, and could be resumed at 
will. Jagirdari was granted to relatives or dependents 
who were under the grantor’s control, usually Jjoe% condition 
that they supplied a quota of armed men on horses. Jagir­
dari lands could also be resumed at will.
There was no separation of agriculture and politics. 
The same men who owned the land and tilled it fought in the 
wars that arose first from the combination against external 
opposition, and later from the nature of the political system
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with its several loci of power. How this affected the 
economic situation is not at all clear from the histories.
It may be correct to assume that at least during the Sikh 
period of rule, agricultural activity was not allowed to 
suffer. 11 ....the country is said to be in a high state 
of cultivation which, I believe, because they carry into 
it all the cattle fit for tillage, which come into their 
possession by plunder, collect a very moderate rent, and 
that mostly in kind, and during any intestine disputes, their 
soldiery never molest the husbandman." As long as the 
Sikhs were paid a tribute, landowners were safe from
plunder. "The cattle is their principal aim........Their
own immediate possessions are exceedingly well cultivated, 
populous and rich; the revenues in general taken in kind
2
throughout and not in money, which is favourable to the tiller."
Agriculture therefore was allowed to flourish, though 
we do not know exactly how the peasant divided his ifear between 
soldiering and cultivation. The modes of holding land did 
not ensure a separation of the two activities either. They 
did have some political significance. The communal tenures 
indicate an equitable distribution of resources among the
1. Major James Browne, "The history of the Origin and Progress 
of the Sicks", in Ganda Singh, 1962, p.17*
2. Col.A.L.H.Polier, "An Account of the Sikhs", probably 
written in 1780, in Ganda Singh, 1962, p.62.
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landowning groups, and the relative independence of 
the community from political or authoritarian involvment 
in the wider system of government, that is, in any formal 
government. The political tenures on the other hand, 
indicate the obtrusion of the Wider system of government 
into the village and into agriculture.
The ’Traditional’ Political System of Punjab
The historical period during which the typical 
traditional system, as described above, existed, began 
in 1763 with the fall of Sirhind, and ended in 1799 with 
the capture of Lahore by Ranjit Singh. We shall examine 
the political units that made up this system, the ties that 
bound them into one system over and above the political ones 
of conflict and coopeaation, and the nature of political 
interaction.
Most historians of the Sikhs list twelve misls or 
leading families who had acquired territorial sovereignty over 
various tracts. The misls may be described as emergent 
chiefdoms, each with a chiefly family that exercised control 
in its territory, not by any formal conferment of power, 
but by virtue of its larger resources both in wealth and
the sikh misls of punjab
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armed might as against the resources of other Sikh families. 
The Sikh chiefs however, had no formal, recognised political 
statuses. And the misl consisted not always of one family 
but of two, or even three, whose relations with each other 
are not very clear. The two or three families may have a 
common ancestor. Again, they may only be neighbours, 
and so share a political interest in their territories. 
Marriages were not consistently used to cement intra-raisl 
relations. In fact, they very frequently occurred between 
misls with rival interests.
The more important misls had a large following of 
clusters, or constellations, of power, in exactly the same 
way that the powerful chiefdoms did in Kerala. There was 
an informal hierarchy of power within each cluster, but this 
was not crystallised into a system of authority relations, 
with some kind of administrative control vested in the misl's 
leading, or central, family. In Kerala the hierarchy of 
power was recognised in the differential caste rank of the 
higher and lower chiefs. The Sikhs had no formally recog­
nised differences, the development of which would obviously 
need a longer time-span than that of the Sikh period.
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The three most important misls, the Sukarchakia,
the Bhangi, and the Kanhaya, between them led over eighty
1
per cent of the smaller chiefs, all of whom are listed, 
with brief biographies, by Griffin. All three were located 
between the Beas and Ravi rivers (Bari Doab). The Kanhaya 
held most of the north-east tract, around Gurdaspur. SukaP- 
chakia held the north-west, around Gujranwala. The Bhangishald 
Lahore and Amritsar, Sialkot and Gujrat. This whole area is 
known as the Manjha tract, and is the home of the Sikhs.
Other misls in the area were the Raragarhia (around 
Amriusar) and the Nakkai (south of the Bhangis.) In the 
Jullundur Doab,between the Beas and Sutlej rivers, and just 
across the Sutlej, were the well-known misls of Kishanwala, 
Karorasinghia, and Dallewalia, none however very powerful, 
and the Ahluwahlia raisl which had a special prestige as its 
founder was recognised by the Sikhs as a religious leader, 
and kept its estates even under the British.
The remaining three misls, the Phulkian, the Singh- 
puria, and the Shahid, were located south of the Sutlej, 
known as the Malwa tract, which was colonised by some Manjha 
Sikhs, and which made some local converts to Sikhisn; but is 
culturally different from the Manjha. The Sikh chiefdoms
1. Griffin and Massy, 1909*
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bordered on, or included, large Hindu populations. The 
Hindus increased in numbers further south, and also diverged 
culturally in speech, dress, diet, and caste forms, which 
resembled (and still do) the contiguous territories of 
Rajasthan and western U.P.
These cis-Sutlej misls seem to have developed on 
different lines*. Both the Phulkian and the Singhpuria 
families split up into several segments, dividing up both 
estates, and political rights in these estates in a way 
that never happened in the Manjha. Partition of property 
at each succession was the general rule among all Sikhs. 
Given scope for political expansion, the Cis-Sutlej 
pattern of segmentation seems the natural result of the 
law of inheritance. The same processes seem to have 
worked in Rajasthan under the early MAghals, when they 
could expand to north and east. The cis-Sutlej misls were 
politically separated from the Manjha, partly through 
geographical isolation, and partly because of developments 
around Delhi, which early brought them under the control of 
the British. The Manjha area was completely independent 
till final annexation in 1848, and here we find what has 
been defined in the present thesis as the typical, or
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traditional Punjabi system of political interaction. In 
the Manjha area, expansion was severely limited by the 
existence of still quite powerful Muslim chiefs in the 
west and north-west. Warfare here was not a glorified 
family quarrel as it was in the cis-Sutlej. And mortality in 
war was more frequent. This would reduce the number of heirs 
to an estate, and limit the fragmentation of territory and 
concomitant political rights. In two of the major misls in 
the Manjha, in the last two decades of the eighteenth century, 
there was only one surviving heir. War in such a situation 
is not merely a symptom of a system of dispersed power. It 
has the positive function of preserving a political unit 
by limiting segmentation of territory.
In Kerala, where ancestral estates were impartible, 
there was no immediate threat to a political unit in having 
several heirs. On the contrary, sanctions existed to 
protect heirs from death in battle. This ensured the con­
tinuity of a political unit. Among the Sikhs, dispersal 
of power was not ensured by the necessary continuance of 
several centres of power, so that no one raignt grow by 
destroying another, as was the case in Kerala. In the 
absence of a settled political system, with large possibilities 
of expansion at the expense of other units, power was
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constantly building up, and then fragmenting by partition among 
heirs. It is not possible to go into a discussion here of 
the Jat laws of inheritance in Punjab as well as outside 
it, and their relation to a political system which allowed 
(and indeed had) opportunities for territorial expansion.
But if we cannot elaborate a historical explanation, we 
can certainly postulate that the laws of inheritance had 
the function of keeping power dispersed. If allowed to 
operate to the full, however, they threatened the exist­
ence of political units by over-fragmentation. The 
decimation of heirs in wars offset this threat. The 
detail in the two regions of Kerala and Punjab therefore 
differs. In both we find a political system consisting 
of conflicting clusters of power, with built-in rules 
that perpetuate the existence of the units that make up 
these clusters. But the rules themselves vary for 
historical reasons, the discussion of which lies beyond the 
scope of the present study.
The military base of the political system was one 
consistent with dispersal of power, and closely resembles 
the feudal legies of medieval Europe. There was no
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centrally organised array. All the fighting men came 
from one stratum, the Sikhs* This stratum, we have 
seen, is not quite a caste stratum. It originally 
recruited its members without any formal restrictions, 
though in fact it quickly became a largely hereditary group. 
The denial of caste difference, we saw earlier, did not 
prevent its being in many ways still a caste stratum, wjth 
nearly two thirds of its members of Jat origin. Most 
warriors in Punjab, therefore, acquired their profession 
first as members of the Sikh group, in subsequent genera­
tions by birth. As Jats, most of them claimed to be 
descendants of the traditional warriors of north India, 
the Rajputs* As Sikhs, they were only reverting to the 
traditional activity of distant Rajput forefathers.
Sikh warriors banded together under a chief who
1
was himself a Sikh* Their equipment was extremely simple 
consisting of swords and daggers, very simple firearms, 
blankets, utensils and ropes, a horse for fighting, and a 
baggage pony. The chiefs differed only in having finer 
horses and weapons. Part at least of the soldiers1
(°IS3L,
1. Gupta ,^ol.I,p.293
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equipment was provided by themselves. "Three fifths
of the horses in the Punjabjare the property of the
different chieftains, the remainder belong to the peasantry
1
who have become settlers." Payments were made from
plunder, and in allotments of land. The most common form
2
of payment was agricultural produce at harvest time. The
bands of soldiers were not formed into regular units or
regiments of a single Sikh army. There was no uniform
system of either recruitment or training. "The chiefs
are numerous, some of whom have the command of ten or
twelve thousand cavalry; but this power is confined to a
3
small number, the inferior officers maintaining from one to
two thousand, and many not more than twenty or thirty
horses, a certain quota of which is furnished by the
chiefs, the greater part being the individual property of
4
the horsemen”. (Polier differs from Francklin on the 
question of who provided most of the horses. What both 
are saying is that warriors were not completely dependent 
on a chief for equipment).
1. William Francklin, extract from 'Military Memoirs of Mr. 
George Thomas', 1803, in Ganda Singh, 1962,p.105*
2. Gupta, 1952, Vol.I,pp.292-293*
3* A European misconception for "chief".
4. Col.A.H.Polier and George Foster, "A Character of the 
Sieks" , extracted from The Asiatic Annual Register for 
1800, in Ganda Singh, 1962, p.67.
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The Sikh warriors therefore did not form a unified 
organisation except, as we shall see shortly,when the 
several chiefs combined in the face of external opposition*
Even then, there was a coalescence of chiefs, or cUlsters of 
chiefs, of unequal power but equal formal status, held 
together only by the external opposition and not by any 
regular internal organisation. The similarities to 
Kerala are obvious. There we had a completely hereditary 
stratum, or caste, of warriors. They were grouped under 
chiefs of unequal power, though unlike the Sikhs, Kerala 
chiefs had recognised differences in caste rank which coin­
cided in a general way with their political and economic 
position. Warriors had simple equipment, the horse being 
unknown here. Swords, bows and arrows, and simple fire­
arms were their main weapons up to the eighteenth century.
Being a more settled region, there was probably less 
desertion from one chief to another than in Punjab, but 
there was no binding legal or religious tie between a chief 
and his warriors, and the latter could desert at will.
Unlike Kerala, wars were not fought according to 
established rules of strategy and social observance.
Like Kerala, however, war was localised and small-scale, *1Id 
it was recurrent. It was fought to keep spheres of influences
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and territory rather than to expand. That no over­
whelming conquests were made is evident from the fact 
that villages regarded as the hereditary estates of
chiefs continued to be so regarded till the twentieth
1
century, though with curtailed powers. Annexation
of land in absolute sovereign right was not the normal
motif of political conflict in Kerala, till the rise of
the Zaraorins, and, later of Travancore. Ror was it so
in Sikh Punjab, till the rise of Ranjit Singh.
An almost perfect concomitance can be postulated
among the three factors of caste stratification, dispersal
of political power, and a non-centralised army (which here
coincides with a hereditary stratum of warriors]) • The
connection of the latter two is a close one. Presumably
however they may occur in societies not stratified into
2
hereditary groups throughout. But caste societies of 
the traditional kind (and this qualification of caste 
is necessary, for it is impossible to predict whether, 
when they change, they can still be justificably called 
caste societies, or should be called something else) are
1. Griffin and Massy, 1909*
2. Andrzejewski , 1953*
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necessarily accompanied by a system of dispersed 
political and military power.
If the political system was fragmented, what 
held the fragments together, apart from the fact of 
political interaction of this non-centralised kind? 
Religious association, we saw, was the original basis 
of the group.
Out of the religious association there developed
a form of political organisation, enabling the Sikhs to
function as a political whole. Such organisation however
was irregular and temporary, being oriented to the solution
of immediate problems. The organisation of political
activity on this scale was formally linked to the major
integrating factor at this level-religion. It took two
main forms. One was the biennial assemblies at Baisakhi
(around April) and Divali (around October) at Amritsar, at
which political decisions were made by the whole group.
The other was military organisation. The meetings at
Amritsar, galled gurumata (which properly means the
"decision of the Guru"|, began in Divali, 1745. The first
gurumata was concerned with organising a Sikh army to be
1
known as the Dal Khalsa. Subsequent decisions related
1. Gupta, 1952, Vol.I,p.21
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to building a fort, and chiefs* residences in Amritsar, 
fighting the Afghans, punishing local enemies of the 
Sikhs, and so on. The last gurumata was held in 1805* 
in connection with a Maratha appeal for help against the 
English.
Gurumatas were regarded as decisions of the entire 
congregation, though in fact a leadership structure very 
quickly developed. The very first gurumata, setting up 
twenty-five leaders with a hundred men each to form the 
Sikh army, probably owed its origin to the emergence of 
this leadership structure which was of a political, as 
distinct from a religious, kind. Sinha makes an interest­
ing point about assemblies held especially to deal with 
policy matters at times other than Baisakhi and Divali.
He notes that these were much less orderly than the
1
annual religious gatherings.
The Dal Khalsa was a collection of small armed bands,
some of which grew considerably in size but no one of which
imposed itself in a position of authority over the others.
2
The chiefs did formally acknowledge one leader, Hawab Kapur
1. Sinha, 1946, pp.142-143*
2. A kuhammadan title. Sikh chiefs rarely had such 
titles.
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Singh of Faizullapur, who then raised Jassa Singh 
Ahluwahlia to the command of the Dal Khalsa. But 
there was no established system by which the commander 
organised the Dal and its strategy. The Dal functioned 
effectively in so far as its constituent chiefs - who 
were not officers but independent men - found it necessary 
to act together against a powerful common enemy. As long 
as the necessity existed, the Dal continued to function even 
after it had grown to sixty-five chiefs in 1748. These were 
then regrouped into eleven jathas (the military predecessors 
of the territorial misls). These jathas were again grouped 
into a senior and a junior branch of the Dal in 1762. In 
spite of the absence of a central command, the Dal was 
militarily effective, till the final defeat of the enemy 
removed the necessity to combine. Then, because of the 
absence of a central command, the D£L at once broke up into 
constituent jathas. Territorial localisation of the 
jathas inevitably created conflicts over territorial 
boundaries and where opportunities for expansion still 
existed. The only central institution of the Sikhs, the 
religious organisation, had no machinery, political or 
judicial, for the resolution of such conflicts. Every
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such dispute could only be resolved by war. Various
1
observers of the period have commented on the state of 
constant internecine war, not only between chiefs of misls 
but within the chiefly families as well. Recurrent armed 
conflict among political persons enjoying roughly 
equivalent power and status, and identifiable as sharing 
common cultural forms as well as participating in a 
distinct social system, is a syratom of a dispersal of power.
The Punjab system therefore shows very close parallels 
to the Kerala system, although the detail varies. The causes 
of conflict were never ritual in Punjab. They very often 
were in Kerala. The secular conflict in Kerala was over 
control of the pepper trade, and included attempts to win 
over foreign traders. In Punjab, it was almost always 
over land. The laws of inheritance contributed to conflict: 
paradoxically in Punjab, by allowing partition in each 
generation so that the number of contenders was always 
considerable and might indeed increase; in Kerala, by 
forbidding alienation so that the number of contenders 
remained constant, and could not decrease. In both cases
1. Browne, Prancklin, in Ganda Singh, 1962, and Malcolm, 1812.
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political persons or families belonged to one stratum,
or to two or three closely linked strata, and to no other.
The warriors on whose strength of numbers and equipment
the power of political persons depended also came from one
stratum, lower in status than the ruling strata,qnd again
with a monopoly over what might be legitimately called their
occupation. The strata in Kerala were clearly castes.
In Punjab, the stratum which held power and provided warriors
was less clearly a caste. It was articulated around a
specific interest- a religious creed, and its political
defence - but it was an articulation confined mainly to
members of one caste, and the fact that it excluded a
caste of slightly higher rank, and traditionally a caste
of rulers, the Rajputs, shows it to be what one might
consider a type of caste association. Here, we need to
make a qualification. Even if we consider it as a caste
association, we cannot include it in the modern form of
caste associationswtoere such associations are concomitants
1
of interaction between castes as such, and which Bailey 
has described as the revolutionary change. As an
qroop
associations!^ the major interaction of Sikhs was with,
1. Bailey, 1963a, 19b3b
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or against, Muslim powers. Although in a sense opposed 
to Rajputs, Sikh political activity was never active in 
this respect. When not facing a Muslim opposition, the 
political interaction occurred within the group, between 
units weakly stratified in internal structure. This 
was the typical interaction of traditional caste societies.
Political Centralisation in Punjab.
The political centralisation of Punjab was forecast
1
about two decades earlier by Warren Hastings • In 1784, 
he said of the Sikhs, 11A constitution so framed may subsist 
unchanged for a length of time, while it has no powerful 
neighbours to invade it and while it remains confined 
within the limits of its native territory. But when it 
aims at permanent conquest and carries the principles of 
its own construction into new establishments, it becomes 
liable to almost certain variation from whatever rules 
they adopt for the distribution of territory or the 
appropriation of revenue, because both must introduce a 
new species of property and add to the individual power 
which becomes possessed of it. In such a change of polity, 
should it so happen that one man of superior capacity c-u
1. Selections from the State Papers of Governer General
Warren Hastings. Forrest, Vol.3, quoted in Sinha, 1946, 
pp. 134-155.
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and enterprise should aquire but a few degrees of power 
beyond his nearest competitors, it will be easy to trace 
in the primitive defects of such a government the gradual 
and easy means by which the whole might be enveloped 
within his own supremacy."
This is exactly what happened in Punjab, starting 
with the capture of Lahore in 1799 by Ranjit Singh of the 
Sukarchakia misl.
The potential for expansion beyond the "native 
territory" of the SiKhs lay mostly towards the western 
plains across the other tributaries of the Indus. The 
two misls which had aquired some footing in this area were 
the Sukarchakia and Bhangi. Both were active against 
border tribes of Muslims. The Bhangis held the city of 
Lahore which had been the capital of the MugKdi province.
This gave them a political prestige in addition to the 
power they actually enjoyed. The misl also had several 
leading men, in itself a source of power to the rnisl.
Leaders of a misl do not appear normally to have quarrelled, 
although they were usually independentof each other.
The Sukarchakia held territories further out in the hostile
26 1
areas of the north-west. They were more open to fatal 
attack, and Ranjit Singh*s father and grandfather both 
died young. Ranjit Singh was an only son, as were his 
father, his grandfather, and also his great-grandfather. 
Leadership was therefore more restricted than in the case 
of the Bhangis.
This proved however to be an advantage in the long 
run, giving just those "few degrees of power beyond his 
nearest competitors'* postulated by Warren Hastings.
Ranjit Singh succeeded to a chiefdom in which for the three 
preceeding generations there had been only a single legal 
heir, and there had no partition of estates at all. By 
demographic accident^, the Sukarchakia misl avoided the 
fragmentation characteristic of all inheritance and succession 
among, the Sikh Jats.
At the age of fifteen, Ranjit Singh married a girl 
of the Kanhaya misl, which was almost as powerful asjthe 
Bhangis and Sukarchakia. Her father, an only surviving 
son with issue, had died in war, and on her grandfather *s 
death, the entire estate went to her mother. Widows 
inherited a life interest in the husband*s property,
262
although in some families where the political stakes were 
high, as the Bhangis, the male collaterals took it over, 
formally, a man's brother inherited his property only by 
marrying the deceased's widow. Several such cases, 
especially among Malwa Sitchs, are recorded by Griffin.
Ranjit Singh's mother-in-law did not marry again as there 
were no husbands brothers. Her daughter, an only child, 
was sole heir to her grandfather's territories, and these 
ultimately came to Ranjit Singh, who had married her, by 
virtue of this marriage. Ranjit Singh therefore inherited 
the whole Sukarchakia territory, and all the territory of 
one leading Kanhaya chief. The following genealogies show 
up his advantage as compared to a related branch of his 
family, the Sindhanwalias, and to his rival misl, the Bhangis.
1. Griffin, 1869
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GENEALOGY OF THE SUKARCHAKIA FAMILY & 
ITS COLLATERALS -  THE SINDHANWALIAS
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/ ^ \ Ami r Smgh /A ^ R atan  Singh
Didar Singh
A Nodh Singh
^  Charpt Singh
Ipurm ukh /_ \G u rb aksh  /\  Mahan Smgh Singh Singh
Axxxifi k. i a k i A  Ranjit Singh
GENEALOGIES OF TH E BHANGI MISL
k Bhama Singh 1 Bhup Singh
Hari Singh
Lehna Singh 
adopted
n
t  ■
Gurbaksh Singh A
I U
I'aAA
A A ATX
A A A
j l r
Not clear whether the two brothers who succeeded Hari Singh were
his sons or not
Based on Griffin and Massy, 1909
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In the first genealogy, we find that whereas 
Ranjit is the sole inheritor of the preceding three gen­
erations, his great-grandfather's brother had twelve 
descendants in the third descending generation. On the 
one hand, such a family derived power from the large number 
of active males. On the other, it fragmented the patrimony 
because of the numerous legal claimants. In the case of 
the Bhangis, there are two separate families. While not 
as prolific as the Sindhanwalias, there was some amount of 
fragmentation.
Ranjit1s father died when he himself was only 
1
twelve years old. Ranjit's mother, who inherited a life
2
interest in her husband's property as the surviving widow, 
took over. But Ranjit soon decided, on grounds of her 
alleged immorality, to take over the Sukarchakia territories 
from her. His mother-in-law, who controlled the Kanhaya 
estates after her father-in-law's death, supported him at 
first. On her daughter's failure to bear a son to Ranjit 
Singh, she procuredt a child, we do not know from whom.
When he returned from a campaign, the child was presented 
to him as his son. Ranjit Singh acquiesced, to avoid a
1. Payne, 1915.
2. Griffin, 1869.
265
breach. Twelve years later, in 1820, when she asked
that the growing prince be given an estate, Ranjit Singh
suggested she give up her life-interest in the Kanhaya estates 
to the boy, and shortly after he annexed all her lands, of
which he gave a part as jagir to the prince.
Early in his career, Ranjit Singh took Lahore and 
Amritsar from the Bhangis, disposing of his only real rivals. 
To confirm his right to their estates, he married two sur­
viving widows of the Bhangi chiefs. Strictly speaking, only 
collaterals could inherit by marrying a widow. Ranjit Singh 
was powerful enough to modify the law about inheritance. This 
marriage to the Bhangi widows was a diplomatic move, giving 
his seizure of the Bhangi territories an appearance of 
legitimacy.
By 1809# Ranjit Singh controlled all the Sikh areas 
north of the Sutlej, except his mother-in-law's Kanhaya 
territories. He had tried to absorb the cis-Sutlej Sikh 
chiefdoms, but here he came up against the British who 
agreed to protect these chiefs from Ranjit Singh. In 1809# 
Ranjit Singh and the British agreed that the latter would 
protect the cis-Sutlej chiefs, and Ranjit Singh never again 
tried to absorb them. Prom then till his death in 1 8 3 9 he 
was concerned to extend his territories into the Muslim areas* 
of Kashmir, Rawalpindi, the Indus river area, and Multan, and
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into the Hindu Rajput chiefdoms in the eastern hills# The
Punjab state, at hi6 death, included the whole region between
the Indus and the Sutlej, up to the territories of the
Afghans of Kabul and of the British south of the Sutlej#
The centralisation of power by Ranjit was accomplished
by important changes in land tenure, administration, and
*’ • 
the army# We shall see that the main direction of change
was from hereditary tenures in every field to appointment
and allotment, often for life, but subject always to recall#
The Army
By the time of Ranjit Singh, the Sikhs had become 
differentiated into warriors and cultivators, and the misl 
chief8 now had standing armies# These misl armies, pre­
dominantly cavalry, partly self-equipped, and with simple 
equipment, dependent on neighbourhood, religious, and almost 
certainly, kinship ties for cohesion rather than organisation 
and overhead control, persisted after the misl chiefs lost 
their independence# They constituted what was known, under 
Ranjit Singh as the Fauj-I-Be-Qawa1 id ("Irregular army"), or 
Fauj-I-Sawari, ("Cavalry")• This was not the most effective 
arm of Ranjit Singh's army. Its members were paid a definite 
salary# They were divided into two sections# The Ghurchara
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Khas ("Special Cavalry") consisted of landowners and
cultivators, often relatives of court officials. They
provided their own equipment. The Ghurchara Misldar
consisted of the petty chiefs dispossessed by Ranjit Singh,
leading their own bands of cavalry. This part of the army
was a survival of the earlier form of military organisation
and was little more than Ranjit Singh's sop to those he had
dispossessed, and those he wished to flatter. Most of them
1
were Jat Sikhs of the Manjha.
The army directly organised by him was the Fauj-I- 
Qawa'id ("Regular Army"). The cavalry wing of this army 
was weak; the Sikhs who did join it could not take to the 
organised discipline with which Ranjit Singh was trying to 
form an army amenable to his general policy of centralisation. 
In the earlier stages, Sikhs hardly joined this force, which 
consisted mainly of Pathans, Rajputs and Dogras.
The infantry and artillery were very well organised 
and both were avoided by Sikhs. The infantry was recruited 
mainly from Afghans, Gurkhas, and Purbia (Eastern) Hindus, 
and Sikhs began to join only around 1818. French officers,
1. Chopra, I960, pp. 63-64. His information is from Catalogue 
of Oriental Public Library, Bankipur, Vol.VII, MS.Ro.622. 
Others were Hindu Rajputs of lower Kashmir, Jhelum Muslims, 
and a few Pathans and Brahmins.
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joining in 1822, carried forward the organisation of men into 
battalions, and battalions into brigades. There was a reg­
ular arrangement of units and a formal hierarchy of function­
aries, recruited often from among Sikh chiefs or landowners.
They were, however, recwoited, and did not hold office by 
hereditary right. The development of the artillery was at 
least as important as the concept of formal organisation as 
an innovation in military organisation. It was the most 
significant technological change in warfare among the Sikhs, 
one they had been able to adopt from the Muslims only towards 
the final decline of Afghan power in the Punjab. Sikhs 
joined this more willingly, but materials were less easy to 
obtain. Muslims, who had a much better knowledge of artillery, 
were recruited here to officers posts, and the general command 
entrusted to Muslims or to Europeans.
The army of the centralised state diverged in two 
important aspects from the misl armies. It was formally 
organised, rendering it easy to control by a central authority. 
And it made use of men not belonging to the social system of 
the Sikhs themselves, men from the western Muslim tracts, 
and Hindus, including Gurkhas, from the eastern hills. This 
rdaased the army organisation from the sanctions which kept 
power evenly distributed and prevented disruption of the
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prevailing social strata. The increased political control 
through a centralised array did not in fact succeed in dis­
rupting the social strata. It changed the political 
system from one of distributed, or dispersed, to centralised 
power. The centralised state however did not last very 
long. From 1839 to 1849# the politically fissiparous tend­
encies of caste or caste-type societies, again became apparent* 
for the centralised government weakened. There was however, 
no reversal to the old misl organisation during this period, 
and the army continued to exist as an organised body of 
soldiers. Cohesion however came not from centralised 
authority, but by reference to religion. This returned 
emphasis to Sikh warriors, and they organised themselves into 
influential panchayats, of the constitution of which not much 
is known. Military campaigns, and through them political 
policy, had to be ratified by these panchayats to achieve any 
degree of success.
Administration
If the army was made more manoeuvrable by the induction 
of outsiders, the administration was a completely manoeuvrable 
instrument of centralisation, by its inherent authoritarian 
nature and by recruitment always from the non-political layers
270
of society* Administration was not a clearly separated
governmental function in the early misls. The local and
misl chiefs were responsible for law and order. The only
1
administrative functionary was the kotwal, a local official 
of whose terms of office we are told nothing. Since one 
of his functions was to care for travellers, the office 
was probably created by the governments that had an interest 
in the trade that passed through this region. His responsi­
bility to the local chief could only have developed after 
local chiefs replaced outside governments, either Mughal or 
Afghan. Local chiefs administered justice, and could punish
with a sentence of death. There appears to have been a kind
2
of feud to settle disputes, known as gaha. But it could not
have been a regular mode of settlement or there would be more
reference to it.
The local chief might delegate some of his judicial
3
powers to his jagirdars, landowners endowed by him. Authority 
was however generally exercised by the chiefs themselves, and 
not delegated to a separate organisation. That the Sikhs 
recognised the importance of an administrative system ib 
evident from their objection to the setting up by the English
1. Gupta, 1944, Vol.Ill ,p.l32f quoting Asiatic Annual Register, 
1809.
2. Sinha, 1946, p.151.
3. Gupta, 1944, Vol.Ill,p.146.
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of a judicial tribunal at Ludhiana cantonment, ostensibly
to protect Englishmen in Sikh territory. They saw it as
a "forerunner of their subjugation". "However guarded and
however limited its jurisdiction it would be universally
considered as a prelude to the introduction of an whole
judicial system, the forerunner of their subjugation or
extirpation, and the annexation of their country to the
1
British dominions."
In Punjab, the development of a separate administration 
followed on the acquisition of centralised power. This is the 
process of "consolidation" after conquest referred to in 
history texts. Precedents for an administrative system 
existed in the set-up of the Mughal government. The Mughals 
had relied on Muslims for military service, but they entrusted 
administration very largely to Hindus. In most northern 
provinces, some one caste or two has provided bureaucrats 
for the Muslim governments, such as Kpyasthas in the Ganges 
valley, Amils in Sind. In Punjab, they drew on Brahmins or on 
Khatris who were usually occupied in trade. These same 
families, and many others, were drawn on by Ranjit Singh to 
provide civil servants for his administration. As in the 
case of the non-Sikhs wings of the array, the use of non-Sikhs
1. Letter from Ochterlony to Edraonstone, no.66 in Book 13 
of Punjab Government Record Office, quoted by Parooqi, 
1941, p.40•
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in the administration rendered it a more effective medium
of control of the region. The use of non-Sikhs is explained
1
thus by Griffin, ....."it was virtually impossible to carry 
on a complex administration without making use of the only 
classes, Muhammadans and Brahmans * who had any hereditary 
capacity for government." The genetic explanation, if 
patently absurd, underlines the almost total exclusion of 
Sikhs from administration. Such exclusion arose directly 
from the kind of interactions existing among Sikhs, as much 
as from conscious central policy. These could only be 
political, that is segmentary, and were inherently liable 
to changes in balance, with no permanent or even stable form 
of dominance. The domination implied in authority relations 
is necessarily stable and relatively permanent. Also it 
requires the acceptance of the dominated, even if such 
acceptance is dictated only by the ultimate threat of superior 
force. Acceptance of domination was acceptance of inequality, 
which would be a direct negation of the bases of cohesion of 
Sikhs. These bases were formally their religious tenets, 
and informally their caste equivalence.
Given the fortfe that backed the administration, it 
was easier for both the central authority and for the subjects
1. Griffin, 1892, p.115.
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to accept Hindus in positions of authority. They were 
more amenable to manipulation, could be appointed on purely 
functional grounds, and dismissed without setting in motion 
disruptive undercurrents in the society. They also mediated, 
or earthed, resentment against a central authority that 
emerged at the expense of others. For the ruled, the status 
differences within the community remained always informal.
The formally ranked administrative system which could have 
formalised status differences was recruited from outside, as 
was the case with the formally organised sections of the army. 
The alternative system of ranking created by the centralised 
power and its organisation was thus not allowed to infiltrate 
the Sikh system of ranking which as we saw was a very informal 
one, and was in fact unsanctioned.
From 1808, five daftars or offices were set up.
These dealt with revenues, official expenditure, domestic
1
expenditure, army expenditure, and daily expenses. Accounts 
were maintained in each daftar of all income and expenditure. 
By 1839f the number of daftars grew to twelve, all supervised 
by Ranjit Singh, and controlled by men who were part of his 
court. Some of them, especially the daftar for revenues, 
grew to large proportions, with a hierarchy of local officials
1. Chopra, I960, pp. 76-84.
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in each village or group of villages which was headed by 
a collector, assisted by foremen, assessors, and registrars.
The state was divided into the provinces of Lahore, 
Multan, Kashmir, and Peshawar. The first two had well- 
orgfanised administrations. The latter two were colonies, 
held with difficulty and of interest mainly as a source of 
tribute. The weakness of the centralised power here was 
reflected inits inability to develop an administrative 
system.
Judicial functions in the centralised state were 
also centralised, but not separated from administrative 
functions. Appeals from local village panchayats could go 
up to the kardars, or vollectors, and to higher officials 
in the cities. The next court of appeal was a special 
institution, the Adalat-ul-Ala at Lahore. The fact that 
little is known about this probably means that it was never 
very important. The final court of appeal was the Darbar 
of Ranjit Singh, where he heard complaints against officials 
of all ranks. The Darbar, while it prevented oppression by 
officials, also gave Ranjit Singh a greater control over his 
administration. Civil disputes were often referred to the 
administration, for evidence might be found in its records, 
relating to loans, land, etc. Disputes over marriage would
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1
be settled locally with reference to customary law.
Criminal offences were more likely to be sent up to as
2
high a level as possible, even to the Darbar, and theoretic-
3
ally the death sentence could only be passed by Ranjit Singh* 
Land Tenures
Tenures of land lost their inviolability* Before 
Ranjit Singh, land - whether inherited or acquired - was 
generally regarded as the inalienable property of the owner, 
to be divided among his sons* In most cases, inherited 
lands did not exceed the area of one village* These heredit­
ary landswere usually respected as such by Ranjit Singh, and 
even by the British after 1848* But acquired lands, which 
in the case of local and misl chiefs could be extensive, were 
not accepted by him as hereditary tenures, though he did not 
interfere with the tenure for the contemporary ownerfe lifetime
unless he was guilty of a serious misdemeanour* Griffin
4
and Massy's "Chiefs and Families of Rote in the Punjab", is 
full of references to the dispossession of heirs, or to 
escheat on failure of heirs, by Ranjit Singh. The Sardars
1. Chopra, 1960,p*90.
2, Ganda Singh, 1952*
3* Chopra, I960, p*90*
4* Griffin and Massy, 1909*
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Hari Singh Nalwa, Fateh Singh Kalianwalia and others 
had served faithfully in his army. But when they died, their 
sons were set aside on various grounds, and at times on none. 
In this way, he weakened all the possible local centres of 
power that might at any time grow into rivals. At the same 
time he enriched himself, and increased his capacity to 
support a paid and organised army and administration.
Land tenures, given for life or for the length of a 
term of office were a common mode of payment. Officials of 
both army and administration were given such tenures and 
these might be added to, or decreased, according to the value 
placed on their services. Payment in this form was a less 
effective means of control in the long run, since recurrent 
changes in ownership are procedurally cumbersome and un­
economic. Ownership would tend to become hereditary, 
partly because of this, partly because of earlier patterns 
of tenure, and partly because no systematic attempt was made 
to terminate hereditary tenures once and for all.
The parallels with Travancore are obvious. The 
development of a bureaucratic administrative system, the 
reorganisation of the army from a group of followers belonging 
to a hereditary stratum of warriors into a centrally paid,
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graded, and organised one, and the recruitment of 
"foreigners" to both array and administration are common 
to both.
The problems arising out of a comparison of 
centralisation in Kerala and Punjab are several. We have 
classed the social systems of both as caste systems. We 
also find that they are roughly contemporary in time, the 
eighteenth-nineteenth centuries. The similarity of the 
processes of centralisation could arise from the fact of 
caste, which is the present hypothesis and is fully dis­
cussed in the last chapter. It is not however impossible 
that the historical forces of the times, especially the 
decline of the Mughals and the rising competition of 
Europeans for trade and political control were the cause 
of this concurrence. At least one other instance of 
political centralisation, the Maratha empire, dates to 
roughly the same period, lending support to the argument. 
The variable - the specific historical period - can only 
be evaluated by comparison with studies of centralisation 
in other historical periods.
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CHAPTER V 
Conclusion
The major hypothesis of the present work is 
that political power in a traditional caste society is 
necessarily dispersed, and that centralisation of power 
is incompatible with caste stratification. The proof 
of this hypothesis has been attempted by detailed des­
cription of two such societies, and by citing some general 
theses about power and society, especially Smith's analysis 
of government and Andrzefewski's discussion of the relation 
of military organisation to social structure, the latter 
offering a strong and independent confirmation of the 
proffered hypothesis.
The best description of traditional caste society, 
derived strangely enough (or perhaps very appropriately) 
from intensive empirical knowledge of modern caste, is 
the one given by Bailey in his "Closed Social Stratification 
in India"• * We saw earlier that according to him tradition­
al Indian society "was divided into countless small political 
units, which I shall call 'blocks', because they could be 
arranged and rearranged to make larger units. While the
1. Bailey, 1963b.
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larger units are segmentary (in the sense that any feudak 
state is segmentary#...) the blocks were organic, 
relatively stable, and relatively indestructible# Blocks 
had these characteristics because ritual, political and 
economic systems reinforced one another and to some extent 
coincided, and because kinship links did not cross the 
boundaries of the unit#"'*'
Bailey takes the small-scale political unit and
2not a wider region as a complete social system# That 
Bailey is referring to a linguistic region is apparent 
in his reference to "two castes which bore the same name#M 
He never, however, explicitly refers to a linguistic 
region, or indeed to any wider boundary within which the 
blocks interacted# The evidence from Kerala and the 
Punjab suggests that the blocks, or their combinations, 
in any one linguistic region, were roughly symmetrical, 
and that the typical political interactions between 
blocks or their combinations did not extend to blocks 
from neighbouring linguistic areas# Further, whereas 
for most castes, kinship relations were confined to the
Ibid.,p.108#
2# Bailey, 1963a, p.132# See quotation on p# Chapter I.
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block, in the ruling caste kinship ties through adoption 
or marriage were formed across the region. The limits 
on the establishment of such ties were the physical 
possibilities of communication, but these were less im­
portant than the strategy of political alliances. Adop­
tion and marriage arrangements did not require continuous 
contact. The regional span of ruling-caste kinship 
affiliation supports the argument that a region was a 
society with a political structure of a certain, here 
non-centralised, kind. This is roughly Miller’s hypo­
thesis, that the higher the status of a caste, the greater 
its mobility.* Looked at from the point of view of caste 
strata and not political organisation, we find that the 
regional society was integrated at the higher caste levels 
(Miller's spatially mobile because ritually pure Brahmins* 
and my ruling caste linked by marriages, more often 
adoptions, and in other ways).
z
To return to Bailey's definition, it is important 
because it takes account of the small-scale political units
1. Miller, 195U*
2. Ibid.
3. Bailey, 1963b*
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that made up the system, and refers to their segmentary 
interaction with each other. We have had earlier dis­
cussions of horizontal and vertical solidarity (Srinivas, 
Pocock),1 which brought out the role of the dominant 
caste as the locus of power in a region* But the dom­
inant caste of modern times, which includes among its 
various distinguishing criteria one relevant to an electoral 
system (numbers, or voting strength) is not the same thing 
as the ruling caste, usually very small in size, but they 
need to manipulate larger castes if they are to retain 
dominance in an elective system of government* The trad­
itional ruling caste did not need to resort to defensive 
manipulation of other, larger, non-ruling castes* Itm 
members ruled by customary right, and retained power by 
ownership of land and other resources, by control over 
lower castes who provided military and other services, 
and by acceptance of their traditional right to chiefly 
powers and privileges* The ruling caste showed no solid­
arity vi£-a-vi6 other castes* "Dominant caste" implies 
horizontal solidarity of some degree* Dominance per
1* Srinivas, 1955# PP* 32-33; Pocock, 1957.
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caste must correlate with subservience per caste. The 
ruling caste of the traditional society had no horizontal 
solidarity (in the sense of combination for political 
action versus other castes); it had a virtual monopoly 
of formal power in relation to other castes and all formal 
political action occurred within it, among and between its 
members. Other castes had no recognised political stathres, 
they did not participate in the typical political interactions 
of chiefdoms at the level of policy-making, and they could 
not combine across political boundaries and so upset the 
balance of power between the chiefdoms. In other words, 
the competition for power took place within the ruling 
caste, and nowhere else.
In contrast to this, in modern society there is no 
ruling (or sovereign) caste. There are, however, powerful 
or dominant castes, that is, castes more powerful relative 
to castes. Insofar as hierarchy persists, and the dominant 
caste is relatively unchallenged in its control of local re­
sources, competition is still confined to it, giving rise 
to the well-known phenomenon of factions, created and led 
by members of the dominant caste and dependents all along 
the caste scale.^ These are vertical segments Just like
1. This is not necessarily true of state or even district 
level politics. It is true of village politics, as we 
know from Oscar Lewis, 1958; Pocock, 1957*
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the old chiefdoms though they lack formal political
status, specific political privileges, and, most important,
any kind of sovereignty in the form of an independent army,
or administration. On the operational level, we might
say that such a system is, very roughly, continuous with
the old. It is still traditional, when the divisions run
vertically. The dominant caste, however, is in the modern
economic and political situation not always able to retain
its control of local resources,^ in which case the competition
moves out of its ranks, and involves other castes. In such
a situation, conflict becomes caste-centred, and the castes,
or horizontal segments, become competing groups. These may
2
develop into the caste-association described by Bailey.
This, as he had pointed out, is the vital difference between 
the old and the new caste systems - the shifting of conflict 
from between vertical units to horizontal ones, or in 
Bailey*s terms, a shift from caste groups to caste associations.
To return to the discussion of the regional system, 
in addition to real or supposed kinship ties linking members 
of the ruling caste, and common caste names, which we could 
call horizontal identity, we have several other integrative 
factors that justify the argument that the blocks were units
1. Including such modern resources as formal education.
2. Bailey, 1963b, pp. 122-123*
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of a system, social and political, and not so many in­
dependent entities. The most important perhaps is the 
contained conflict among blocks, its nature, and its 
specific causes. We have seen that a very important 
cause of wars in Kerala was disputes between chiefs 
over ritual and managerial rights in temples. The sending 
of chavers to Tirunavayi at the mahamakham ritual is the 
most outstanding instance.of such disputes. Less striking 
but very similar occurrences are to be found all through 
Kerala history up to 1792, and they had no overt connection 
with, for example, economic competition. Inihct, in the 
period (Portuguese onwards) when economic competition 
became not only overt but also far more intense, wars 
over ritual things became less frequent. That therb was 
economic change in Kerala from the time of the arrival of 
the Moors, we can safely assume, and can relate much of 
the strategy of conflict of that time (two to three centuries 
before the Portuguese) to the change. Unfortunately, we 
know so little about the period before this that we cannot 
postulate that at any time Kerala had a perfectly stable,
1. See Chapter III.
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unchanging economy in which wars overtly about temples, 
et cetera, had no latent economic motives. In any case, 
the temples in themselves, as owners of large estates, must 
have been worth controlling in a pre-trade, agricultural 
economy, so that ostensible conflict about ritual privileges 
in fact concealed strong economic motivation.
The important point to note in conflicts about 
temple management is that they ramified into the social 
system. They involved observance of a common set of rules 
about ritual things, which were applied regardless of the 
power of individual chiefs, and derived their sanctions from 
a wider system of stratification and its supporting values.
The temple ritual and the main burden of management lay with 
the Brahmins, who were accepted as the ritually purest caste 
everywhere in Kerala. The Brahmins, in addition to the 
quality of ritual purity ascribed to them in the overall 
system of values* were the largest landowners in Kerala, 
together with the chiefs. They were however more numerous 
than the chiefs, and though we have no statistics, before 
the Mysore and British upheavals the term jenmi, or landowner, 
implied a Brahmin. Tradition claimed that all the land 
belonged by original right (dating from Parasuvama's having 
created the coast and settled Brahmins on it) to Brahmins,
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and most of the land was held, judging from all records, 
by only three categories of owners - temples, Brahmins, 
and chiefs. Ritual sanctions relating to temples and 
supported by Brahmins would to that extent be more effective, 
for their control of land gave them a control over all those 
who made a living out of it. As a non-political category, 
both formally and actually, they were not subject to faction- 
alisation over power, and held a status position vis-a-vis 
the whole society. One might here postulate horizontal 
solidarity, but apart from the fact of their common interest 
in maintaining their ritual status, and indeed the whole 
system of castes ranked within a scale of ritual values, 
which they were able to do as the law-givers, and by their 
control of temples and ritual, we do not know that they 
combined, in a modern sense, for political action. Brahmins 
did not have territorial sub-castes as did the Nayars, for 
example, but were identified by social origin - Rarabudiris 
from Kerala, Pottis from Canara, Pattars from Tamilnad, or 
some smaller castes of Brahmins of different, usually lower, 
status. These tended to have a territorial distribution 
but were not territorially segmented. Here, therefore, was 
a level of the social system - the highest - at which we 
find an integration of the structure and the provision of
28 7
sorae part of the framework of rules and limitations 
within which conflict took place. Specifically, temples 
and Brahmins were inviolable in war, which was a major form 
of expression of conflict. Nor were Brahmins normally 
warriors.
Conflict in itself is no criterion of the existence 
of one structure or several. The kind of conflict does 
provide a criterion. Where the conflict is regularly 
recurrent, even if at infrequent intervals, and where it 
occurs along certain normal and normative lines, within a 
framework of stated or unstated rules and limitations, it 
occurs within a structure where in fact conflict is con­
tained in such a way that it does not impair or radically 
change the structure. It is obviously compatible with 
the system and is, per the present hypothesis, necessary 
to its functioning.
The Kerala and Punjab type of conflict, up to 1729
in Kerala, and up to 1793 in Punjab, was of this kind, and
provides an empirical, non-cultural basis for regarding each
of these regions as complete, or integrated (if loosely)
1
social systems. In Kerala wars were fought to certain rules,
1. A similar system existed in Maharashtra before its
centralisation by Shivaji in the late seventeenth century.
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derived from ecological necessity, religious values, 
attitudes to property and (chief) kingship, hereditary 
political rights and privileges. At the informal level 
the political units, embedded in an overall system of 
stratification, tended to maintain a balance of power by 
strategic alliances and hostilities without which the 
system of stratification could not be maintained in its 
existing form. If the layered structure was to persist, 
power must be spread through the controlling layer. If 
the balance of power were not so maintained, and there was 
any tendency to individual (or family, in the Indian context) 
monopoly of power, the existence of strata would be threat­
ened, since a monopoly of power would require a strong 
vertical axis of government to maintain itself. Such a 
government must be independent of the status system if 
it was to be an effective instrument of control. This 
would provide an alternative status system of office holders, 
which by its very nature would be to some degree open, or 
allowing mobility, and thus end the immediate and exclusive 
relation of status to caste strata.
In our Kerala (Travancore) example of centralisation, 
the problem of how to set up a bureaucracy in an essentially
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caste society was solved by employing 11 foreigners” from 
the east coast. This meant the local hierarchy of 
castes was intact, and local mobility in status still 
inhibited. The ruling family, on the other hand, never 
reached a position where it needed to break with its caste. 
There were still powerful Kshatriyas in Kerala who could and 
did contest Travancorefs attempt to absorb other political 
units. Indeed, we are not sure that Travancore would have 
tried, even given enough resources, to absorb its full 
status equivalents. It certainly supported them against 
opposition external to Keala, instead of joining the latter 
to absorb them under its own control. An obvious limiting 
factor to a region-wide expansion would be poor resources, 
including military and administrative personnel suitable 
for such expansion. Allowing for this, I would say caste 
stratification also inhibited extensive centralisation 
where it might entail absorption of caste equals - equal 
not only in ritual rank but also in political status.
Punjab situation. The absorption by the Sukarchakia misl 
of all the others north of the Sutlej was complete. The 
raisls were led by families of roughly equal status and, 
originally, almost equal resources in land and qjen. The
Some confirmation
290
Sukarchakia acquired an edge over other misls in these 
resources - like Travancore, although for different 
reasons and in different ways. It finally mastered all 
Punjab. The caste situation In Punjab, we saw, was 
relatively fluid. Castes had traditions - and genealogies 
of families - showing considerable migration, mainly from 
Rajasthan, dating back at times to three or four centuries, 
so that the territorial segmentation of castes, so evident 
in Kerala, never developed to the same extent here. The 
history of the region, with the frequent invasions from the 
north, must also have contributed to this. There was 
always some amount of physical mobility. Further, the 
particular groups involved in the exercise of, and competition 
for, power were all Sikhs. While they retained some of their 
original caste status and attributes, after conversion 
to Sikhism they accepted its beliefs which included the 
ritual equality of all adherents. The Sikh situation was 
therefore one that allowed for flexibility because, one, the 
Sikh group at least initially was a religious association, 
formed for a specific purpose and not coinciding with any 
group in the organic society; two, its formal dissociation 
with any such group, indeed with the whole system of such 
(caste) groups. On an analogy with Kerala, the chances of
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successful organisation of bureaucracy would be greater 
here. Indeed, the Sikh centralisation was more extensive, 
comparatively speaking, and more complete than in Kerala, 
though here again we find a “foreign” non-Sikh bureaucracy 
forming the main instrument of consolidation of centralised 
power. In so far as Sikhs themselves formed one stratum 
without overt hierarchical differences they were unsuitable 
for bureaucracy, though other reasons may also be advanced 
for this, including cultural ones, such as Sikh martial 
tradition.
Centralisation of power is incompatible with caste 
stratification, partly because it would break up a ruling 
stratum and bring in mobility - for the rising family or 
“centraliser” , thus endangering the whole basis of caste 
ascription, partly because it cannot achieve any lasting 
success without some form of bureaucratisation. Where a 
bureaucracy is locally recruited, it poses a direct threat 
to caste ascription by providing an alternative mode of 
allocating status, and one that like centralisation of 
power, permits mobility.
This argument raises a number of questions about 
modern caste systems, which are all subject to some degree 
of bureaucratisation. Are local and state administrations
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recruited to any extent from an "external” area? If 
not, do they threaten caste stratification? Or does the 
location of power in the people themselves, and the per­
missive dispersal of power in a multiple-party system, lessen 
the centralising effect of bureaucracy and so perpetuate caste 
stratification, by allowing factions in dominant castes 
to continue their arguments through political party alignments, 
especially at the village and district legels? How does 
centrally controlled bureaucracy affect local caste systems?
Is it comparable to the "foreign” bureaucracies of Travancore 
and Punjab? To answer any or all of these questions would 
be a thesis in itself, and beyond the present work.
If we go back in time to the ancient Hindu empires, 
again we have the problem of how they were formed, and how 
held together. "The typical state system of Hindu India 
was one in which a king loosely controlled a number of 
powerful vassals, who in turn were masters of lesser lords, 
in a descending scale down to petty village chieftains.
With minor changes in its character, and with only occasional 
and temporarily successful efforts at establishing more 
centralised control, this system continued down to the days 
of the East India Company, and indeed it did not entirely 
vanish until after the great events of 1947.”1 This
1. Basham, 1958, pp.7-8.
accurately, if briefly, describes the system in Kerala
and, with modifications, in Punjab. Basham does not
accept that climate, lack of communications, absence of
a sense of history, or other-worldliness account for such
a system. Lack of communications is the only factor
worth some anthropological consideration, and is certainly
cited by Bailey as a relevant factor in traditional caste
systems* Basham, however, points to the similar lack of
communications in Rome and China, both of which had well-
developed bureaucracies. Basham explains it thus, ftI
believe that the main reason for the failure of Hindu and 
%
Muslim al£ke was that no Indian ruler or dynasty was 
capable of providing administrative machinery adequate to 
control a really large state.* Basham however has over­
simplified the situation, perhaps intentionally. He 
makes no reference to the social base out of which the 
Hindu and Muslim governments had to be formed. For ex­
ample, Muslim government in a largely Hindu area must 
have the same problems as a Hindu government. In a 
Muslim area, it would develop a different,probably more 
centralised, form. In the light of the preceding dis­
cussion, caste must be a major variable in the formation and
29 4
development of both Hindu and Muslim governments* The 
absence of administrative development explains the failure 
of centralisation, but needs itself to be explained* I 
maintain that such development militated against caste 
stratification, hence the transience of empires*
This of course engenders a further question, of 
some theoretical interest* Why, in caste societies, do 
attempts at centralisation appear again and again? We 
know something about how they are carried through, but 
why they occur is extremely difficult to answer. Can 
one postulate an inherent tendency in all human societies 
for concentrations of power to build up? So that 
economic expansion lead to the progressive growth of 
political systems, from small segments into a larger unit, 
which again merges with other like units? The comparative 
study of political systems, and their directions of change 
could yield evolutionary hypotheses that would he more 
fruitful than the ones put forward by investigators of, 
for example, kinship and marriage, in the last century.
I referred earlier to a framework of rules and 
limitations within which political conflict occurred*
The common acceptance of these was confined to Kerala,
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though sotfie were typical of other Hindu systems* "It
was legitimate, indeed worthy, for a king to attack and
defeat his neighbour* To depose the conquered king and
annex his territory was a breach of the dharma of kings,
and a great sin."1 This was exactly the case in Kerala
up to 1729$ and only after that was this rule consistently
broken by Martanda Varma of Travancore (described variously
as ruthlessly cruel, and a great Kerala patriot)* The
rule ensured the continuity of political statuses even
though the content of their power may have varied at
different periods* The lists of Kerala chiefly families
2
provided by early Portuguese and Dutch writers correspond 
with remarkable accuracy to the chiefly families dealt 
with by the English in 1792*^ With this general principle 
went other rules that ensured continuity* The persons 
of the chief and hi6 kin, or more accurately of all members 
of a ruling family, were safeguarded by the custom of 
avenging the death of a prince or chief of the other camp* 
Such vengeance was almost always exacted, even if it took 
some years, and it did not spark off a continuing feud.
1* Basham, 1958, p*12*
2* Heer van Rede, for example, who was Comissary-General for 
Affairs of the Dutch East India Company in 169U»A.D*, whose 
list is reproduced in Hamilton (1737)* 1930 ed*,pp.161-162* 
See Appendix II.
3* Report of a Joint Commission, 1792*
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It was more in the nature of a retributive punishment.
The killing of a chiefly personage in war was therefore 
separated out as a recognised crime, and was definitely 
not included in war strategy. ^Another guarantee of 
continuity was the structure of ruling families. The 
formal political statuses, or sthanams, were held 
collectively by the family, and allotted by simple 
seniority. Rights in both property and formal status 
were impartible. Where a family expanded and split 
into segments or branches, each of these held its own 
estates, but the formal statuses and political sovereignty 
over the chiefdom, and control of vassals were vested in 
the whole family, including its branches, though effective 
control may pass either regularly into the hands of 
sthamis, or irregularly, to some branch or branches which 
have somehow become more powerful than the others. Svaru- 
pams (ruling families) almost never became extinct. The 
impartiality of the family meant there was alwpys a plenti­
ful supply of adult males to fill up sthanams. ’Where 
there was any danger of extinction, (once in the Zamorin 
family, frequently in Travancore) adoptions were made from 
any friendly ruling family of the same caste*
29 7
The legitimacy of war as a mode of* political 
activity was generally recognised. Every chief, with 
some territorial sovereignty, had a right to maintain 
an army, and to war with any other chief as his own re­
sources or strategy dictated. There waw no sanction 
preventing or discouraging armed conflict between a power­
ful chief and his vassal, except the former’s greater re­
sources, and a vassal, even if he initiated the conflict, 
could not be punished by any formal legal or customary 
procedure. This right to war and an independent army 
was an aspect of the dispersal of power, and its general 
prevalence contributed to continuity of political statuses 
even where these were of a lower order both formally and 
in content.
An extremely important rule concerning part of 
political activity - war - was that only Nayars be used 
as warriors. This was not a formal rule enforced by law, 
nor was it supported by ritual values about the duties of 
the different varnas. In any case, not all the chiefs were 
of the Kshatriya varna. On the other hand the Nayars, who 
made up the bulk of the warriors, were only Sudras. We 
might consider it rather as part of the built-in economic 
pattern of a caste society. Occupations were specialised
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by caste, and thfc warrior’s arts were one of these 
occupations. The Nayar armies are our most important 
clue to the kind of political structure we are dealing 
with.
We now take up Andrzejewski ’ s argument about the 
relation of military organisation to social structure.1 
His position is that military factors affect the distribu­
tion of power, that is, the "territorial concentration or 
dispersion of power respectively", (as opposed to the 
functional and the competitive distribution of power).
In a discussion of what he calls the Military Participation 
Ratio (the proportion of army personnel to the population), 
and social stratification, he says M.P.R. affects the 
balance of power, and will exert a levelling influence, 
or a stratifying one according to whether the warriors 
are equipped and paid by the state or not. "....if they 
are equipped and maintained by the government, they are, 
as a rule, also fitted into an army organised by the 
government and commanded by officers appointed by it, 
and not left in their territorial or kinship units under 
the command of their tribal or elected leaders. They
1. Andrze;jewski, 1953 > (published 195*J-)»
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can thus be disciplined...1*1 His general thesis is that
where the army is recruited from a hereditary stratum, 
it strengthens stratification, and vice versa. A con­
clusion of greater interest to us is that certain factors
these are mainly military factors, such as who pays the 
soldiers and how, technology and technique, communications, 
and organisation, elaborated upon below. The hereditary 
stratum of warriors is not included by him in this list, 
as it certainly ought to have been. It is closely linked 
to the military factors. Such a stratum is consistent 
with a strategy of defence rather than attack, one of the 
factors making for dispersion per Andrzejewski. It has 
established military roles which imply an established 
strategy and consequent limitations on expansion. It 
must also carry established rights as a stratum, and a 
policy of attack would possibly on the one hand increase 
its power and so upset both its internal balance and its 
position vis-a-vis other strata. Established, and 
therefore circumscribed, rights might be replaced by a 
scramble for power, during which there may occur considerable
encourage, or support, power. All
1. Andrzejewski, 1953> P*58#>
30 0
structural realignment in power, where there is a change 
not in the centres which among them hold the "balance of 
power, hut in the kind of balance of power itself. On 
the other hand, a policy of attack would take it outside 
its own social boundaries where its hereditary position 
in the home region would not give any kind of power and 
prestige, and the warrior stratum would have to rejky on 
sheer force and organisation. A hereditary stratum, 
held together by organic ties of kinship and marriage, 
reinforced by common political and economic interests, 
was hardly fitted for such a summons of force and organ­
isation.
Other factors, discussed by Andrze jewski^also 
determined the distribution of power.
The second factor that contributes to dispersion 
is lack of good communications which spatially limit the 
area of operation of an army. A hereditary stratum of 
warriors is unlikely to survive the improvement of 
communications which makes possible an expansion of military 
activity and with it the size of an army. Arms and 
organisation also affect power. If it is the superiority 
of individual warriors over others that gives them power as
1. Ibid..1953.
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a stratum, it is dispersed* If it is as an organised 
group that they dominate, they are more likely to centralise. 
This can be put in another way, in terms of the horizontal 
and vertical axes of government, where the warriors are 
all of relatively similar status, as would be the case in 
a hereditary stratum, power is dispersed or segmented.
Where they are organised into an authoritative structure, and 
subject to a definite leadership, obviously power is centra­
lised, and the warriors are more liable to changes in status 
through movement in the army hierarchy. Even if such 
statuses are held on some kind of hereditary tenure, and 
changes limited thereby, the warriors no longer form one 
stratum in society, but may form a separate series of strata, 
or be derived from the several strati of society.
The monopoly of superior techniques by a group or 
individual enables it to centralise, but continued monopoly 
of technique is only possible where there is a very wide 
technological gap, unbridged by cultural communication, 
between the ruling group and the ruled. This applies 
therefore mainly to colonial, and not to indigenous empire- 
building. Complexity of techniques may however reinforce 
the position of a central power. Payment was quite crucial 
in determining the extent of central control, as was equipment.
30 2
Where warriors depended directly on the centre for 
remuneration in cash or kind, central control could develop 
an authority structure and manipulate warriors to further 
its own policies. Where warriors equipped themselves, 
and where they were maintained not directly by the centre but 
on hereditary tenures of land, they were obviously less 
amenable to organisation and discipline. A hereditary 
warrior stratum would tend to have stable hereditary tenures, 
whether as owner or some kind of tenant, of land. Any 
other form of remuneration, such as life tenures in land or 
salaries, which were not hereditary, would entail a certain 
amount of both social and spatial mobility, and break up a 
stratum.
All the military factors cited by Andrzejewski as 
conducive to dispersion of power are also the ones that make 
for a hereditary stratum, or caste, of warriors. We have 
an almost syllogistic argument to support the hypothesis that 
caste stratification makes for a system of dispersed power.
Any region in India that has a traditional military caste 
must have dispersed or uncentralised power. Most regions are 
known to have had such castes. For those of which we are 
not certain, we cannot say they never had military castes but 
only that if they had them, they have so completely and for
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so long ceased to be warriors that even the tradition of 
their being so is lost* It would be reasonable to assume 
that the old caste societies generally had a warrior 
stratum. From this however, we cannot deduce that caste 
stratification per se goes with dispersion of power. The 
traditional warrior caste is not always identifiable in 
present-day caste societies especially where for many 
centuries such castes have taken to other occupations.
Are caste societies necessarily politically seg­
mented and warring (and by warring we would also mean 
factionalised, where conflict falls short of war)? The 
answer is yes. Members of a ruling caste share political 
power in their region, and they must do so roughly as 
equals if they are to maintain control over other castes or 
strata. The exclusive monopoly of power by one family 
would mean the removal of the checks on power provided by 
the constant opposition of like segments, and would enable 
it to manipulate the status system. The element of 
mobility so introduced would obviously be the germ of 
structural change. In fact, some manipulation of the 
status system is recorded by historians of ancient India, 
where a king could raise groups to higher caste status.
This was more manipulation within the system, of social
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personnel, but not a manipulation of the whole system,
such as would be represented by creating an administration,
or an army, completely independent of the caste system*
Such an opening up of the status system would entail the
end of caste as the exclusive indicator of status. We
might then see Indian societies as showing a tendency
throughout their history to centralise, but this tendency
was always checked because it conflicted with caste
stratification. It is no coincidence that the old
Hindu empires achieved such measure of centralisation as
they did by denying at some stage of their development
the validity of caste stratification, and that they did
not succeed in a complete centralisation insofar as the
caste structure set a limit on their policies. Both
Buddhism and Jainism were propagated by ancient and
medieval Hindu rulers who had embarked on a policy of
expansion and centralisation, and who were probably using
these for their political ends. The Mauryas, especially
1
A^oka (269 to 232 B.C.) propagated Buddhism* while Jainism
2
became "virtually the state religion" in parts of south
1. Basham, 1954* 
2 * • 9 P• 77 •
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1
India in the medieval period - up to the lbth century*
These religions have been regarded as revolts by ruling
2
warrior groups against Brahmins and Hinduism. I suggest 
that they were used by centralising monarchs to consolidate 
central control over territorial extensions, such territorial 
extension and its control from the centre representing a 
threat to the existence of hereditary ruling strata, and 
thence to the whole system of stratification, including 
its ritual evaluations, and the position of the Brahmins. 
Invariably, these attempts at centralisation failed to 
change the system of stratification, and the Hindu empires 
reverted to the original,politically fragmented system 
consistent with caste stratification.
This raises problems about the effect of caste 
systems. Does an impersonal, salaried, non-hereditary 
bureaucratic government provide an alternative mode of 
status evaluation thus weakening the ritual basis of caste, 
stratification? On the other hand, how far does caste 
stratification inhibit the working of a bureaucracy, and 
its development. A bureaucratic organisation makes 
possible effective control from a centre. In India now
1. Basham, 1954, p.XX.
2. Ibid..p.246. Basham thinks this is only partly true.
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there exists an organised, bureaucratic administration, 
controlled by the central government. According to 
the present hypothesis, political centralisation is in­
compatible with caste stratification. We need to know 
in what ways caste stratification is giving in, or 
changing, because of centralisation. Or does it persist 
and make centralisation difficult?
Appendix I
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Recipients of English pensions, as arranged from
the early nineteenth century* (Based on Logan, Vol.II, 
1887, Appendix XX, and Ayyar, 1938, Appendix II.)
The Zamorins and their dependent, or allied.chiefs:
The Zamorins of Calicut
Rupees 
1,32,163
- annas
- 4
- pi<
0
1. The Zaraorin, or chief sthanam 69,663 J 4 - 0
2. Eralpad or second sthanam 15,000 - 0 f 0
3. Munnalpad or third sthanam 7,000 - 0 - 0
4. Edattralpad or fourth sthanam 5,000 - 0 — 0
5. Nedutralpad or fifth sthanam 4,500 - 0 - 0
6* Ambadi princess, chief female sthanam 4,000 0 - 0
7. Putiya Palace, senior princess 9,000 - 0 - 0
8. Padinyare Palace, senior princess 9,000 - 0 - 0
9. Kizhakke Palace, senior princess 9,000 - 0 - 0
The Zamorin, out of his pension, had tfc pay his dependents
as follows:
1. Punattur chief, feudatory 4,994 - 8 - 0
2. Tirumanasseri1s Brahmin chief,
feudatory 1,028 - 9 - 4
3. Kutiravattattu i^ayar, a leading
military commander 982 — 0 — 0
4* Venganad Rampati, a frontier commander 859 - 0 - 0
5. Manakkulara chief, branch of Punattur 457 - 2 - 4
6* Azhuvancheri Tamprakkal, leading
Kerala Rambudiri 342 — 13 8
7. Eliyangad chief 342 — 13 8
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8 . Chittanhur chief, branch of Punattur 228 - 9 - 4
9 . Chief priest of Tirunavayi 200 - 0 - 0
10. Tamrae Panikkar, family* s military
instructor 102 - 14 — 0
L I . Kotachirakkal Adhyan 85 - 11 - 8
L2. Mangat Achan, hereditary chief minister 57 - 2 - 4
The Kurumbranad Family 5 ,824 0 0
(no sthanams mentioned)
1 . Ramamangalatta Palace male head 4 ,000 - 0 - 0
2 . Mutirakkal Palace Senior Princess 420 - 0 - 0
3 . it tt Junior Princess 180 - 0 - 0
4 . Mallisseri 11 Senior Princess 480 - 0 - 0
5 . tt it male head 600 - 0 - 0
6 . Kolapatta M Senior Princess 144 - 0 - 0
The Beypore Family 3 ,0 3 4 1 1
1 . Chief sthanam 1 ,725 - 14 - 4
2 . Second sthanam 276 - 11 - 5
3 . Third sthanam 223 - 1 - 2
4* Fourth sthanam 151 - 10 - 3
5 . Manayatt Palace Princess 142 - 13 - 0
6 . Kediyal 11 it 142 - 13 - 0
7 . Panangatt M it 142 13 - 0
8 . Putiya M tt 142 - 13 - 0
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The Parappanad Family
1. Valu Putiya Palace Chief
2. Valu Putiya Palace Princess
The Payyormala Rayars 
1# Avinyatt Rayar 
2* Kuttali Rayar
4.114 - 4 - 8
3.085 - 11 - 6 
1,028 - 9 - 2
5.825 - 1 - 0
4.085 - 4 - 2
1,766 -  12 -  10
The Kolathiris and their dependent, or allied, chiefs:
The Chirakkal (Kolatfeutri) Family 22.127 - 1 * 5
(Ro sthanams mentioned. See text, Chapter II)
1. Chief (Chirakkal Palace) 12,475 - 0 - 2
2. Tevanankott Palace male head 1,400 - 0 - 0
3* 11 11 female head 2,993 - 12 - 0
4. Kavinisseri Palace male head 1,496 - 14 - 0
5. Padinyara 11 1,496 - 14 - 0
6. Chenga 11 * w 170 - 13 - 3
7* Udayamangalam 11 ,f 11 500 - 0 - 0
The Kottayam Family 5,900 - 0 - 0
(Ro sthanams mentioned}
1. Tekka Palace male head 1,250 - 0 - 0
2. 11 11 female head 500 - 0 - 0
3« Padniyara Palace female head 1,750 - 0 - 0
4. Kishakke 11 ,f " 1,650 - 0 - 0
5* 11 11 junior prince 750 - 0 - 0
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The Kddattanad Family 26 .441 - 0 - 0
1 . Porlathiri chief sthanam 13 ,801 - 0 - 0
2 . Second sthanam 4 ,000 - 0 - 0
3 . Chief female sthanam 600 - 0 - 0
4 . Ayancheri Palace Senior Princess 4 ,020 - 0 - 0
5 . Edavalatta Palace Senior Princess 1 ,610 - 9 - 2
Kottayam's dependent: Pulavayi Nayar 1 ,610 9 2
The Iruvalinad Jtfarabiars 6 .6 9 5 14 6
1 . Kizhakedatta male head 1 ,191 - 9 - 6
2 • Mittangott female ,f 595 - 12 - 9
3 * Kampratta male ,f 791 - 9 - 6
4 . 11 female 11 400 - 0 - 0
3. Chandroth male H 315 - 0 - 0
6* ** female 11 and a male 280 - 12 - 9
7. flarangoli male head 835 - 15 - 0
8. " Ramatta branch male head 278 - 10 - 4
9. 11 Puttalatta branch male head 278 - 10 - 4
1 0 . 11 Mallisseri M female head 278 - 10 - 4
11. Kariyatt male head 724 - 10 - 0
1 2 . 11 a male member 362 - 5 - 0
1 3 . 11 a female member 362 — 5 0
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The Kurangoth Nayar
1. Putiya Vittil male head
2. 11 11 *' member
3. 11 11 two female members and a
4. Trikkeikal Cheriya, a male member 
5* Koderi madam, male head
6* Kurangoth Tale two females
7. 11 Vishnumangalam three females
Kurangoth's dependent Poyyapratta Nayar 
1. A male
2* Two females
The Valluvanad Raria
(No sthanams or palaces mentioned)
The Palghat Family
1. Chief sthanam
2. Second sthanam
3* Senior princess
4. Naduviledam, a male
5* Ilaya Achan edam, a male
6. Kizhakka Konikkal iSdam, a male
1.427 - 1 2 - 9  
350 - 3 - 2
150 -  0 - 0  
male 244 - 7 - 4  
7 5 - 1 3 - 4  
116 - 7 - 4
107 - 2 - 4  
178 -  1 - 8
155 - 9 - 7
50 -  0 - 0
16.415 - 1 - 7
18,099 - 3 - 3 
13,898 - 4 - 6
2,857 - 3 - 3 
137 - » - 3 
517 - 1 3 - 9  
517 - 13 - 9 
170 - 13 - 9
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Palghat1s dependent Nayars 3 .053
1. Kongad Nayar 1,044
2* Edattara Nayar 1,031
3. Mannur Nayar 976
Kavalappara Nayar 4.567
(independent, claimed as dependent by Zamorins)
0 - 1  
1 3 - 1  
6 — 4 
1 2 - 8
IQ...". 2
A ppendix I I
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List of principalities given to Heer van Rede on his 
assumption of duties as Comissary-General of the Dutch 
East India Company in 1694. Reproduced in full by Hamilton 
(1737), 1930 ed.
(Where the chiefdom is identifiable, the modern or 
current spelling of its name is given).
lfThe Province of Tipopo Soriwan (Tiruppappur Svarupam) can 
raise forces by its Clans, viz:
Terivancoar (Travancore) 1 ,#00,000 men
Attinga (Attingal) 30,000 it
Eleda Soriwan (Elayadath Svarupam) 50 ,000 */
Peritalie (Peritally) 3,000 tt
Seigenatie (Desinganad or Quilon) 30 ,000 tt
Teirewey (Cheravai) 15,000 it
"Odenadie Carree (Odanad):
Coilcolong (Kayarakulam)
Pana Pollie (Panappalli)
Martin Gallie (Karnnagapalli) 
Carimbalie (Kartikapalli)
Teiora Balanore Koilie 
Renbanie Aregalie 
"Rapolim (Edapilly):
Elengoly Serewan (Elangallur Svarupam)
50,000 
15,000 
15,000 
15 ,000 
3,000 
3,000
5,000 if
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"Courour Nadie (Klfururabranad) 2 
Courour Mouta Coil 
Billiatte SeTewan 
"Badecancore (Vadakkumkur)2 
Manna Tellam 
Moda Callie 
Boy Pilcore 
Kilraalle Core
15.000 men
15.000 ”
30 ,000 
3,000 
15,000 
15,000
"Perimba Daponadie (Perurapatappunad, or Cochin) 2 
Martingaly Tavil (Matattinkal Tavazhi)
Moute Tavil (Mutta Tavazhi)
Palo#mbe Tavil (Pallivirutti Tavazhi)
Teilor Tavil (Chaliyur Tavazhi)
Ela Tavil (Elaya Tavazhi) 
f,Chitawa Canaar (Chetwai coast)
Tellicherry Baakie 
Elependre May Porombo 
Dedamaadie Peneretta 
Moeterte Manka Polie 
"Perorabara Corraaar:
Arregatte Calgampolie 
Matins lie Madonie
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
15,000
tt
If
It
It
It
tt
tt
15,000
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"Bambellendada (Vempalinad):
Kilpolie Chitway 75,000
Martingallie Coer 37,000
Tekellenore (Tekkumkur?) 37,000
Doenjatte Penmaal (Punjar Perumal) 3,000
"Cottenadie (Kuttanad)
Zembaga Cherry (Purakkad) 30,000
"Tesegidin Genatie (Desinganad or Quilon):
Elertecore 10,000
Moutere Coree 10,000
Ambada Coree 10,000
"Tesieragatta Nadie (Cheragattanad?J:
Teiragalle Cayraaal 15,000
Padanarie erte Caymaal 8,000
"Pindereretol lMaae:
Pindereretol ixambi Deri (a jNambudiri) 15,000
Coil Pade 1,000
!tMangela Kade (Alangad):
Belatte Tavil (Veluta Tavazhi) 10,000
Carata Tavil (Karuta Tavazhi) 15,000
,fNambouries or Priests:
Bay Pinade 6,000
Aaron Ade 2,000
Merinade Nambouri 3,000
men
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"Randeretti Rade:
Coro Seir Caymal (Codachery Kaimal) 30,000 men
Cories Caymal (Coratty Kaimal) 5,000 ,f
Siangrande Caymal (Changaracodda Kaimal) 5,000 11
Panna Maketts Caymal (Panamukattu Kaimal) 3,000 11
"Tollapoli Rade (Talapilly):
Amacotta ftambedi (Ayinikuttu Nambidi) 15,000 M
Manacotta Narabedi (Manakkulam JMambidi) 15,000 M
Cacatte Rambedi (Kakkat Eambidi) 15,000 M
Tistul Nambedi 15,000 M
Terratekin Nair 15,000 11
!,Nambiar, or Priests of the Second Order:
Relolaste Nambiar 3,000 !*
Relo Canadarie 30,000 "
ffEranaden Caree (Ernad or ZamoriJas):
Caunal Canadrie (Kunnalakonthiri or Zamorin) 40,000 11
Rete Coil 5,000 11
Paro Pachoil (Parappanad) 3,000 11
Ropo Coil (Beypore) 2,000 11
lfTomera Serinade (Tamarasserinad):
Aya Nade 20,000 !f
Payanade 15,000 11
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"Iregale Nade (Iruvalinad), a Priest of the
1
first Order
"Candette Nayer
!lOrnnitrie (Unnithiri?)
°Palangier (Pazhayancheri) Rayer
"Mangalacka
"Dana Seir Ilerda
"Ramenatte Corie
"Polletti i\;ade:
Callistree Odirose Coilan (Kolathiri, of 
Udayamangalam Kovilakam
Palle Coilan Ziereck Coilan (Palli and 
Chirakkal Kovilakams)
Ballanore Burgary (Kadattanad)
Tellicherry Mota EaiYfe
Zitre Caymal Mar
Alerte Tere Caymal
Alarte Rade Adovodie
Paravia Coil (Puravalya Kovilakam of
Kottayam)
"Bayella ftade
Mangalette Eaire 
Manetane Naire 
Callepatte Raire 
Teyka Patte Raire 
Motrel Raire
3 ,000 men 
10,000 M 
10,000 "
3,000 "
3,000 " 
10,000 ” 
15,000 1
23,000 1
30,000 M
15,000 "
30,000 11
30,000 "
15,000 1
60,000 1
1,000 ”
1,000 11
1,000 "
1,000 11
3,000 1
1* Iruvalanid was actually under Rambiar chiefs, who are 
high Nayars, and not Brahmins*
b ib l io g r a p h y
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